GAZETTE
(Continued from page 62)
disclosure, and the fact that they had been brought into
existence for the purposes of a particular action which
had been concluded was treated as immaterial. Lindley,
M.R., stated the rule succinctly — "once privileged
always privileged". It is, however, important to remember
that this simply means that, once a particular client's
privilege has attached to a document, it remains for his
benefit and that of his successors in title, but the maker of
the document may not rely on this principle to claim
privilege. Thus, in
Schneider v. Leigh
(1955) 2 Q.B. 195,
the plaintiff had claimed damages for personal injuries
against a company, whose solicitor obtained the usual
Medical report — a document in relation to which the
company enjoyed the ordinary litigant's privilege. The
report was made by the defendant and the plaintiff
contended that it libelled him. It was held that the
defendant could claim no privilege with regard to his
re
port. A plea of qualified privilege in the law of
defamation might have succeeded if the defendant could
show that he was not actuated by malicc or some other
'fripropcr motive and in discharge of some public or
Private duty but plea of legal professional privilege failed.
Finally as the privilege is that of i particular person or
class, matters covered by it may always be proved by the
evidence of other witnesses. In
Lloyd v. Mostvn
(1842) 10
M
.&W. 478, in the course of argument, Parke, B. said:
'Where an Attorney entrusted confidentially with a
document communicates the contents, or suffers another
to take a copy, surely the secondary evidence so obtained
may be produced. Suppose the instrument were even
st
olen, and a correct copy taken, would it not be
reasonable to admit it?" It is on the authority of this
remark that the Court of Appeal allowed copies of proofs
pf witnesses with notes on evidence in a former action
mstituted by the Plaintiff's predecessor in title to be used
by the defendant in the case of
Calcraft v. Guest
already
referred to above, the originals having been handed over
by the defendant's solicitor to the plaintiff to whom they
belonged. Whilst the originals were undoubtedly
Protected, the matters covered in the documents were
admitted in evidence by other means.
The rule has the effect of excluding evidence, though
admissible and relevant, on grounds of public policy. In
More
v.
Weaver
(1928) 2 K.B. 520 the Court of Appeal
in England, following
Brown
v.
Dunn
(1893) laid it down
APRIL 1978
that communications passing between j\ solicitor anil his
client on a subject upon which the client has retained the
solicitor, and which arc relevant to that matter, arc
absolutely privileged.- However, in
Minter v. Priest
46
T.L.R. 302. the House of Lords left open the question
whether the privilege resulting from the relationship is an
absolute or a qualified one. Nevertheless, in all the
established authorities, the strong indication is that the'
privilege, once established, is absolute and can only be set
aside by statute. Despite this a Crown Court Judge ruled
in the case of
Regina v. Barton
(1973) 1, W.L.R., 115
that the rules of Natural Justice require that any.
documents in the possession or control of a solicitor
which are both relevant and admissible to prove that a
defendant was innocent of the alleged criminal charge are
not privileged and that the solicitor should produce the
documents if they arc relevant and admissable. Caulfield
J. stated that he felt that he was obliged to consider the
matter on "basic principles". He did not review the
authorities but he considered the principle as set out in
Cross on Evidence,
3rd Ed. (1967) very briefly. The
Judge's ruling in this case has the effect of setting aside the
privilege to serve a higher public interest, namely, the
prevention of a miscarriage of justice. The writer feels
that this case will be of particular importance to the
development of the principle in Irish law in view of the
Constitutional obligation on our Judges to ensure that the
. rules of Natural Justice are applied. It will be recalled that
Gavan Duffy J. in
Cook
v.
Carroll
(1945), I.R., 515
made it clear that the Irish Courts are obliged to
scrutinise all Common Law principles, however firmly
established, in the light of the Constitution. Furthermore,
in the course of his judgement in that case he stated that
"quite apart from the Constitution, a Judge, when
ascertaining the law, must reject interpretations of the
Common Law p l a i n ly u n r e a s o n a b le a nd
inconvenient..
By way of conclusion, it may be said that whilst the
principles are well settled and firmly rooted in the
Common Law there are certain aspects which need to be
clarified in the Irish Courts before the rule can be outlined
with confidence. The most important aspect of the
principle requiring clarification, in
1
the writer's view, is the
question whether the privilege is absolute or qualified
only. Hopefully, the Supreme Court will be called upon to
consider the rule in its entirety in the near future.
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