223 / 324
made absolute to attach the sum of £203 45. .6d.
to answer their judgment and order.
It was held by Judge Conroy, in discharging the
conditional order, that the solicitor's equitable
lien was prior in time to the debt of the judgment
creditor. This point was well covered by authority
and was indeed only right in common sense and
justice.
(Temple Press Ltd.
v.
Blogh (1955-56), Ir. Jur.
Rep. 53).
Mortgage—Tenancy purported to be created by mortgagor
before completing purchase.
While negotiating for the purchase of a house'
the title to which was registered under the Land
Registration Act, 1925, the intending purchaser
received two sums of money from C., the first
expressed to be in respect of advance rent for a
flat in the house and the second to be the balance
of three years' rent in advance for the flat, the
tenancy to commence after the conversion of the
house into flats, the rent to be weekly, and should
C. vacate the flat on one week's notice any balance
of the rent to be refunded. On the day the sale
was completed the purchaser executed a charge
in Land Registry form and the transfer and charge
were duly registered. C. was let into possession
a few days after completion of the sale. Is the
plaintiff chargee entitled to possession as against
C. within 28 days from completion of the order ?
Yes, said Harman, J. The arrangement with C.
was made before the purchaser had any title to
the property, and there was nothing to operate
as an estoppel as against the chargee. As against
him C. was merely an occupier on sufferance. Even
if C. was entitled to a tenancy as against the pur
chaser, the tenancy would not have been a valid
exercise of the power of leasing conferred by Sect.
99 of the Law of Property Act, 1925, since the
tenancy was not granted at a rent and the payments
were fines within sect. 205 (i) (xxiii) of the Act.
NOTE :
Sect. 99 of the Law of Property Act 1925
replaces Sect. 18 (6) of the Conveyancing Act 1881 ;
which states that " every lease shall reserve the
best rent that can reasonably be obtained . . . without
any fine being taken" Section 205 of the 1925
Act is a Section dealing with definitions, and
the word defined is " fine " as including a premium
or foregift. In Sect. 2 (ix) of the Conveyancing
Act 1881, "fine" is also stated to "include a
premium or fore-gift, or any payment, considera
tion, or benefit in the nature of a fine, premium
or fore-gift."
(Hughes
v.
Waite, (1957) i All E.R. 603).
"
Property recovered or preserved." Charging order for
costs,
A
legally aided plaintiff brought a successful
action for specific performance of a contract whereby
he was to exchange his dwelling house for that of
defendant, who was also an assisted person, her
contribution being assessed at nil.
There was
no evidence that the dwelling houses were of
different value. The plaintiff paid his maximum
contribution of £194, but the Law Society registered
against the house conveyed to him, under the
Land Charges Act, 1925, a charge for the balance
of the costs, some £286. Is the Law Society
entitled so to do ?
No, said Harman, J. If this was permitted the
result would be disastrous to the plaintiff, for
having got the house he would have paid not
only the " price" for which he agreed but in
addition his maximum contribution of £194 and
a charge of £286 on his house. The house had
not been " recovered or preserved " in the action
within the meaning of sect. 3 (4) of the Legal
Aid and Advice Act, 1949, and even if it had, it
was contrary to the whole policy of the Act that a
legally aided person's dwelling house should be
made subject to a charge where it happened to
be the property recovered or preserved in the
action.
(Wagg
v.
The Law Society (1957) 2 All E.R. 274).
New trial ordered on account of judge's interruptions at
cross-examination of witnesses at trial.
In an appeal from a decision dismissing her
claim under the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Pro
visions) Act 1934 and the Fatal Accident Acts,
for damages for negligence and breach of statutory
duty, the plaintiff widow made a submission that
she had not had a fair trial on the ground that
the Trial Judge had frequently interrupted counsel
in cross-examining witnesses and had thus not
given an opportunity to counsel to conduct the
case properly.
HELD by the Court of Appeal (Denning, Romer
and Parker,
L.JJ.) reversing Hallett J. that there
should be a new trial since every litigant was
entitled to a fair trial at which his case could pro
perly be put, and without that no cause could be
lost nor could the appellate court affirm that it
had been.
Per Denning, L.J.—Nevertheless, we are quite
clear that the interventions, taken together, were
far more than they should have been. In the system
of trial which we have evolved in this country,