284 / 338
property and was ordered to stop by a police
constable. Instead of doing so S. accelerated and the
constable jumped on the car. S. drove fast and made
the car swerve violently so that the constable fell off
and was killed beneath an oncoming car. S. pleaded,
inter alia,
that he had no intent to kill or to cause
grievous bodily harm but he was convicted of
capital murder.
The Court of Criminal Appeal
allowed his appeal and substituted a verdict of
manslaughter and a sentence of 10 years' imprison
ment. The House of Lords, allowing the pro
secution's appeal held (i) that S.'s actual intention
was not material, since as a reasonable responsible
man he must be taken to have intended the natural
and probable consequences of his acts ; (2) there was
no justification for drawing a distinction between
harm "certain" to result and harm "likely" to
result; (3) the words "grievous bodily harm" bear
their ordinary meaning of "really serious" harm ; (4)
s. 1 (i) of the Homicide Act, 1957 has not abolished
malice constituted by a proved intention to inflict
grievous bodily harm :
Director of Public Prose
cutions
v.
Smith (1960) 3 W.L.R-546 ; 104 S.J. 683 ;
(1960) 3 All E.R.i6i, H.L. ;
'reversing decision of
the Court of Criminal Appeal
sub. nom.
R.
v.
Smith
(1960) 6 C.L. 77.
Note:
This decision has been severely criticised by
Academic lawyers.
Alimony—Wife receiving National Assistance
(Matrimonial Causes Act, 1950 (14 Geo.6. c.25),
s. 19 (i)). The Court has a wide and unfettered
discretion to do what it thinks just in awarding
alimony, and will not fetter that discretion by laying
down any general principle that national assistance
benefit received by a wife must be taken into account
in awarding alimony.
An order for alimony
pendente life
at the weekly
rate of £2 55., was made in the district registry in
favour of a petitioning wife. The order was affirmed
on appeal by Marshall J. and the husband now
appealed to the Court of Appeal on the ground that
the wife was in receipt of national assistance benefit
and that this should have been taken into account.
Held, that there was no general principle or rule of
practice to the effect that national assistance benefit
must be taken into account, although it would be
wrong to remove it from the area of the judge's
discretion: Slater
v.
Slater (1960) 3 All E.R. 217, C.A.
Evidence—Statement by witness on previous occasion.
Evidence of a witness's previous statements is not
in general admissible to support the evidence given
by him in the box, though there is an exception
where his evidence is challenged as being a recent
invention.
7*
The appellant, Dr. F., was charged with infamous
conduct in a professional respect in committing
adultery with a named patient. The Disciplinary
Committee of the General Medical Council found the
charge made out and decided that Dr. F.'s name shall
be erased from the Register of Medical Practitioners.
The main evidence against Dr. F. consisted of
statements made by him to one of the witnesses. On
appeal to the Privy Council it was argued on his
behalf that these statements ought not to have been
admitted and that, in any event, they were capable of
an innocent interpretation. Dr. F. tendered evidence
that at a date before the hearing by the General
Medical Council he had made a statement to a
friend denying the alleged adultery. Held, dismissing
the appeal, that the main evidence of statements
made by Dr. F. was admissible, and that the Privy
Council was free to form its own view of their
significance ; but that Dr. F.'s statement to a friend
denying the alleged adultery amounted to no more
than the previous assertion of the appellant's story
told at the hearing and was inadmissible :
Fox
v.
General Medical Council (1960) I.W.L.R. 1017 ; 104
S.J. 725 ; (1960) 3 All E.R. 225, P.C.
Covenant—Payment of School Fees.
If trustees receive payments applicable for the
benefit of a child and use it in paying a school bill for
which the child's parent is legally liable, or if they
put the payments at the disposal of the parent and
he uses it to discharge such a bill, the payment in
question does not thereby lose its character as income
of the child and become income of the parent.
I.C.I, covenanted to pay to trustees £27,000 less
tax per annum for seven years for the maintenance,
education or benefit of named children of certain
employees. The trustees paid into the bank account
of one such child the sum of £140 odd less tax and
the child's father directed the child's bankers to
apply this sum in paying school bills. Neither the
child nor his parent gave any consideration to I.C.I.
for the covenant. The child's bankers claimed a
repayment of the tax deducted by the trustees. The
claim was not allowed by the inspector, and an
appeal to the General Commissioners failed. On
appeal by way of case stated, held that the appeal
should be allowed. The payments made by I.C.I.
were in the nature of annual payments from which
I.C.I, could deduct tax, and the income was the
income of the child, not the father : Barclays Bank
v.
Naylor (1960) 3 All E.R. 173. Cross J.
Verdict ofJury—to be given in open Court (Eire}.
In Long
v.
Saorstat & Continental Steamship Co.
(No. 2) (1953) 94 I.L.T.R. 130, in an action for