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Revenue Commissioners or the Exchequer that is the

victim but the general body of taxpayers who because of

the avoidance action of the well-to-do are left carrying

a larger burden themselves. The State has a clear ob-

ligation to counter tax avoidance activities.

It is the case of

Clinch v the Inland Revenue

Com-

missioners,

1973.

All

England

Reports,

Page

977.

the plaintiff asked the Court to rule that a notice

served on him was invalid and one of the questions

addressed to itself by the Court was: Has the plaintiff

established that the Commissioners have exercised their

discretion unreasonably? The Inland Revenue contend-

ed that the notice could only be attacked for unreason-

ableness if the degree of unreasonableness was such

that no reasonable person could consider the notice

necessary for the purposes of the Act. The plaintiff con-

tended that the Court was entitled to interfere if it

could be shown that, viewed objectively, the authority

were acting unreasonably, albeit that they were acting

within the four corners of the authority conferred on

them. In the course of the judgment, the Judge

said: "The particulars are sought of the intermediary in

order that he may be used as a stepping stone towards

obtaining the more detailed information required by the

Commissioners to enable them to decide whether or

not, in their opinion, tax has been unlawfully evaded.

The information which they require is such as to give

them a shrewd idea of the relationship between a tax-

payer and a foreign company, partnership, trust or

settlement. Accordingly, if the particulars sought went

substantially beyond that which was required for this

purpose so that they could be properly described as

unduly oppressive or burdensome, I have no doubt that

a Court would be entitled to intervene and declare

the notice invalid. One of the vital functions of the

Courts is to protect the individual from any abuse of

power by the executive."

In the event, the judge held in favour of the

Inland Revenue. This would be similar to the kind

of instance that could arise if the Revenue Commission-

ers used the powers given to them under the 1974 Act.

Those powers may only be reasonably used and if a

taxpayer, or a person to whom the notice is addressed,

is of opinion that they are being unreasonably used,

then a right exists to take the matter before the Courts

to see if the Courts would have a different view. It is,

therefore, clear that the Revenue Commissioners in

acting under this section and in looking for the infor-

mation will do so when they think it necessary. I have

no reason to anticipate that the Revenue Commission-

ers will act unreasonably. In fact, the law assumes that

the State and its agents will act in a reasonable way in

using any powers given to them. One does not need to

use the words that Deputy Colley suggests in his am-

endment in order to ensure that reasonableness will at

all times prevail so far as the conduct of this State is

concerned.

Mr. Colley:

May I ask the Minister in regard to the

case he quoted whether the relevant portion of the

English Act was similar to this? Does it contain the

phrase: "such particulars as they think necessary"?

That was the phrase in question.

Mr. R. Ryan: Yes.

Mr.Colley:

What the Minister has said in regard

to a requirement that the Revenue Commissioners

would not act unreasonably in general, is true

With all due respect, that, is not really the point of this

amendment

which

is

that

if

you

have

the

phrase:

"such particulars

as they

think

nec-

essary" and if the Court is asked to interpret

whether the Commissioners acted reasonably or not,

the Court will establish a certain level of responsibility

which I suggest would be different from what would

be established if the section were to read: "such partic-

ulars as they reasonably require". There is a slight

difference in the meaning and I think there would be

a difference in the interpretation by the Courts arising

out of these words. Therefore, he should not have any

difficulty in agreeing that the phrase "they reasonably

require" be inserted. If I understood him correctly ear-

lier he was saying in effect that it does not make any

difference whether you put in "reasonably require" or

"they think necessary", that you get the same stan-

dards applied by the Courts.

That does not inhibit the Revenue Commissioners

in any way in carrying out their duties under this pari

of the Act. It should meet the requirements of anybody

in the House that the Courts would not interpret it in

a way that would hinder the Revenue Commissioners

but it does establish some criterion, some level on which

an aggrieved taxpayer can stand and can apply to the

Court and get a greater degree of protection than is

implied in replying on the general obligation of the

Revenue Commissioners to act reasonably and within

reason. On the other hand, if his argument is

that it makes no difference, I suggest he might ac-

cept it anyway because he is not losing anything.

— Debate adjourned —

(continued on page 191)

Appointments

The Hon. Mr. Justice Walsh has been nominated

as President of the Law Commission for a

period of 5 years from 1st August, 1975.

The other members of the Law Commission

are:— Mr. Justice Charles Conroy, President

of the Circuit Court, Professor Robert F.

Houston, Dean of the Faculty of Law, Trin-

ity College, Mr. Martin Marren, solicitor, and

Mrs. Helen Burke, Department of Social

Science, UCD.

Mr. John O. Sweetman, Barrister-at-law, has been

nominated to the Land Registration Rules

Committee by the Bar Council in place of

Miss Agnes B. Cassidy, who has become a

District Justice.

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