GAZETTE
NOVEMBER 1991
1988 upholding the High Court
decision of Blayney J. and the
arbitrator's award was delivered by
McCarthy J. He concluded with
lines which are often quoted by
judges, practitioners and students:
"Arbitration is a significant feature
of modern commercial life;.
.
.
the
field of international arbitration is
an ever expanding one.
It ill
becomes the Courts to interfere in
such a process;
if policy considera-
tions are appropriate, as I believe
they are in matters of this kind,
then
every such
consideration
points to the desirability of making
an award final in every sense of the
term."
In
Keenan -v- Shield,
the insurance
company repudiated liability on the
basis of alleged misrepresentation
of fact and non-disclosure of
information. The arbitrator's award
found against the insurer on those
allegations but decided that the
insured was not entitled to recover
under the policy. Challenges to the
award failed in the High Court and
on appeal to the Supreme Court.
McCarthy J. in his judgment also
made the following points:
(1) It was t oo late for the
arbitrator to state a case under s.35
of the 1954 Act after he had made
his award and became
functus
officio.
(The case-stated procedure
has in general not been abused in
the Irish jurisdiction. In England &
Wales, which have Arbitration Acts
d i f f erent f rom Scotland and
Northern Ireland, a restricted
appeal system has replaced the
case-stated procedure).
(2) At common law, the Court can
either remit or set aside an award
if there is an error on its face. Policy
considerations point to the
desirability of making an arbitration
award final in every sense of the
term. Therefore, McCarthy J. did
not approve of courts fine-combing
an award unless it showed on its
face an error of law so fundamental
that the courts could not stand
aside and allow it to remain
unchallenged.
Keenan -v- Shield
was not such a case. The learned
judge was critical of fine-combing
by Costello J. in a previous case
Church & General Insurance -v-
Connolly & anor.
6
Comment
The jurisdiction to set an award
aside because of an error of law on
its face is often criticised as
anomalous.
9
It was abolished in
the English Arbitration Act, 1979
which also introduced (a) a new
appeal procedure with specific
restrictions, (b) statutory recognit-
ion of parties' rights to reasoned
awards. There is a strong case for
similar reforms in Irish law so that
arbitrators in line with international
trends may give reasons for awards
without perceived fears of undue
court interference.
In
McStay
-v-
Assicurazione
Genera/i & Maguire,
10
known as
the
McStay case,
the Supreme
Court in November, 1990 upheld
the arbitrator's award and dis-
missed the p l a i n t i f f 's appeal
against a High Court challenge to
the award. This was also an
insurance case. The plaintiff/
appellant, John McStay as receiver
of Hotel Holyrood Ltd. pleaded
inter
alia
in the High Court for an order
remitting to the second defendant,
Peter Maguire SC, for reconsidera-
tion part of his award in which the
arbitrator had decided that he had
no jurisdiction to award interest for
the period
prior
to the award.
Chief Justice Finlay's judgment in
McStay
endorsed the arbitral
process and made the following
points:
(1) A fundamental ingredient of
arbitration as contained in the
common law is the finality of the
arbitrator's decision subject to cer-
tain qualifications and precautions.
Parties acknowledge when agree-
ing to refer a particular question in
dispute to an arbitrator's decision,
that they have abandoned their
right to litigate that precise
question.
(2) Exceptions to the finality as
outlined at (1) above arise at
common law and in statutory
provisions:
(a) The arbitrator has power to
state any question of law arising
in course of a reference or
award, as a special case for the
High Court's decision. The Court
may, on application, direct an
arbitrator to state such a case -
s.35, 1954 Act.
(b) The Court may remove an
arbitrator for misconduct -
s.37, 1965 Act.
(c) The Court may set aside an
award where an arbitrator has
misconducted himself or an
award has been improperly
obtained - s.38, 1954 Act.
(d) The Court may revoke an
arbitrator's power because he
may be partial.
(e) At common law, where an
arbitrator decides a question of
law
where that precise question
has not been referred to him for
decision,
the Court may intervene
in its discretion and in particular
cases where the decision is
clearly wrong on its face by re-
mitting the matter to the arbi-
trator in the interests of justice.
The Chief Justice emphasised in
McStay
that a decision made by an
arbitrator on a specific point of law
referred to him for decision, was
not covered by any of the
exceptions listed above even if the
award appears on its face to be
erroneous.
Finlay C.J. referred to an
English case
Abso/om -v- Great
Western London Garden Village
Society
:
11
Lord Russell of Killowen
succinctly set out the law:
" I t is essential to keep the case
where disputes are referred to an
arbitrator in the decision of which
a question of law becomes mater
ial, distinct from the case where a
specific question of law has been
referred to him for decision . . . The
authorities make a clear distinction
between the two cases . . . in the
former case the Court can interfere
if and when any error of law
appears on the face of the award,
but in the latter case no such
interference is possible . . . "
362