GAZETTE
APRIL 1985
How EEC Law Affects Practitioners*
Part II
by
Senator Mary Robinson, S.C.
(Part I of this article was published in the January/February
Ggzette
at p.5.)
Rights under Community Law:
Their Enforceability in the Irish Courts
Following the analysis in Part I of the penetration of
Community law in Ireland, the next step involves
consideration of the extent to which it can form the basis
of legal rights which individuals or companies may rely on
or assert before the Irish courts. In the case of regulations
— which by their nature are directly applicable — and
also in the case of Treaty Articles or provisions of
directives which have been construed to be directly
effective, substantive rights can adhere to a party or
parties which the Irish courts must uphold and protect.
1
A
few examples may help to illustrate this:
(a)
Equality of Pay and Conditions of Employment:
There are both Community and Irish provisions
governing equality of pay and conditions of employment,
but it is now clear that even if there were no domestic Irish
provisions women workers could rely directly on some at
least of the Community provisions. The relevant EEC and
Irish provisions on equality are as follows:
Equal Pay
EEC Treaty Article 119
Council Directive 75/117 (O.J. No. L45, 19 Feb.
1975).
Anti-Discrimination (Pay) Act 1974 — came into
operation 31 December 1975.
Anti-Discrimination (Pay) (Amendment) Bill
1975 — was withdrawn in 1976 because EEC
Commission refused Ireland's application for a
derogation from the Directive.
Equal Treatment of Men and Women Workers
Council Directive 76/207 (O.J. No. L39, 14 Feb.
1976).
Employment Equality Act 1977 — Law on 1 June
1977.
Employment Equality Agency established 1
October 1977.
Equality of Treatment between Men and Women in
matters of Social Security
Council Directive 79/7 (O.J. L6, 10 Jan. 1979) —
Required to be implemented by 22 Dec. 1984.
Social Welfare (Amendment) (No. 2) Bill 1984
published in December 1984 but not yet debated.
The Irish Acts implement the obligations on Ireland
under the Council Directives; but even in the absence of
such domestic legislation women workers could rely on
the direct applicability of Article 119, and possibly on key
articles of the Council Directives which the Court might
in appropriate circumstances construe as having effects
which could be relied on at least against the state itself. In
the
Second Defrenne Case
2
the Court of Justice ruled:
"The principle that men and women should receive
equal pay, which is laid down by Article 119, may be
relied on before the national courts. These courts
have a duty to ensure the protection of the rights
which that provision vests in individuals, in
particular in the case of those forms of discrimina-
tion which have their origin in legislation provisions
or collective labour agreements, as well as where
men and women receive unequal pay for equal work
which is carried out in the same establishment or
service, whether private or public."
The date of that decision is interesting (8 April 1976),
because a few days later (14 April 1976) the Commission
took a formal decision to reject the application by the
then Irish government for a derogation from Council
Directive 75/117 seeking to defer full implementation of
equal pay in certain sectors of the economy until 31
December 1977.
Following the landmark judgment in the
Second
Defrenne Case,
a considerable body of case law on
equality has been emerging from the Court of Justice,
either on references from national courts under Article
177 or in proceedings brought by the Commission against
Member States for failure to comply with the Directive.
3
The question of the possible direct effect of the Equal Pay
Directive was raised in five equal pay cases from the U.K.
alone,
4
but the Court has so far avoided giving a direct
answer on the point, probably because to construe the
Directive itself as giving rise to horizontal direct effects
would tend to blur the distinction between
regulations
which have direct applicability and
directives
which
require to be implemented.
A separate issue, raising a different question regarding
the possible effects of directives, may arise where the
directive has either not been implemented, or been only
partially implemented by a Member State.
As already discussed in Part I, the Court of Justice has
made it clear in a number of recent decisions that an
individual may be able to rely on the terms of a directive
as against the official organs of a Member State, provided
the time allowed for implementation of that directive has
passed. None of these cases involved the equality
directives, but the issues raised by the national courts and
determined by the Court of Justice would appear to have
general application. In the
Becker Case
5
the Plaintiff was
able to claim exemption from German turnover tax
73