11 / 364
38 Ashe Street, Listowel, Co. Kerry;
James J.
Nestor, Dunmore, Co. Galway; William F.
O'Driscoll, B.C.L., Bandon, Co. Cork; Michael V.
O'Mahony, B.C.L., LL.B., (N.U.I.), 62 Stiles Road,
Clontarf, Dublin (Silver Medal) ; Niall P. O'Neill,
Ard Caein, Naas, Co. Kildare; David W. Prentice,
96 Granite Field Estate, Dun Laoghaire, Co. Dublin ;
Edmond M. Veale, B.C.L., (N.U.I.) 30 St. Kevins
Park, Dartry, Dublin.
ROAD TRAFFIC ACTS 1933 AND 1961
Copies of the Department of Local Government
circular relative to the above may be obtained from
the Department;
they contain a statement of the
provisions of the law of the Road Traffic Act, 1961
and the Orders, Regulations, Byelaws and rules made
thereunder which are now in force; particulars of
the provisions of the Road Traffic Act, 1933 and
certain other enactments which have been repealed
by the 1961 Act, and particulars of Orders etc., made
under the 1933 Act which is still in force. The
statement covers the position as at ist April, 1964
and supersedes all previous statements issued by the
Department on the subject.
CASES OF THE MONTH
Costs Itemised Bill.
In a recent unreported decision of Kenny J. in the
High Court the plaintiffs on a special summons were
the solicitors for a limited company and the defend–
ants were the company. The solicitors sought a
direction remitting a solicitor and own client bill for
taxation, the clients having refused to sign the
requisition to tax. The charges related to business
done in connection with a number of take over
agreements and the bill was drawn at £2,600. The
first bill submitted was a lump sum bill for this
amount and the clients required particulars under
clause 6 of the Solicitors' Remuneration General
Order, 1960.
In the particulars submitted all the
work done was summarised under the heading of
instructions running to over 100 pages and the last
six pages of the bill comprised itemised charges
amounting to a sum of between £300 and £400.
Kenny, J. held that the system of solicitors' remuner–
ation for non-contentious business had been funda–
mentally changed by the Solicitors' Remuneration
General Order, 1960. The instructions fee allowed
the Taxing Master to give remuneration over and
above the total of the itemised charges where having
regard to the considerations enumerated in item i
of the schedule he thought it reasonable to do so.
His lordship stated that the charge of £i for the first
hour of an attendance with 15 /- for each subsequent
half hour might be grossly inadequate. He hel 1
however, that the General Order required that in a
particularised bill the items should be separately
listed and priced under items 2 to 20 of the schedule
and that the instructions fee should be shown
separately.
Any particular items of work which
cannot be allocated to items 2 to 20 would be shown
under item 21 (J. H. Walshe & Co.
v.
Greenmount
Oil Co. Ltd. and Le Brocquy).
Costs.
Review of taxation.
Debenture.
Appeal on
quantum.
In a solicitor and own client bill relating inter alia
to a debenture securing a sum of £3,900,000 in which
no lands were involved a sum of £3,673 was charged
for instructions on the basis of one quarter of the
scale fee of a mortgage for the same amount. The
Taxing Master allowed 1,500 gns. After a review of
the bill the Taxing Master in his report referring to
item i of schedule II stated that he regarded clauses
(a), (b~)
and
(c)
germane. These relate to
(a)
the
complexity, importance, difficulty, rarity of the
questions raised
(b)
where money or property is
involved its amount or value and
(c}
the importance
of the matter to the client. The Taxing Master did
not specifically refer in his report to clauses
(d)
to
(g)
of item i which have more direct application to the
amount of work done and time expended thereon.
Budd, J. on an appeal from the Taxing Masters
found that the report afforded a ground of objection
to the principles applied to the taxation since it
appeared therefrom that the taxing master had
regard only to some of the matters enumerated in
item i and the matter was referred back so that
the taxing master should have regard to each of the
clauses in the item. A further question raised before
the Court as to whether it was now open to the Court
to consider an appeal on a pure question of quantum
by reason of the word amount in order 99 rule 38 of
the Rules of the Superior Courts, 1962 was not
decided.
(Whitney Moore and Keller
v.
Shipping
Finance Corporation Ltd.).
Damages—Delay Between Accident and Trial
The plaintiff claimed damages from his employers
for injuries suffered in an accident at work in
December, 1959. Held :
that the plaintiff had not
made his case.
Per curiam :
It is not right and fair, and makes
the Court's task an almost impossible one, that more
than four years should elapse between the accident
and the trial. For every moment that elapse between
memory gets weaker and imagination stronger:
(The Times, March I4th, 1964, Paull J.).
Medical Partnership—Dissolution.
(Partnership Act, 1890 (53 & 54 Vie. C 39) 8.26).
In 1948, two doctors A and F entered into partner-