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GAZETTE

SEPTEMBER 1 9 88

FOOTNOTES

1. For an account of these new rules,

see Hogan and Morgan,

Admin-

istrative Law

(1986) at pp. 331-362.

2. 119831 2 A.C. 237.

3. Thus, the Ord. 53 procedure does

not apply if, for example the plaintiff

is required to challenge a public law

decision as a condition precedent to

establish a private law right:

Cocks

-v

Thanet District Council

11983] 2

A.C. 286. Nor is it applicable to a

pure claim for damages

(Davy -v-

Spelthorne B.C.

11984] A.C. 262) or

where the alleged invalidity of an

administrative decision is raised by

way of defence:

Wandsworth

L.B.C.

-v- Winder

11985] A.C. 461.

4. The Ord. 53 procedure has now been

put on a statutory basis by s.31 of

the (English) Supreme Court Act,

1981. It may be questioned whether

it was

intra vires

the Superior Court

Rules Committee to prescribe what

is in effect a limitation period (save

that time may be extended for "good

reason") for judicial review

applications in the absence of

specific statutory authorisation.

5. This requirement is contained in

0.84. r.20 of the 1986 Rules.

6. o.84, r.21. The time limit is as short

as three months where relief other

than

certiorari

is sought (e.g.,

mandamus

; 0.84, r.21(1).

7. 0.84, r.20(2)(b). This is contrast to

plenary proceedings, where a

plaintiff can impeach the validity of

an administrative decision by simply

alleging the existence of the facts

necessary to support his claim.

8. Sir William Wade described Lord

Diplock's judgment as an opinion "of

notable range and synthesising

power": "Procedure and Prerogative

in Public Law" (1985) 101

L.Q.R.

180, 186.

9. Professor Jolowicz described

O'Reilly

-v-

Mackman

as a

"singularly unfortunate step back to

the technicalities of a byegone age":

"The Forms of Action Disinterred"

(1983)

C.L.J.

15, 18.

10.

The State (KellyI -v- District

Justice

for Randon

11947] I.R. 258 and the

dicta approving of

Kelly

in

The State

(Walsh) -v- Maguire

11979] I.R. 372;

The State (Coveney)

-v-

Special

Criminal Court

[1982] I.L.R.M. 284

and

The State (Furey) -v- Minister for

Defence

[19881 I.L.R.M. 89.

11. (19881 I.L.R.M. 89. This important

case was decided in 1984 (i.e.,

pre-1986 Rules) but was not reported

until this year.

12. [1981 ] I.R. 181. See Horgan, "Natural

and Constitutional Justice:

Adieu

to

Laissez-Faire"

(1984) 19

Ir.Jur.

309.

13. But as McCarthy J. correctly

observed in

Furey

(11988) I.L.R.M. at

99-100), the all important distinction

between the two cases is that:

"Cussen's

case was, essentially, a

proceeding between private parties.

This case is not such a proceeding

- this case is a claim by the citizen

that the State should render him

constitutional justice . . Clearly, a

distinction is to be drawn in cases

where the private rights of third

parties have been effected either

directly or indirectly by the order or

instrument sought to be quashed, as

in

Cussen's

case, and where no such

event has taken place, as in this case

where the private citizen is seeking

redress from the executive organ of

government, and, failing in that,

turning to the judicial organ for

remedy."

14. Working Paper No. 9. 1979.

15. High Court. 2 November 1987.

16. [1986] I.R. 317.

17. At pp. 4-5 of the judgment.

18. The decision of Lord Denning in

R.

-v- Herrod. ex p. Leeds D.C.

119761

Q.B. 540 is often cited as an

authority for the proposition that an

applicant for judical review may lose

on the ground of delay

even

where

he has applied

within

the prescribed

time-limit. But this seems to overlook

the fact that Lord Denning's

reasoning was, in effect, rejected by

the House of Lords on appeal: see

[1978] A.C. 403.

19. High Court, 30 January 1984.

20. High Court, 21 July 1988. Note also

that in

Connors -v- De/ap,

High

Court, 27 November 1987, Lynch J.

referred to the fact that the applicant

had delayed some fifteen months

before moving the Court for judicial

review to challenge his conviction

and cited this as a further ground for

exercising his discretion against the

applicant. However, the Courts will

sometimes not be strictly bound by

the time-limit and in

Ryrne -v- Grey,

High Court, 9 October 1987,

Hamilton P. was content to extend

time in the context of a challenge to

the validity of a search warrant

where the applicant was a mere

thirteen days out of time.

21. In

Rainey -v- Delap,

Supreme Court,

6 March 1988, Finlay C.J. held that

the power conferred on a District

Court clerk to issue summonses

under s.10(4) of the Petty Sessions

(Ireland) Act, 1851 by Rules 29 and

30 of the District Court Rules, 1948,

was

ultra vires

the District Court

Rules Committee Section 10(4) had

confined the power to receive a

complaint and to issue a summons

to a Justice of the Peace. The

functions of the Justice of the Peace

were transferred to the District

Justice by the Courts of Justice Act

1924. It was not therefore

competent for the Committee to

purport to confer these powers on a

District Court clerk. The Supreme

Court had earlier ruled in

Director of

Public Prosecutions (Nagle) -v- Flynn,

10 December 1987, that the validity

of any particular summons could be

raised on an appeal to the Circuit

Court, as such appeals were heard

de novo.

22.

11988] I.L.R.M. at 100.

23.

The People

(Director

of

Public

Prosecutions)

-v- Parrell

11978] I.R.

13 is just one example among many

of where a conviction was quashed

by reason of a technical irregularity.

Here the Court of Criminal Appeal

held the prosecution had failed to

prove that the appellent was in

lawful custody at the time an

extension order was served on him

under s.30 of the Offences against

the State Act 1939 by a Garda

Superintendent. The power to

extend a period of detention under

s.30 be exercised by such an officer

but only if he has been authorised in

that behalf by a Chief Superin-

tendent under s.3 of the 1939 Act.

Here the Superintendent had

exhibited a standard form circular

(which he had filled in) and which

merely recited that he had received

authority from a Chief Superin-

tendent for that purpose. O'Higgins

C.J. held that this did not suffice and

concluded that the appellant was in

unlawful custody at the time he

made an incriminating statement,

which was the only evidence against

him. As this evidence was excluded

by reason of a breach of his constit-

utional right to liberty, the conviction

was accordingly quashed. But cf. the

views expressed by Lynch J. in the

Connors

case, where he said that if

an order of

certiorari

was to issue

quashing the conviction by reason of

a technical flaw it would "clearly

deprive the people of Ireland of the

retribution to which they are entitled

by reason of the crime committed by

the applicant."

24. Supreme Court, 8 March 1988.

25. [1977] I.R. 287.

26. Henchy J. dissented on this ground.

He concluded that it would now be

unfair to the adoptive parents and

the child if the adoption order was

now to be declared

ultra vires.

27.

[1977] I.R. at 296.

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