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The Waterford Courthouse is a notable architectural
building in Waterford. However the cumulative effects
of age, neglect and inadequate repair progressed to the
stage where the building became structurally unsound
and dangerous. Since October 1970, different High
Court Judges on Circuit had refused to sit in Waterford
Courthouse. Since November 1972 an order has been
made excluding Waterford City from the sittings of
the South Eastern Circuit. The Waterford Law Society
(hereinafter called the Society), consisting of the sol-
icitors of Waterford city and county, expressed concern
at the stete of the Courthouse, and a lengthy correspon-
dance ensued. Eventually the Society requested the
Misister for Justice to exercise his statutory powers
under the Courthouse Act 1935.
On 20 January 1972, the Minister reminded Water-
ford Corporation of their duty, under Section 3 of the
1935 Act, of providing proper courthouse accommodat-
ion and expressed serious concern that adequate court-
house accommodation had not yet been provided. As a
temporary expedient the Corporation decided to ac-
quire and adopt as a courthouse the Quaker's Hall in
O'Connell Street. The District Court resumed its sit-
tings in that building in October 1973, and the Circuit
Court has sat there since July 1974. 10 local solicitors
gave evidence that the courthouse accommodation at
Quaker's Hall is quite inadequate and unsuitable as
the courtroom is small and ill-ventilated. There is hard-
ly any accommodation for litigants wotnesses, jurors
and practitioners. Facilities for consultation were non-
existant.
In
Byrne v
Ireland-(1972)
I. R. 241-the old British
theory of Crown Immunity had been disguarded, and it
was thus not possible to contend, as had been done in
the Courts before 1972, that the writ of mandamus did
not lie against a Minister. Accordingly the prosecutors
are entitled to have their order of
mandamus
made ab-
solute. The operaition of repairing the courthouse will
however be suspended for three months.
The State (King and Golf) v The Minister for
Justice —Doyle J. — unreported, May, 1975.
If owners of an unseaworthy boat, who are aware
of this condition, take it out to sea with passen-
gers, and the passengers are subsequently drown-
ed, they alone, and not the manufacturers of the
boat, are deemed negligent.
The facts of this case have been fully set out in the
April 1973 Gazette at page 88. It will be recalled that
Pringle J. on 2 October, 1972 held that the effective
cause of the accident at New Quay in June 1969, in
which an overloaded boat sank, was precisely because
it was overloaded, and not from any defect in the con-
struction of the boat. The English Company, Fairways
Fabrication, had built the boat, and the first defendants
appealed on the grounds that Fairways were held not
to be bound to make any indemnity or contribution, as
they were not deemed to be "concurrent wrongdoers"
under the Civil Liability Act 1961. Earlier that day,
toe vessel had put to sea for the fifth time, and, in
the course of the trial, water had poured on the decks.
The owner of the ship, one of the first defendants, had
forbidden the ship to be taken out. Despite this, within
an hour, one of the ship's officers agreed to take some
50 local boys and girls out for a trip; the boat was then
dangerously overloaded, and, when the children pan-
icked, the boat capsized and many of them were drown-
ed. If Fairways were negligent in sending forth an un-
seaworthy boat, the negligence must be such as to have
caused an unknown and hidden defect. In the afore-
mentioned circumstances, the defendants, by proceeding
to sea with passengers, wh en they knew the boat was
unseaworthy, decided to supplant Fairway as tortfeasor
in the Court of an accident. The direct and proximate
cause of this accident was the decision of the first de-
fendants to put to sea with passengers, when they had
a clear warning that the boat was unfit for the task.
Th e appeal is accordingly unanimously dismissed by
the Supreme Court.
Conole v (1) Redbank Oyster Co. and Stassen;
(2) Fairways Fabrication Ltd.; and (S) Bord
Iascaigh Mhara — Supreme Court (Walsh, Budd
and Henchy, J. J.) per Henchy J.—unreported—7
May, 1975.
Exclusion of priest-teachers from receiving
credit for service abroad held to be unconstitut-
ional discrimination.
The facts of this case were stated in the May 1974
Gazette at page 118. Butler J. had held to be uncon-
stitutional a Department rule which excluded religious
teachers from receiving credit for teaching service in
undeveloped countries. By the Rules for Payment of
saleries to Secondary Teachers 1958, it was agreed that
"approved teaching service" would include credit for
teaching service given by a lay secondary teacher in
specified underdeveloped countries. Father Mulloy, hav-
ing taught in a secondary school in Nigeria from 1960
to 1965, returned to Ireland, and since 1968, has been
a teacher in Templeogue College.
In May 1971, the plaintiffs solicitor wrote to the
Department claiming to be entitled to an incremental
salary for his service in Africa, pointing out that it
would be an obvious unconstitutional discrimination
not to grant it. In July 1971 the Department blandly
"did not accept rs valid" this vital constitutional issue.
Furthermore in February 1972, the Chief State Solic-
itor purported to construe the Constitution by stating
that "the scheme does not extend fb religious mission-
aries".
Although the plaintiff had issued proceedings claim-
ing that the defendants had acted in breach of Art 40
(1) and Art. 40 (3) of the Constitution, this was not
pursued at the appeal. The plaintiff relied entirely on
Art 44 (2) (3) of the Constitution which reads as fol-
l o w s :— "The State shall not impose any disabilities
or make any discrimination on the grounds of religious
belief, profession or status". As religious profession or
belief does not arise here, the question of religious
status must be considered.
Quinn's Supermarket
case—
(1972) I. R. 1 — i s not relevant here as it wrs decid-
ed on different grounds. The reference to religious
status ensures that no matter what one's religious pro-
fession or belief or status, the State shall not impose
177