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GAZETTE

JULY

Custody, Adultery and the

Welfare Principle

Paper delivered by Alan J. Shatter, at the Summer Meeting of the

Incorporated Law Society of Ireland, May, 1977 in Wexford.

The law as to Guardianship and Custody of Children is

governed by the Guardianship of Infants Act, 1964. The

Act gives statutory expression to the equitable rule that all

matters concerning guardianship and custody of children

should be decided on the basis of the welfare of the child,

and to the constitutional principle that parents have equal

rights to and are the joint guardians of their children.

Section 3. of the 1964 Act provides that :

"Where in any proceedings before any Court the custody,

guardianship or upbringing of an infant... is in question,

the Court in deciding that question shall regard the

welfare of the infant as the first and paramount

consideration".

Welfare in relation to an infant is said to comprise its

religious and moral, intellectual, physical and social

welfare.

Giving judgment in the Supreme Court in

MJi.O'S v.

P.O.O.'S

(1974) Walsh, J. stated that:

"All the ingredients which the Act stipulates . . .

namely the religious, moral, intellectual, physical and

social welfare of the child are to be considered globally".

The matter is not "to be decided by the simple method

of totting up the marks which may be awarded under

each of the five headings. It is the totality of the picture

presented which must be considered".

In viewing this picture the Courts since the coming into

force of the 1964 Act have constantly reiterated that

"An award of custody is not a prize for good

matrimonial behaviour".

Evidence tending to prove that the behaviour of one or

other parent contributed to or caused the breakdown of

the parents marriage "is relevant only to the character of

the respective parents with a view to deciding whether the

welfare of a particular child would be best served by being

left in the custody of one parent rather than the other"

(Fitzgerald J. In

B.

v.

B. [1975] I.R. 54, (S.C.-

1970).

Thus the fact that one parent must bear the bigger

share of the blame for the collapse of his or her marriage

does not mean that he has by his conduct forfeited the

right to be awarded the custody of his children. However,

Kenny, J. has pointed out that where a marriage has

broken down

"It may be possible to show that the welfare of the

children requires that one or other parent should by

reason of character of conduct be excluded from

consideration as being a person unfit to have custody"

(Kenny J. In

B. v. B.

July 1972 unreported H.C.)

In determining a parent's fitness the danger of the moral

corruption of the child in respect of whom the award of

custody is sought has been given considerable weight by

the Courts and it seems that a parent engaging in an

adulterous liaison will have considerable difficulty in

securing an Order of custody. It is in this area that

members of the judiciary, both in the High Court and the

Supreme Court have produced a variety of conflicting

opinions and approaches in the application of the welfare

principle.

Custody not reward for good matrimonial

behaviour

In January 1971 Kenny, j. in the High Court

delivered Judgment in the case of

M.O.'B. vJ*M.O'B.,

the facts of which are as follows.

The father sought the custody of his four children, two

girls aged 9j and 7 years and two boys aged 8 and 5

years. The parties had married in April of 1960, but by

September of 1965 their marriage had totally broken

down. In March of 1966 the High Court granted custody

of the four children to the wife. In 1970 the wife

struck up a relationship with another man (a Mr. G.) and

at the date of these proceedings Mr. G. was living with the

wife. Kenny, J. described the husband as "unfeeling,

insensitive, unemotional and very self centred", and

further stated that "he wants to get custody of the

children now primarily because he does not want his wife

to have them and because he knows that she is

passionately attached to them". Further there was

evidence that all four children were fond of G.

Emphasising that "custody is not a reward for good

matrimonial behaviour" Kenny J., continued,

"Nor should the Court deprive a parent of it, as a way of

showing its disapproval of conduct, which most people in

a community regard as being immoral"

Although stating that the children's

"Religious and moral welfare is not promoted by Mrs.

O'B's living with G. as his wife, although not married to

him", he continued

"I do not accept the proposition that a parent who has

been guilty of matrimonial misconduct is necessarily unfit

to have custody or that the "Innocent" party is in every

case the one who will best promote the welfare of the

child".

With regard to the age of the children, the fact that

they had remained in the mother's custody for five years

and in view of their need of stability and affection he felt

the children should remain with the mother. In a final

reference to her relationship with G. Kenny, J. stated that

"From the standpoint of the moral welfare of the children

it was deplorable, but in considering its effects . . . it is

relevant to point out that Mr. and Mrs. O'B. had not lived

together since September 1965, and that the association

with G. began in March of 1970".

A few months later the Supreme Court delivered

Judgment in the case of

JJ.W. v. BJM. W.,

in which a

similar problem arose. In this case the husband and the

wife had been living in England and in 1969 the wife left

her husband and went to live with a Mr. L. There were

three children of the marriage, all girls, aged

9, 7 and 3 years. When the wife left home she took

the two youngest girls with her, but the husband regained

custody of the children. The husband returned to Dublin

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