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INTRODUCTION

On 11

th

December 2005 one of the largest explosions in peace time Britain occurred

as a result of overfilling a gasoline storage tank at the Buncefield depot of the

Hertfordshire Oil Storage Ltd. The explosion measured 2.4 on the Richter Scale, the

smoke cloud being visible from space. Fortunately, the incident did not result any any

fatalities, however there were over 40 casualties, 2 of which were serious. The

resulting damage to local property was significant and the storage facility itself was all

but destroyed.

Following the incident and in parallel to the judicial enquiries, the Major Accident

Investigation Board (MIIB) published a report making recommendations on emergency

preparedness, response and recovery for the oil storage sector. In addition, the

Buncefield Standard Task Group (BSTG), being the joint Competent Authority /

industry standards working group was set up to review safety and environmental

protection standards at fuel storage sites following the Buncefield incident.

In July 2007 the BSTG final report was published, I was part of the BSTG working

group involved with LOPA and Safety Instrumented Systems.

Following the publication of the BSTG report a second industry / regulator group,

Process Safety Leadership Group (PSLG) was formed with the purpose of developing

the work produced by the BSTG and providing guidance for the sector in relationship

to complying with all of the recommendation produced by the MIIB.

I continued as a part of the PSLG, again in the capacity of assisting in the development

of LOPA and Safety instrumented System guidance.

Following the publication of the BSTG report, industry and the regulator felt that the

LOPA contained in Appendix 1, a simple order of magnitude example, lacked sufficient

complexity and detail. It was therefore a term of reference to the working group that a

more detailed example should be developed and guidance produced for the PSLG

guidance. The output of this work is Part 1 and Appendix 2 of the PSLG final report

published in 2009. ISBN 978 0 7176 6386 6.

PSLG set up several working groups, working group 3 (WG3) – Control &

Instrumentation was to produce guidance on LOPA and Safety Instrumented Systems.

A sub-group of WG3, the LOPA sub-group was formed and the group decided that an

effective way forward in producing guidance, would be to perform a LOPA at a UK

storage facility. This would allow the work of the sub-group to be validated in a true

environment.

For my part within the sub-group, I was to liaise with the terminal and chair the LOPA

site meetings, together with producing the LOPA calculations and results, together

with presenting the findings to the full working group.