278 / 338
had only to state that to feel that something had
gone very wrong. It was said that the commission
of the offences was so serious that, whether he had
been guilty of conduct disgraceful in a professional
respect or not, his name ought to be removed. But
the fact remained that the committee, in considering
the penalty, must have taken that finding into
consideration.
The two offences were driving while under the
influence of a drug and dangerous driving. They
were undoubtedly serious offences, although it did
appear that there were mitigating factors.
The
appellant suffered from alcoholism. He submitted
himself to treatment and in the course of one treat
ment was given paraldehyde, and, most unfortunate
ly, although it might have cured his alcoholism, it
made him an addict of that drug. The medical
evidence was that on the day of the offences he was
suffering from the drug and just did not know what
he was doing.
It did appear that he had had previous convictions.
They were quite rightly before the committee, but
in his lordship's opinion, even taking them into
account, it was not a case for the extreme penalty.
His lordship would substitute two years' suspension
to date from the date of the original findings by the
committee in November, 1959.
Mr. Justice Ashworth and Mr. Justice Elwes
agreed.
(In re Hans,
The Times,
i2th October, 1960)
Appeal against dismissal of case by disciplinary committee
rejected.
The Lord Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Ashworth and
Mr. Justice Elwes dismissed with costs this appeal by
Colonel Alfred Wintle, of Wrotham, Kent, from the
findings and order of the Disciplinary Committee
refusing his application that the respondent solicitors,
practising under the style of Janson, Cobb, Pearson
& Co., be struck off the roll, and ordering Colonel
Wintle to pay the costs of the application.
Colonel Wintle appeared in person ; Mr. Norman
Broderick, Q.C., and Mr. Michael Hoare for the
respondents ;
and Mr. Peter Webster for the Law
Society.
The Lord Chief Justice, giving judgment, said that
Colonel Wintle had had some prolonged litigation in
the courts against a solicitor at Brighton, and the
respondents had acted throughout as the London
agents of that solicitor. In the course of the litigation,
and at a time when Colonel Wintle was appealing to
the Court of Appeal, he received from them a letter
saying that they enclosed therewith a notice requiring
him to bring a certain legacy into Court within seven
days. The names of the parties were set out and then:
" Notice to bring legacy into court".
Colonel
Wintle's case was that that notice enclosed in the
letter was calculated to and did deceive him. He
said that he looked on it as a writ and that he had
suffered great anxiety ;
that it was a great shock ;
that he had come to London to consult other people;
and that he had been put to great expense. His case
was that the notice was sent by the London agents
espousing the cause of the solicitor at Brighton;
that it was done deliberately; bad faith was mentioned
and such phrases as "playing with loaded dice",
"illegitimate means of warfare", and, in his own
affidavit, "immoral and wilful attempt to pervert
the course of justice by means of a trick".
Colonel Wintle had had some experience of
litigation and his lordship himself doubted whether
the notice had come as a shock to him, but for the
purpose of the proceedings he was prepared to
assume that he was horrified. There was not a shred
of evidence that the London firm of solicitors were
acting in bad faith, or using illegitimate means of
warfare, or were intending to mislead or pervert the
course of justice.
So far from that, it was to be
observed that what they did was done on the advice
of counsel. The appeal should be dismissed.
Mr. Justice Ashworth and Mr. Justice Elwes
agreed.
The Lord Chief Justice said that in the ordinary
case where there was an appeal by a solicitor, names
were not mentioned in the Cause List and the press
were good enough not to give-the names in case of
any prejudice resulting in the event of a successful
appeal.
That practice had not altogether been
followed in the present case and his lordship asked
whether anyone minded the names being disclosed.
Colonel Wintle said that he did not suppose that
his name would be kept quiet .
Mr. Broderick said that there was no objection to
the names being disclosed.
The Lord Chief Justice said that there seemed no
good reason for keeping the names out of the press.
In re solicitors—
The Times,
zyth, October, 1960.
Innkeeper—motor-car left in garage.
In Adams (Durham)
v.
Trust Houses (1960) i
Lloyd's Rep. 380, the plaintiffs left their car in the
hotel garage under the direction of the defendant's
night porter who, during the night, took the car and
wrecked it. Atkinson J., held (i) that there was a
contract of bailment; (2) that as the second plaintiff
had never been given a garage ticket the clauses on
the ticket were not part of the contract; (3) that the
night porter's act was a fundamental breach of the
contract determining the contract together with any
conditions which formed part of it; and (4) that the
defendants were negligent in their engagement of the
night porter.
66