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point, on which the plaintiff had contended that the
defendants should not be awarded any costs as their
notice of payment in of the .£1,000 merely stated that
this sum was "enough to satisfy the plaintiff's claim,"
and did not specify what sum was paid in respect of
common law negligence and what sum in respect of
breach of statutory duty. The plaintiff contended
that the notice therefore failed to comply with the
requirements of R.S.C. Ord, 22, r. i (2). The case
is reported only on this point.
Per Lord Somervell: On the conclusion to which
I have come on the first point as to quantum, this
point does not arise because the amount would then
be in excess of the amount paid into court; but
counsel on each side asked us, if we came to a con
clusion on the point to express it; and although
normally it is desirable not to decide matters which
one does not have to decide, it is right to express
the view which I and my brethren hold on this point,
which may often arise.
The claim here was a claim, as so often arises in
these cases, for negligence, or alternatively for breach
of statutory duty; and the point taken was that as
the payment into court did not specify the cause or
causes of action in respect of which the payment was
made, therefore it was a bad payment in, and that
leave ought to have been obtained from a court or a
judge. One sees, of course, how the point arises on
the wording of the rule ; but any rule, or indeed any
document, falls to be construed in the light of its
purpose to be gathered from its terms. The purpose
of this rule is to avoid embarrassment in the tech
nical sense, when damages are claimed under two or
more independent causes of action in cases where the
relief claimed is cumulative. A man is claiming
under cause A and cause B, and if he wins on both,
he gets X plus Y in damages. If a sum of money is
paid into court, it is difficult for him to know what
to do if he does not know how much is allocated
to cause A and how much to cause B.
If £250 is
allocated to cause A, he may say : "That is all I hope
to get under that, so I will take that sum out, and
that will be the end of that." The case will then
proceed on cause B. That obviously is the problem
with which the rule is intended to deal. In cases such
as the present, however, where the relief claimed is
not cumulative, and where the two causes of action
are alternative methods of claiming the same relief,
the embarrassment which the rule is designed to
prevent cannot arise, and, moreover, it would be
impossible to comply with the rule by allocating
part of the sum paid in to one, and part to the other,
of the two alternative causes of action. Therefore,
the learned judge was right in deciding that there
had been no breach of the rule. (Graham
v.
Heinke
(1959), 3. All E.R. 650.)
Person arrested in Court for non-compliance with a
Court Order cannot claim privilegefrom arrest.
Lord Parker, Mr. Justice Cassels and Mr. Justice
McNair, refusing this application by Mr. Kenneth
Hunt, chemist, of Ashford, Middlesex, for a writ of
habeas corpus ad subjiciendume,
held that a litigant's
immunity (if any) from arrest while in the precincts
of the court was a privilege of the Court to ensure
that justice was done. The applicant was committed
to Brixton Prison on November 4, 1958, by Mr.
Justice Wynn Parry for contempt of court
(The
Times,
November 5), and his appeal against Mr.
Justice Wynn Parry's order was dismissed by the
Court of Appeal on November 27
(The Times,
Nov
ember 28).
The Lord Chief Justice, giving judgment, said that
Mr. Hunt had raised every conceivable point, but
the one which had been developed at greatest length
and with which the Court was really concerned was
whether he was properly arrested.
There was a motion by the defendants, Allied
Bakeries Ltd., before Mr. Justice Wynn Parry, to
commit the applicant to prison for contempt of court
in failing to attend an appointment before an exam
iner of the court. The Judge, having heard the case,
came to the conclusion that the applicant had no
intention of attending any examination that might be
fixed, and thereupon ordered his committal. The
Tipstaff, who had arrived in court, arrested him and
took him to Brixton Prison.
In those circumstances Mr. Hunt said that he was
wrongfully arrested, and claimed that he had some
privilege from arrest while he was in the court. He
took some four or five other points, all of which
admittedly had been raised by him on his appeal to
the Court of Appeal. His Lordship found it un
necessary to decide that the decision of the Court of
Appeal was
resjudicata
in these proceedings. Whether
it was or not, approaching the matter
de novo
and
having heard all the arguments raised by Mr. Hunt,
his Lordship saw no reason to come to any other
view than that taken by the Court of Appeal and so
far as the points other than that relating to privilege
were concerned Mr. Hunt failed.
The question regarding privilege was an interest
ing one and one on which one would expect to find
clear authority in the text books. Mr. Hunt said that
except in the case of special contempt, by which he
meant contempt in the face of the court and criminal
contempt, a litigant properly before the court had a
complete immunity from arrest while in the pre
cincts of the court.
His Lordship found it unnecessary to go through
the history of the matter. It seemed perfectly clear
from the authorities and text books that it was a
misconception to talk about a litigant or a solicitor
86