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PREǧIMPLANTATION GENETIC DIAGNOSIS UNDER THE EUROPEAN COURT …

une situation spécifique laquelle, d’après les éléments de droit comparé dont la

Cour dispose, outre l’Italie, ne concerne que deux des trente-deux Etats ayant

fait l’objet d’examen, à savoir l’Autriche et la Suisse. De plus, quant à ce dernier

Etat, la Cour note qu’un projet de modification de la loi en vue de remplacer

l’ interdiction du D.P.I., telle qu’actuellement prévue, par une admission

réglementée est actuellement en cours

36.

Not only is such remark not strictly required for the conclusions on Article 8

ECHR, the Court’s interpretation of the comparative data also appears to be

erroneous. The documents prepared by the Steering Committee on Bioethics and

the Joint Research Centre show that, among the 30 States considered, 20 authorize

PID (including three States permitting the screening even in the absence of a detailed

regulation), while such a practice is not allowed, not only in those States explicitly

banning it, but also in the other nine countries, which have not adopted rules and

are not reported as

de facto

practicing the PID. In other words, it is possible to infer

that in these countries the lack of a regulation on PID results in an inability to access

such procedures.

A similar interpretation of the available data would have led the Court to

hold that the European consensus on the issue is not yet consolidated and that, as

a consequence, States have a wide margin of appreciation regarding how to regulate

access to PID. Nonetheless, this would have not changed the Court’s findings. The

lack of consistency of the Italian legal provisions on PID and on therapeutic abortion

would still have represented an infringement of Article 8 of the ECHR. Indeed, the

same reasoning can be applied to those legal systems in which, in view of a possible

access to therapeutic termination of pregnancy, the absence of rules on PID implicates

the unavailability of this screening technique.

Both the reading of the comparative data provided by the Court and the

relevance accorded to them, suggest the Strasbourg judges’ support for a legislative

solution that allows the pre-implantation genetic diagnosis in the case of serious

genetic disorders, even regardless of the need to guarantee internal coherence within

national legal systems.

VI. Concluding Remarks: the Need for a Detailed Regulation

The ECtHR Court of Human Rights usually maintains a very cautious approach

in evaluating controversial bio-ethical issues, firmly believing that States are in the

best position to meet the society’s perception and needs. This is also confirmed in the

present case, as the Court avoided calling for the need to extend MAP techniques to

subjects who are not currently included in the categories envisaged by L. 40/2004

and limited its focus on the ban of PID.

Nevertheless, in

Costa and Pavan

the Court adopted a very brave approach, in

three different directions. First, it has clearly declared that, from the point of view

36

Costa and Pavan

v.

Italy

(n 4), para. 70.