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or a witness having immunity from arrest within the
precincts of the court. That privilege, if privilege
there was, was a privilege of the court to ensure that
justice was done in court and for that purpose to
prevent anybody properly before the court from
being arrested.
In so far as it was said to be a
privilege of the person attending the court, it was no
more than that they were entitled to rely on the
Judge of that court seeing that Justice was not inter
fered with by their being arrested. It was perfectly
clear that there was nothing to suggest that a person
was privileged from arrest in a court if the arrest
was done on the order of that court, and indeed it
would be very surprising if that were not so. It had
long been the practice for a person properly before
the court to be committed by the court and arrested
in court not only if he was guilty of a "special"
contempt but also in the case of ordinary contempt.
Accordingly in his Lordship's judgment the applica
tion failed.
(In re Hunt-[i959] 2 W.L.R. 95).
Solicitor defendant in person who was reticent about giving
explanations before
the Disciplinary Committee repri
manded.
The Lord Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Donovan, and
Mr. Justice Ashworth on hearing fresh facts, allowed
this appeal by a solicitor, Mr. William Ingle, prac
tising at Leeds, from an order of the Disciplinary
Committee of the Law Society dated August 14,
1958, suspending him from practice for one year, and
substituted a reprimand for the order of suspension.
Mr. Lyons, for the appellant, said that he would
not criticise the suspension as improper on the facts
before the committee.
The appellant, who was
somewhat reticent and halting in his speech, was
sufficiently unwise to appear before the Law Society
unrepresented and had given an inadequate explana
tion in what was a complicated matter. He was a
man of very high, almost Victorian, principles and
it was hoped to satisfy the Court that there was a true
explanation which put the facts in a different light.
The appellant's suspension had received prominent
publicity in the Yorkshire Press, so that laymen
might have thought that he had been tampering with
his clients' money, and the Court was asked to make
it clear that there was no question of dishonesty.
An unsolicited affidavit had been received from the
solicitor who was the complainant before the Law
Society, and there was a bundle of 5 2 affidavits from
other solicitors practising in Leeds and Bradford who
without exception spoke of the appellant as a man
of unusual probity and said that never in any of their
dealings with him had he been guilty of any lack of
diligence or courtesy.
The Lord Chief Justice, giving judgment, said that
the charges against the appellant fell under three
heads ;
first, that he withdrew a sum of £258 6d.
in July, 1957, from his clients' account and paid it
over to a person who had no such money in the
account. That had undoubtedly occurred.
It was
unnecessary to go into details, but it was quite clear
that it was an isolated instance which arose quite
innocently in error and, the moment it was pointed
out, it was put right.
It involved no element of
dishonesty whatever and his Lordship did not think
that the committee had thought that it had.
The real gravamen of the case against the appellant
concerned the second charge—in effect, that he had
failed to give proper attention to the affairs of a
client. The position arose that he was reported to
the Law Society, warned that his practising certificate
would not be renewed unless certain matters arising
out of this charge were put in order, and yet he
continued to practise. The third charge, of practising
without a current practising certificate, was a matter
arising out of the second charge.
On the face of the findings the appellant had failed
to answer letters over a period of three to four years,
and those who complained about him to the Law
Society were fully justified in doing so. Most un
fortunately the appellant completely failed to give
any valid explanation to the committee, though he
did say that it was because the matter had become,
as he put it, repugnant to him. Speaking for himself,
his Lordship thought that that was no explanation
whatever and as an excuse was one which would
rather anger any committee ; it was difficult to think
that any committee would have come to any other
decision but to suspend the appellant.
In the Divisional Court the appeal was by way of
rehearing, and although it had not been challenged
that there was some failure to give attention to the
affairs of a client, the facts had been put against a
background which threw a completely new fight on
what had occurred. It was not a case of a solicitor
saying that the matter was repugnant to him and
that he was going to shelve it and do nothing about
it; his Lordship was satisfied that the appellant had
been put in a very difficult position by one of his
clients.
The Court had been greatly assisted by the attitude
of the Law Society who had accepted the facts now
put forward without formal proof and had gone
further and said that on those facts there was a strong
case for mitigation. His Lordship, while satisfied
that the appellant had brought upon himself the
order made by the committee, felt that had the full
facts been brought out the proper punishment would
have been one of reprimand and not suspension.
His Lordship would vary the order in that way.