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claim under the Fatal Accident Act could be brought
to run out without informing the plaintiff of that
fact.
In deciding without reference to the client
that a writ should not be issued he had not exer
cised the standard of care he was bound to exercise
in the conduct of the affairs of a client.
Mrs.
Kitchen would have been awarded a maximum of
£3,000 if successful.
A claim by the plaintiff against the Royal Air
Forces Benevolent Association was dismissed, his
Lordship holding that there was no breach of duty
on their part.
(Kitchen
v.
Donald, Darlington and Nice.
The
Times,
May 22nd, 1957).
„
Disgraceful
conduct—opinion of professional
body.
The Divisional Court (The Lord Chief Justice,
Mr. Justice Hilbery and Mr. Justice Devlin), gave
judgment for the appellant in this appeal under the
Architects (Registration) Act, 1931, by Mr. Thomas
Hughes, F.R.I.C.S., of Boreham Wood, Hert
fordshire, from a decision of the Discipline Com
mittee of the Architects Registration Council of the
United Kingdom disqualifying.him from practising
as an architect for two years.
Lord Goddard giving a reserved judgment, said
that
the Discipline Committee had
found
the
appellant guilty of conduct disgraceful to him in
his capacity as an architect on the ground that he
combined estate agency with his practice as an
architect, and had ordered that his name should
be removed from the register of architects, that
he should be disqualified from registration for two
years and that his name should not be re-entered
on the register unless he submitted himself to an
examination.
Considering that the appellant, who was over
60, had been in practice for 35 years without any
complaint as
to his professional competence, it
was remarkable that the respondent council should
decide that the suspension imposed should only be
determined if he sat for and passed an examination.
His Lordship could only suppose that the reason
for imposing such a condition was that the Council
in fact meant to suspend him for life, as it was
inconceivable that at his age the appellant would
be willing" to submit himself for examination.
His Lordship doubted whether such a condition
could lawfully be imposed.
.
The Architects
(Registration) Act, 1931, had
established a register of architects. Those in prac
tice at the time of the passing of the Act were
entitled to have their names included on the register.
The appellant who had, since 1919, been in practice
as an architect, chartered surveyor, land and estate
agent and valuer had availed himself of this right
in 1934. The Act had also established the Archi
tects' Registration Council and a Discipline Com
mittee.
The council had, at some time after the
passing of the Act, issued a code of professional
conduct which provided that estate agency should
not form part of a registered architect's practice.
Such a code had no statutory force of itself.
It
was clear that at the time the code was issued an
architect who also practised as an estate agent was
entitled to apply for registration.
The Architects Registration Act,
1938, pro
hibited anyone calling himself an architect unless
he registered.
In 1937 the president of the council
had written to the Institute of Chartered Surveyors
recognizing the fact that there was nothing in the
Bill (which the council was promoting) to interfere
with the activities of architects.
The conduct which
the discipline committee
found to be " disgraceful " was that the appellant
had refused to comply with the standard which the
profession had set for itself. Disgraceful conduct
was attributed to
the appellant for doing that
which the council had said legislation would not
interfere with. The council seemed to have recog
nized that, in spite of the provisions of the code,
they ought to allow the members who had prev
iously carried on their avocations to continue to
do so at least for a time, but that they had fixed
a date (January ist, 1956) beyond which it would
be misconduct if they continued to do so.
The appellant had had the right to have his
name entered on the register in the years after 1931.
If the decision of the Discipline Committee was
right, it would have been open to the council to
remove the appellant's name from the register the
moment it had been entered.
Such a result was
plainly absurd. The appellant had openly combined
his practice as an architect with his practice in
other occupations for the 20 years following his
registration. How could it reasonably be said that
it was disgraceful for him to continue to practise
his other occupations after a particular date which
the council chose to appoint ?
The Court was concerned with a
transitional
state of affairs.
In his Lordship's opinion it was
wrong to apply the same consideration and standard
to those in practice'before 1931 as to new entrants.
The appellant could not be held guilty of conduct
that by any standard could be said to be " dis
graceful " because he continued
to practise
in
exactly the same way after registration as before,