The Gazette 1958-61

nominee company and the appointment of an agent

to deliver a deed already sealed must itself be under

seal if it were to be valid.

(2) If a deed is delivered to an agent (not

authorised by deed delivered) on the footing that

it was not to become binding on the grantor until

certain instructions had been fulfilled, and if the

instructions are revocable so that the deed could be

recalled at any time before delivery, then there was

not delivery of the deed by the grantor either as an

escrow or at all; accordingly as the branch

manager's instructions were revocable, the deed of

appointment did not become binding as the deed

of the nominee company when he fulfilled them.

(3) The deed of appointment could not be

regarded as an appointment under hand validly

made on behalf of the nominee company because

there was no evidence that the directors, when they

put their names to the deed, were authorised to do

any other thing than witness the affixing of the deed

of the nominee company to the deed of appointment,

which, being on its face a deed, could not, therefore,

be treated as an instrument under hand.

(Windsor Refrigerator Company, Ltd. and another

Branch nominees Ltd. and others (1960. 2. All

E.R. 568).)

Certiorari—costs

—

mistake of justices. It is not the

general practice to award costs against a party who has not

appeared to resist an application for an order of certiorari.

Justices convicted the defendant of a driving

offence at the close of the prosecution's case. The

defendant applied for an order of certiorari. Held,

allowing the application and quashing the conviction,

that the defendant would not be granted costs, since

the justices had acted under a pure mistake, and

since the prosecution had not appeared to resist the

application :

Liverpool Justices ex p. Roberts

(1960) i W.L.R. 585 ;

104 S.J. 450; (1960) 2 All

E.R. 384^, B.C.

Covenant not to assign—unreasonable refusal—claim for

damages.

In Rendall

Roberts & Stacey (1959) 175 E.G.

265, where a lessee covenanted not to assign without

the previous consent of the lessor " but so that such

consent shall not be unreasonably withheld to an

assignment of the whole of the demised premises to

a respectable or responsible person," Salmon J. held

that although there had been an unreasonable

refusal the lessee was not entitled to damages.

Landlord and Tenant Act,

1954—

new lease—recon

struction

—

discovery. (Landlord and Tenant Act,

1954.

30 (i) (/)).

Discovery in proceedings in the Chancery

Division by originating summons ought only to be ordered

in very special cases, when the facts are such as to justify

an order being made.

On a notice served by landlord under s. 30 (i) (/)

of the Landlord and Tenant Act, 1954, determining

a tenancy of business premises and stating that they

intended to reconstmct the premises, the tenants

applied to the court by originating summons for a

new tenancy. The tenants filed an affidavit disputing

the landlord's intention to reconstruct and the

Master adjourned the summons into court to be

tried on oral evidence-in-chief which would be

cross-examined. The tenants applied for discovery

of a large number of documents. Held that in the

circumstances discovery, bearing on the question

whether the landlords had a firm and settled intention

of reconstructing would be ordered :

Wine Shippers

(London)

Bath House Syndicate (1960) i W.L.R.

613; 1048.J.490; (1960) 2 A11E.R. 511, Buckley J.

Dentists—infamous and disgraceful conduct.

(Dentists

Act,

1957, j-j. 25, 29.)

To make good a charge of " infamous or dis

graceful conduct in a professional respect " under

s. 25 of the Dentists Act, 1957, in relation to such

a matter as the keeping of the prescribed dental

records it is not enough to show that some mistake

has been made through carelessness or inadvertence

in two or three cases out of some hundred patients

treated during the period in which the mistakes

occurred, whether the carelessness or inadvertence

consisted in some act or omission by the dentist

himself or in his ill-advised delegation of the

making of the relevant entries to a nurse or reception

ist and omitting to check the forms to see that she

had done as she was told. To make such a charge

good there must (generally speaking) be some

element of moral turpitude or fraud or dishonesty

in the conduct complained of, or such persistent and

reckless disregard of the dentist's duty in regard to

records as can be said to amount to dishonesty for

this purpose. The question is to some extent one

of degree.

The Disciplinary Committee of the General

Dental Council found a dentist, registered under the

Dentists Act, 1957, guilty of infamous or disgraceful

conduct in a professional respect in overcharging

for and wrongful certification of treatment of

National Health Service patients. The committee

ordered that his name should be erased from the

on the facts the case of overcharging fell short of

the degree of culpability required, nor could the

wrongful certification amount to infamous or

disgraceful conduct. Felix

General Dental Council

(1960) 2 W.L.R. 934; 104 S.J. 446; (1960) 2 All

E.R. 391, P.C.