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negligence and breach of statutory duty, the jury
answered ten out of the eleven questions left to them
but disagreed on the eleventh, despite further
directions being given by the trial judge on this
question. On return to court the foreman informed
the judge that the jury could not agree and the judge
discharged the jury. After the parties and counsel
had left the court the Issue Paper, which was
unsigned, was handed to the judge. Two days later
when counsel appeared before him the judge gave
judgment for the defendants based on the findings
of the jury. On a motion by the plaintiff for a new
trial the Supreme Court of Eire held that the verdict
of the jury must be given in open court and must be
accepted by the judge and recorded in due course by
the certificate of the proper officer countersigned by
the judge. The appeal was allowed and a new trial
ordered.
Injunction granted to Attorney-General.
Per Pearce L.J. :
It is now firmly established that
where an individual or public body persistently
breaks the law, and where there is no person or
sufficient sanction to prevent the breaches, these
courts in an action by the Attorney-General may lend
their aid to secure obedience to the law. They may
do so whether the breaches be an invasion of public
rights of property or merely an invasion of the
community's general right to have the laws of the
land obeyed: Att.-Gen.
v.
Harris, (1960) 3. All
E.R. 207.
Misconduct—Costs.
(R.S.C., Ord. 65, r.n). It is not a proper ground
on which to deprive a solicitor of his costs that he
may have acted unprofessionally
in obtaining
evidence.
The solicitor to a petitioner in a divorce suit
interviewed the husband and obtained from him a
statement admitting adultery.
The trial judge
disapproved of this practice, and while giving
judgment for the petitioning wife refused to allow
the solicitor's costs of obtaining the statement. The
wife and the solicitor both appealed. Held, (i) that
there was no general principle as to the propriety of
such conduct, and that on the facts of the present
case the solicitor was not guilty of misconduct;
(2) that it was no part of the judge's function to say
whether the solicitor has acted improperly or not;
the only ground on which a solicitor can be deprived
of his costs is where his misconduct has caused costs
to be thrown away, whether the order is made under
R.S.C., Ord. 65, r.n, or under the inherent juris
diction of the court:
Davies
v.
Davies (1960)
I.W.L.R. 1004; 104 S.J. 745; (1960) 3 All E.R. 248,
C.A.
Restrictive Trade Practices—"Evidence.
During the course of a hearing, where the Phenol
Producers' Association were seeking to justify their
price restriction policy under s. 21 (i)
(b)
of the
Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1956, one of the
witnesses, called by the registrar, said that he was
buying phenol at prices below those fixed by the
association. The registrar sought to exclude this
evidence on the ground that the witness should not
be questioned about his contract which was a
confidential trade document and should not be shown
to his trade competitors nor should its contents be
made known to them.
It was directed that "The
normal method of giving evidence is by oral testi
mony. In some instances, as a matter of discretion,
we shall direct that the answer of the witness should
be written down where it seems to us proper to do so.
But there is no advantage to be obtained by that
course in the present case with this witness and,
therefore, if it is sought to adduce evidence about the
actual price he has paid for his phenol, he must
give that evidence like any other witness by oral
testimony, and he will be subject to cross-examina
tion on it in the same way as any other witness. It
may be that in all the circumstances it will not be
sought to elicit from this witness the actual price he
has paid for his phenol" :
Re
Phenol Producers'
Agreement (Practice Note) (1960) L.R. 2. R.P. 49,
R.P. Ct.
Trade Dispute—Picketing—Liability of Executive.
(Trade Unions Act, 1939 (Leeward Islands No. 16
of 1939), s. 2 as amended).
Pickets employed by executives of a trade union
are not the servants of the executives, so as to make
them (the executives) vicariously liable for torts
committed by the pickets.
The owners of a drug store in Antigua dismissed
a trade union member employed there as a clerk
without giving reasons. The executive committee
of the trade union resolved that H., the general
secretary, should take steps to picket the drug store.
H. and J., another member of the executive commit
tee, engaged pickets including S. J. and S. and other
pickets caused an actionable nuisance. In an action
by the owners f&r damages and for an injunction
restraining the watching and besetting of the drug
store, the executive committee, H., J. and S. were
defendants. The trial judge awarded an injunction
and damages of £80 against all the defendants. The
plaintiffs appealed on the ground that there was no
trade dispute, as
(a)
the dismissed clerk was not a
"workman" within the meaning of s. 2 of the
Leeward Islands Trade Union Act, 1939 and
(b)
the
only dispute was between the plaintiffs and the union,
no other members of which were employed at the
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