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GAZETTE

JULY

prosecution was brought in the name

of the investigating Garda, the

Garda, though performing what was

his duty, was in legal quality a

common informer. Mr. Justice

Griffin said that if, in transferring the

functions of the Attorney-General to

the DPP in criminal matters and in

substituting the DPP for the

Attorney-General in all statutes or

statutory instruments, the Legislature

intended that a change or reservation

would be made in respect of

prosecutions formerly taken in the

name of the Attorney-General, he

would have expected such a drastic

change to have been clearly and

expressly stated by the Legislature.

The authority purported to be

conferred by the letter of January

9th, 1975, was therefore in his view

unnecessary.

Statutory Power

If the practice of bringing

proceedings in the name of a Garda

was to be continued it would be far

more desirable that he should be

given a statutory power to do so

rather than having to prosecute as a

common informer. It would,

however, be more desirable still if all

prosecutions were brought in the

name of and prosecuted by the DPP,

if whatever administrative difficulties

which now existed could be

overcome.

Mr. Justice Parke said that he

would agree with the judgment of Mr.

Justice Griffin and would therefore

answer the District Justice's question

in the affirmative and allow the

appeal.

The People at the suit of the Director

of Public Prosecutions v. William

Roddy, John J. Duffy and Edmund

Ro d d y . — Supr eme Court

(O'Higgins, C.J., Griffin and Parke

J.J.) — unreported — 25 February,

1977.

PRACTICE

Plaintiff entitled to be paid in foreign

currency if judgment is given against

foreign defendant.

Application by plaintiff for judgment

in default of appearance to a

Summary Summons claiming 14,740

Dutch guilders being the amount due

for goods sold and delivered. The Cent-

ral Office ofthe High Court refused the

application on the ground that the

practice has always been to give

judgment in Irish currency only.

However there is no reported

decision of an Irish Court that a

judgment cannot be given in a foreign

14

currency. The question whether a

judgment can be given in foreign

currency has recently been

considered by the House of Lords in

Mileangos v. George Frank (Textiles)

Ltd.

- (1975) 3 A.E.R. 801 -

which laid down that judgments

founded on moneys due on foreign

currency could henceforth be paid in

that foreign currency. The requirements

of International Commerce are best met

by a rule which enables the Court to

give judgment in whatever currency

the plaintiff is entitled to under the

terms of the contract. In

Barclays

Bank Ltd.

v.

Levin Brothers Ltd.

(1976) 3 A.E.R. 900, Mocatta J.

held that to obtain judgment

expressed in a foreign currency, it is

not necessary to establish that the

proper law of the contract is a

Foreign Law.

Accordingly the plaintiff is entitled

to an order that the defendant does

pay to him the sum due in Dutch

guilders or the Irish currency

equivalent thereof at the date when

the judgment in default is entered in

the office.

Damen & Zonen v. O'Shea. —

McMahon J. — unreported — 25

May, 1977.

RIGHT TO LIGHT

Exjunction granted to plaintiff to

demolish defendant's extension, as it

obstructed the light of plaintifTs

diningroom.

Plaintiff is owner of premises in

Palmerston Gardens, Dublin, and

defendant is owner of adjoining

premises. These houses form part of

a row of two storey non-basement

houses with returns, built in pairs.

The return of plaintiff's house is on

north side, while that of the defendant

is on the south side.

The defendant built an extension

from the rere of his house to the

garden wall, which was 12 feet high

for a distance of 21 feet, and had a

flat roof. The plaintiff complains

that there has been an actionable

interference with his right to light to

the ground floor of his premises,

which he uses as a dining room. The

plaintiff contends that in any event

the dining room was not a well-lit

room, and that the erection of the

defendant's extension has caused a

further substantial diminution of light

in that room.

The plaintiff's wife was first

approached in April 1974 and asked

by the builder whether she had any

objection to the defendant building

the extension. The plaintiffs wife told

the builder that he would have to get

in touch with the plaintiff, who

emphasised that he would protect his

rights if the building was too high;

this was confirmed by a letter of 21

April 1974. The erection of the

extension commenced after 15 May

1974 to a height of 12 feet 10 inches.

The plaintiff's solicitors wrote to the

defendant on 21 May 1974 to the

effect that, as a result of a search in

the Planning Department, they could

not discover any evidence of an

application for permission to erect

the extension. The solicitors for the

plaintiffs then stated that, if the work

continued, an application would be

made to the Court for an Injunction.

No notice was taken of this letter and

the extension was completed. The

various witnesses for the plaintiff now

proved that the diningroom was

much darker than formerly. There is

no doubt that the erection of the

defendant's extension has caused a

substantial deprivation of light to the

plaintiff's dining room. The plaintiff

is accordingly entitled to compel the

defendant to remove the extension

which he has built. This is all the

more the case, as the defendant

persisted in the building of the

extension with notice of the plaintiff's

objection, and that apparently the

extension was built without planning

permission.

Loughney v. Byrne — Murnaghan J.

— unreported — 7 October 1974.

CERTIORARI

Conditional Order of Certiorari

discharged as Tribunal had observed

rules of Natural Justice in deducting

Social Welfare benefits from

prosecutrix.

Conditional Order of Certiorari

granted to the prosecutrix, Monica

Hayes, on 2 March, 1977, to quash

the award made by the Criminal

Injuries Compensation Tribunal in

respect of the death of John Hayes,

on the following grounds:—

(1) The Tribunal did not have

jurisdiction to reduce the gross

value of the loss suffered by the

dependants of John Hayes by a

sum which was the value of the