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Payments made by wife towards purchase of a
house or repayment of a mortgage are on the
same basis as a trust, and she is entitled to a
share in the house as a trust beneficiary accord-
ing to her contributions, even though the house
is nominally in the husband's name.
The defendant husband, Brendan Conway, and the
plaintiff wife, Winifred Brady, were married in April,
1961. They lived at first in a flat in Rathgar, but in
October, 1963, purchased a house in Killester for £2,200.
The husband was then a barman earning £7 a
week, and had no savings; he paid a deposit of £220.
The wife had inherited £242 on the death of her
father, and her mother provided her with more money.
She gave these sums to her husband so that he could
pay the deposit. The husband had also obtained an
advance of £2,005 from the Irish Permanent Building
Society, and this enabled him to close the sale and take
possession. Despite the financial advances made by
the wife, the documents of title were entered in the
name of the husband only.
This mortgage of £2005 was repayable over 30 years
by monthly instalments of £13.65. The husband was
unable to pay the instalments regularly but, on seven
different occasions, the plaintiff obtained £100 from
her mother and brother, who were living in England
iin order to pay these instalments. The total amount
contributed by the wife towards the purchase of the
house was £1,027.
There were 5 children of the marriage — 4 daugh-
ters and 1 son — born between 1961 and 1971; the
eldest daughter died in 1970 at the age of 9. The hus-
band remained a barman until 1968, when he began
to work as a self-employed electrician earning £35 per
week. From February, 1972, he was employed by a
company until May, 1974, as an electrician, earning
£39 per week and expenses. In the evenings, he
worked as a part-time barman in Ballsbridge, and
earned £1,306 between May, 1973 and November,
1974. From June to November, 1974, he registered
for unemployment benefit and obtained £30.85 per
week.
The marriage was reasonably happy until 1967,
when the husband used to often come home late drunk.
In 1971, conditions were so bad that the wife went
to reside with her mother in Yorkshire for 10 months.
The husband promised to give up drink, if the wife
returned, and conducted himself reasonably for a short
time. But then he began to drink again, and would
only give his wife £13 per week out of the £50 he earn-
ed. From 1973, he locked the largest room in the house,
turned off the electricity, and disconnected the tele-
phone. He then used to play a guitar very loudly with
his sister in the locked room while they both drank.
There were many assaults and quarrels and Guards
were sent for numerous times. From October, 1974,
the husband left the house, and went to live elsewhere.
The wife is now drawing home assistance, and has
ceased to pay the instalments on the house.
In July, 1973, the wife brought proceedings under
the Married Women's Status Act 1957, claiming that
she was entitled to possession of the house in equal
shares with her husband. She also brought proceed-
ings claiming custody of the children and payment for
their maintenance. Ultimately the two cases were heard
together in November, 1974.
The correct approach to this case is to apply the con-
cept of
a
Trust to the legal relationship which arises
when a wife makes payment towards the purchase of
a house or the repayment of a mortgage instalments
when the house is in the sole name of the husband.
Wh en this is done, the husband becomes a trustee for
the wife for a share of the house, which depends on
the amount of contributions the wife has made towards
the purchase of the house or the repayment of the
mortgage. As the cost of the house in 1961 was £2,200,
and as the wife paid £1,027 in 1962, it was held that
a declaration would be made, that the husband holds
the premises as to one half of the beneficial interest
therein in trust for his wife. As there is ample evidence
that the children are frightened of the husband, their
custody is awarded to the wife. Special detailed ar-
rangements as to the payments to be made by the
husband were set out. As the husband has made no ap-
plication for access to the children, this will not be
granted until he renews his application later.
Winifred Conway v Brendan Conway — Kenny
J. — unreported — 3 June, 1975.
A planning application in the press must state
the purpose unambiguously and accurately, other-
wise the County Council are entitled to be re-
ferred to the Minister as to whether the applic-
ation is a development.
Before 1969, James McGurk owned a site on New-
town Park, Blackrock, where he owned a plant for mak-
ing concrete blocks and some readymix concrete. By a
written agreement of 4th June, 1969, the plaintiffs
acquired an option to purchase the area. On 28th June
there was a planning notice in the press on behalf of
McGurk which sought for replacement of this concrete
plant, and an application for planning permission was
also made at that time. The existing plant erected 30
years previously consisted mainly of a concrete mixer
with cement pits, and was 15 feet from the main road.
It was proposed to remove the old plant, and to erect
instead a modern plant 120 feet from the road. The
planning application of McGurk had in fact been
drafted by an engineer, McNurney, and the plans in-
volved the sites of the proposed new structures. Plan-
ning permission was eventually granted by the defendan
t
County Council on 29th August 1969, subject to re-
placement of existing concrete plant. Mr. McGurk re-
ceived notification of this permission on 9 October 1969.
Later the plaintiffs purchased the land, and the site
was conveyed to them on 12 December 1969.
As a result of two letters written by the plaintiffs
to the defendant Council in January 1970, the planning
authority notified the plaintiffs that the operations de-
scribed constituted a change of use in development, and
consequently they requested the Minister to decide
whether the proposed change was deemed to be "de-
velopment" or "exempted development". In January, the
Minister confirmed by letter-that the matter had been
referred to him.
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