GAZETTE
JANUARY/FEBRUARY 1991
obtains only special property in the
goods, general property passing
directly to the buyer once the docu-
ments are forwarded to the bank by
the seller:
Sewe/I -v- Burdick.
17
Therefore banks dealing in
commercial credits are unable to
rely on Section 1 of the Bills of
Lading Act 1855 to ground an
action against a carrier.
The requirement as t o a Bill of
Lading
Section 1 of the Bills of Lading Act
1855 is restricted to transactions
involving a bill of lading and no
other document will suffice such as
a ship's delivery order. In particular
this would be the case where part
of a bulk was being purchased,
where the purchaser will at best
have a delivery order and some-
times no documents at all.
Con t r ac ts imp l i ed at c ommon
l aw
Parties not covered by Section 1 of
the Bills of Lading Act 1855 must
rely on the common law to imply a
contractual relationship between
the carrier and themselves. This
implication will arise where a bill of
lading or ship's delivery order is
presented and the goods are
delivered on foot of it. The implica-
tion is that there is a contract on
the terms contained in the docu-
ment, be it a bill of lading or a ship's
delivery order.
The leading case in this area is
Brandt -v- Liverpool, Brazil & River
Plate S.N.
18
In that case goods
were shipped damaged but the
shipowner nevertheless issued a bill
of lading stating that they were
shipped in apparent good order and
condition. Subsequently, the cargo
had to be unloaded
and
reconditioned, at a cost of £748
and reshipped on another vessel,
being f o rwa r ded late to its
destinatiaon. The bill of lading was
indorsed in favour of the plaintiff
pledgee (a bank), who advanced
money on it in good faith. When the
second vessel arrived at its
destination, the indorsees pre-
sented the bill of lading, paid the
freight and, under protest, the sum
of £748, which the shipowners
demanded, and took delivery of the
cargo. The indorsee bank sued the
shipowners for damages due to
delay (the general value of the
cargo having fallen) and repayment
of the £748. It was held that while
they had no grounds under Section
1 of the Bills of Lading Act 1855,
the acts of presenting the bill of
lading, payment of freight and the
delivery of the cargo, gave rise to
an implied contract between the
indorsee and the shipowners.
While the point has not been
judically considered in Ireland,
con t r ac ts have been implied
between parties originally outside
the bargain (see
Fox -v- Higgins
19
)
and there is no apparent reason
why the doctrine in
Brandt -v-
Liverpool
would not be followed.
In all the cases in which the
doctrine has been successfully
relied on by a receiver of a cargo,
he has paid the freight or de-
murrage and this is the considera-
tion for the implied contract.
However, the consideration for the
implied contract need not be of a
financial nature. The mere pre-
sentation of the bill of lading can be
sufficient consideration for the new
con t r ac t
2 0
since its delivery
relieves the carrier from further
obligations regarding the goods and
therefore confers an advantage on
him and amounts to good con-
sideration. Irish courts would
accept this proposition provided
the consideration was sufficient. In
Kennedy -v- Kennedy,
Ellis J
summarised the position in the
following terms:
"once there is consideration, its
adequacy . . . is irrelevant to its
validity and enforceability"
21
The doctrine in
Brandt -v-
Liverpool
does not depend on the
transfer of the bill of lading, or on
the passing of property, and so
avoids the difficulties inherent in
bulk consignments.
In the case of
Peter Cremer,
Westfaelische Central SA; The Dona
Man
22
it was held that the fact that
property did not pass would not
prevent the principle in
Brandt -v-
Liverpool
from operating and that a
contract will be implied where the
purchaser presents a ship's delivery
order and not a bill of lading. How-
ever, if the delivery order is not
issued by the shipowner no contract
will be implied.
23
Where, as in
Brandt -v- Liverpool
the damage occurs before ship-
ment, the basis of the shipowner's
liability is that he is estopped from
so pleading, because he has issued
a clean bill of lading. Since the
statements in the bill of lading or
ship's delivery orders are not con-
O F F I C E S TO L E T
Dame Hse/St
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sq.ft. to 1,430
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tractual promises by the carrier
24
it
is essential that an indorsee relies
to his detriment on such repre-
sentations in order to bind the
carrier in estoppel. The absence of
reliance is fatal.
25
The necessity of
reliance in the doctrine of estoppel
is established in Irish case law (see
for example
McCambridge
-v-
Winters
26
).
The doctrine in
Brandt -v-
Liverpool
is, however, subject to
certain limitations. Firstly the
contract is implied on delivery of
the cargo so obviously it has no
application where goods are totally
lost at sea and, secondly, the
principle does not operate where
the documents are not issued by
the ship's owners.
Terms of Imp l i ed con t r ec ts bet-
ween buyer and carrier
Where a con t r act is implied
between a purchaser and the
carrier the terms are those set out
in the bill of lading or delivery order.
This is not the case between the
shipper and the carrier, since in that
case the terms will be contained in
the contract of carriage which will
have been negotiated prior to
loading. Thus, where the bill of
lading or the delivery order do not
contain the same terms as the
contract of carriage, the bill of
lading or the delivery order will
prevail as the terms of the implied
contract.
A difficulty arises where an
indorsee of the bill of lading is also
the charterer of the ship. The
problem that arises in such a
situation is which contract is to
prevail, the charterparty contract or
the bill of lading contract. Since the
charterparty will invariably have
been made before the bill of lading
is indorsed to the charterer it is
logical that it should prevail in this
instance.
27
This will not be the
case, however, with subsequent
purchasers as they will not have
been party to the original contract
and will not normally have notice of
its terms
28
and therefore these
terms would not form part of the
contract.
27




