185 / 336
The plaintiffs then issued a plenary summons against
the Council and the Minister claiming declarations that
the permission of October, 1969, was a valid and sub-
sisting permission and the Council was not entitled to
derogate from it. The Minister in his defence stated
that he was lawfully entitled to decide the matter. The
plaintiffs contend that any change in the structure does
not amount to "development". Pringle J. decided in
favour of the plaintiff, because the grant of permission
did not specify the purpose for which the structures
were granted, therefore the plaintiffs could use them
for the purpose for which they were designed.
In the application, what was clearly meant was that
the one plant was to be demolished because of dilapi-
dation, and that a new modern plant was to be erected
'n its place. The intention was to grant permission for
a replacement of the existing plant for the carrying out
of the production of concrete blocks but in a modernised
fashion; this did not mean the substitution of an entire-
ly new plant, and for the new process of manufactur-
ing readymix concrete. "Development" means the carry-
ing out of any work on or under land, or the making
of any material change inthe structure of the land.
Here a question has to be answered as to whether or
not the new structures are or are not "development",
and the matter must be referred to the Minister.
FitzGerald C. J. and Budd J. would accordingly
allow the appeal, and dismiss the plaintiff's claim.
Griffin J.
concurred in allowing the appeal. He
said there were certain additional facts which were
material. 6 years before the sale, James McGurk open-
ed another plant in a site of 16 acres at Baldonnell.
From the time the bulk of his business was done in
Baldonnell, and some days there was no work at Black-
rock, he was prepared to sell it for £20,000 for a valu-
able site. The business carried on by McGurk was that
of a conventional concrete plant. All the processes of
manufacture were at that time completed on the site.
However the process intended to be carried on by the
plaintiffs was completely different. The new plant has
a large output, and the cement is delivered to the site
in large bulk containers of 20 tons each; in fact a large
truck moves into or out of the site every 10 minutes for
10 hours a day. The usetowhich the land had been put
was in fact a material change in the use of the land
which has been properly referred to the Minister.
Wh e n any development is proposed, it is essential
that the proposal should be brought in unambigious
terms to the residents of the neighbourhood. Any person
can then inspect the document, and, if dissatisfied, ap-
peal to the Minister. The press notice in this case did
not give adequate notice of the extent and nature of
the development required, as the words "readymix
plant" are carefully omitted. Th e County Council had
not the proper particulars on which to act. The grant of
Permission specified the purpose for which the structures
Were to be used as the existing ones of a concrete plant
and not of a readymix plant. The question whether the
plaintiffs have made a change in the use of the struct-
ures of the land is essentially one that was properly
referred to the Minister.
Henchy J.
a nd
Walsh J.
would have dismissed the
appeal. Wh en McGurk made his application for per-
mission to modernise the plant he was making concrete
blocks and bricks. It was not stated that McGurk had
executed an agreement with the plaintiffs granting them
an option to purchase the premises for £20,000. The in-
tention was that, as soon as development permission
was granted the plaintiffs would exercise their option
to purchase, and would then become free to use the
development permission for the distribution by lorry
from the site of "readymix" concrete. Thus McGurk
was in fact only an ostensible applicant. The plain-
tiffs then took up their option, and the property was
conveyed to them. They then carried out the permit-
ted modernisaton and distributed readymix concrete.
Neighbouring occupiers complained that the use of
the site for this purpose was not within the scope of
the permission granted. In an effort to resolve the dis-
put, the defendant Council referred the matter to the
Minister.
There is no doubt but that the "replacement plant"
in the application came within the definition of "devel-
opment" and so required Ministerial permission. In this
case, as the permission incorporated by reference also
the plans, the decision of the County Council must
also be notified by reference to the plans. Every noti-
fied permission has to be entered on an official Register,
and anyone who acts on the basis of the correctness
of the Register is entitled to do so. Since the permission
is a public document, it must be construed objectively.
The submission by the Council that this permission
is to be construed as having the meaning given to it by
the Council, is rejected, as this would not be objective.
Th e use for which the structure is here designed must
be determined by an ordinary reading of the applicat-
ion, plans, etc. The permission duly specified a pur-
pose for which the structure was to be used, i.e. the
production of concrete. In other words the permission
did specify a purpose. The ultimate use by the plain-
tiffs of the plant for the production of readymix con-
crete is within the permission granted.
In this case permission has been granted by the plan-
ning authority to an extent not intended by them. Per-
tinent enquiries by the Council here would have
brought to light the specific use to which the structures
were to be put. This type of non-disclosure is easily
avoidable by planning authorities.
Finally it is desirable that a permission should be
clear and specific in its terms, and as far as possible
self-contained, so as not to incorporate unnecessary
documents.
Accordingly the majority of the Supreme Court held
that the appeal should be allowed and the injunction
granted by Pringle J. should be disallowed.
(Readymix (Eire) Ltd. v Dublin County Coun-
cil and Minister for Local Government — Sup-
reme Court—separate judgments by Budd J. and
Griffin J., and dissenting judgment by Henchy J.
— unreported —30 July, 1974).
181