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GAZETTE
JULY
LANDLORD AND TENANT
Applicants not entitled to new
tenancy, as premises are not a
"tenement" not being within an
"urban area".
The applicants applied to the Circuit
Court for a new tenancy in respect of
premises at Waterstown Avenue,
Paimerstown, Co. Dublin, which had
been granted for 10 years from 13
August 1966. The respondents
contended that the premises were not
a "tenement" within the Landlord
and Tenant Acts 1931-71. The
Circuit Court on 17 January 1977
granted a new lease of the premises
for 21 years, and its terms were fixed
by the Court. The respondents
appealed.
The respondents contend that the
demised premises do not constitute a
"tenement" as they are allegedly not
situated in an "urban area". The
applicants contend that the premises
are situate in the village of
Palmerstown, and are therefore in an
"urban area". The site of the
applicants is however situated just off
a private driveway in open fields
approximately 175 yards from the
nearest habitation, and the mode of
access to it does not bring it within a
defined "urban area". As the
premises are not a "tenement" within
the Act, the applicants' claim for a
new tenancy must fail, and the
decision of the Circuit Court must be
reversed.
Readymix Ltd. v. Liffey Sandpits
Ltd. — Costello J. — unreported — 8
June 1977.
PLANNING
Application for permission to erect
temporary buildings includes an
access roadway — Advertisement
published gives the plaintiff residents
no notice of this — Declaration
granted that the permission granted
was not a valid permission.
Applicant nun, the first defendant,
pub l i s h ed
an
i n a d e qu a te
advertisement concerning an
application for permission to erect
three temporary prefabricated
classrooms at a secondary school
with more than six acres of ground;
this notice did not purport to include
a roadway giving access to the
schools through a cul-de-sac. It is
clear that access from this cul-de-sac
to the school generally is not within
the nature of an application to erect
p r e f a b r i c a t ed
c l a s s r o om s.
The grant of permission was not
validly granted and the plaintiff re-
sidents are entitled to a declaration
accordingly. The planning per-
mission must specify the exact
work to be done. Any person who
thinks he is prejudiced by it can
appeal because he has before him
details of the work to be done. If
there were an agreement between the
appellants and the planning
authority, there would be no way for
other residents like the plaintiffs to
appeal.
Kelleghan, Dodd and O'Brien v.
Mary Corby and Dublin Corporation
—McMahon J. — unreported — 12
November, 1976.
PRACTICE
Court says Gardai may use DPP'S
name in prosecution
The Supreme Court upheld an
appeal by the Director of Public
Prosecutions from a decision of Mr.
Justice McMahon in the High Court
in which he dad decided that the
District Justice could not hear
charges brought by a member of the
Garda Siochana in the name of the
DPP when no specific authorisation
had been obtained from him.
Because of the importance of the
point of law decided,however, the
Court allowed the respondents their
costs.
The matter arose out of charges
against William Roddy, John J. Duff
and Edmond Roddy, all of
Cloonlumney, Co. Roscommon, in
Ballaghadereen District Court in
September, 1975. The charges
included assault, obstruction of the
Gardai in the execution of their duty,
using language calculated to lead to a
breach of the peace, and being drunk
and disorderly.
No Authorisation given by DPP
District Justice Gilvarry, in a
consultative case stated, asked the
High Court to say whether he could
hear charges brought by a member of
the Garda Siochana in the name of
the Director when he accepted that
no specific authorisation was
obtained from the DPP.
The District Justice, in his case
stated, said that it was conceded by
the Superintendent that no such
authorisation had been obtained, and
it had therefore been submitted on
behalf of the defendants that the
charges brought in the name of the
DPP were not properly laid against
them.
Opposite View
In the High Court, Mr. Justice
McMahon had held that such
charges brought in the name of the
DPP did require his specific
authorisation.
In the Supreme Court, the Chief
Justice, Mr. Justice O'Higgins, said
that no general authorisation given to
the Gardai to bring prosecutions in
the name of the DPP would suffice.
In his view, Mr. Justice McMahon
had been correct and the appeal
should be dismissed.
Mr. Justice Griffin and Mr. Justice
Parke, who were the other members
of the Court, took the opposite view
and in separate judgments said that
they would allow the appeal.
Mr. Justice Griffin, in his
judgment, said it had been conceded
in the District Court that the
authorisation of the DPP had not
been obtained. Reliance, however,
was placed on a letter dated January
9th, 1975, from the DPP to the
Commissioner of the Garda
Siochana asking him to bring to the
notice of Gardai that as and from
January 19, 1975, the DPP would,
pursuant to the provisions of the
Prosecutions of Offences Act, 1974,
perform all the functions formerly
performed by the Attorney-General
in relation to all criminal matters
defined in the Act.
Before the passing of the Criminal
Justice (Administration) Act, 1924,
all prosecutions were brought in the
name of the King unless they were
brought by persons authorised by law
to do so, including common
informers who were always entitled
at common law to institute a
prosecution. For the purpose of
bringing a prosecution in the name of
the King it was not necessary to
obtain the consent or permission of
the King to do so.
Existing Rights
The 1924 Act substituted the
Attorney-General for the King in
respect of prosecutions brought in the
District Court but continued to
preserve existing rights. There
seemed to have been no settled rule
as to whether such prosecutions
should be brought in the name of the
Attorney-General, or at the suit of
the Superintendent or in the name of
the prosecuting Garda. Where the
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