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GAZETTE

JULY

Social Welfare benefits payable

on his death;

(2) The Tribunal wrongfully

purported to assess the Social

Welfare benefits without giving

the prosecutrix an opportunity of

making submissions.

This Tribunal was set up by direct

executive act and by means of a

Scheme which the Minister for

Justice laid before the Houses of the

Oireachtas in February, 1974, and

not by any statute. Briefly the

Scheme provided that this Tribunal

could pay ex

gratia

compensation in

.pect of an injury which is directly

attributable to a crime of violence, or

if the victim attempted to assist the

prevention of crime or the saving of

human life. The Tribunal is free to

determine the amount of the

compensation, and there is no appeal

from its verdict. Despite these

conditions, the High Court on

Certiorari can intervene if the

principles of Natural Justice are not

observed.

The prosecutrix is the widow of

John Hayes, who, whilst an employee

of- Aer Lingus, was killed by the

setting off of a bomb at Dublin

Airport. She duly brought an

application before this Tribunal for

compensation on behalf of herself

and other dependents. The

application was supported with an

actuarial report based on the earnings

of the deceased which the Tribunal

considered in detail. The scheme

provides that the compensation tr

awarded will be on the basis

damages under the Civil Liability

Act, 1961. Section 50 of the Civil

Liability Act provides that, in

assessing damages for fatal injuries,

account shall not be taken of any

pension, gratuity, or other like benefit

payable under Statute. This clearly

excludes as a deduction any Social

Welfare benefit payable to a

dependant. The Tribunal contends

that, if on the ordinary construction

of the word "claimant", it means any

person entitled to claim, the Scheme

provides that any person claiming

compensation from this Tribunal,

which is entirely funded by the

Government, should be prevented

from obtaining further funds from

Government sources. Therefore, as

regards Point (1) ante, the Tribunal

was acting entirely within its

jurisdiction. As regards Point (2), the

prosecutrix gave evidence before the

Tribunal, and her legal representative

was invited to make submissions with

regard to her claim. The prosecutrix

was duly informed at the hearing that

the Tribunal intended to deduct the

Social Welfare benefits from the

amounts payable for compensation.

Accordingly there was no want of

Natural Justice in the proceedings

before the Tribunal, and the Tribunal

was correct in its approach to the

matter. It follows that the Order of

Certiorari will be discharged, and the

cause shown against the making of

the Order will be made absolute.

The State (Monica Hayes) v. The

Criminal Injuries Compensation

Tribunal —Finlay P. - Unreported

- 24 May, 1977.

Negligence — Fatal Injury

New trial directed on the issue of

damages and of mental distress —

Correct actuarial evidence not

applied in assessing damages.

The plaintiff was the mother of the

deceased, and, as a dependant under

the Civil Liability Act, 1961, took an

action for negligence on behalf of

herself and nine other dependants, in

respect of the death of Jeremiah

Dowling in the course of his

employment at defendant's factory at

Monkstown, Co. Cork, on 23rd

May, 1973. The action was heard by

Murnaghan J. in Cork sitting without

a jury, and damages in the sum of

£3,060 were assessed, The Judge

also awared £940 for mental distress,

making a total award of £4,000. The

plaintiff appealed against this award,

seeking to have it set aside, on the

ground that the Judge failed to have

regard to the evidence of the actuary

in assessing damages, and that the

total sum awarded was perverse,

inadequate and against the weight of

evidence.

The deceased was bom in July,

1955, and was not yet 18 years of

age at the date of the accident. The

amount of his wages varied

according to the number of hours

worked, as he was employed at an

hourly rate. He had been employed by

the defendants for 5 months before

his death. There were nine children in

the family. The deceased paid about

£12.00 per week to his mother, and

the net value to the family of his

contribution was £8.00.

Although the actuarial evidence did

not substantiate this, the trial Judge

was quite satisfied that the reasonable

probability in that case was that

certainly by the time he reached the

age of 23 years the deceased would

have left home, and probably would

have got married. As the deceased

was not 18 at the time of his death,

there was no evidence of any kind

touching his intentions with regard to

marriage.

Walsh J., in considering what a

Court should do in such a situation,

stated that a Court could only have

resort to such probable pattern as might

reasonably be deduced from available

statistics. The plaintiff was not absolved

from the primary duty of discharging

the necessary burden of proof which

required not merely the evidence given

by the actuary but a more detailed

analysis of that evidence than was in

fact given. Walsh J. said that the trial

Judge admittedly misunderstood the

nature of the actuarial evidence. The

figure of the actuary was based on a

calculation which related particularly to

a case of a person who was unmarried

but who would probably get married in

accordance with statistics. It followed

that a new trial should be ordered in

respect of the damages resulting from

the loss of dependancy.

Walsh J. said that it was not possible

to detect upon what evidence the trial

Judge awarded £940. The correct

approach was for the Judge to make a

notional award in the sum which he

would on the evidence be justified in

giving to each of the persons who

suffered mental distress, without taking

into account the maximum sum of

£1,000. If the total of the notional

figures, when arrived at, exceeded

£1,000, then the figures should be

scaled down proportionately, so that the

total is reduced to £1,000. As this

procedure has not been followed in this

case, a new trial was directed on the

issue of compensation for mental

distress as well as on the issue of

damages.

Dowling v. Jedos Ltd. — Supreme

Court (Walsh, Kenny, and Parke

JJ.) per Walsh J - unreported - 30

March, 1977.

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