12 / 364
ship expressed to be for their joint lives under a
written partnership deed. At the end of 1958 they
agreed in principle with another doctor, B., that all
three would go into partnership, share profits and
losses equally between them, obtain a lease of the
premises where A and F had their joint surgery, make
a clinic there and equip it at their joint expense. On
March 3rd, 1959, a Lease was granted in which A,
F. and B. were described as the lessees who would
carry on the business of medical practitioners in
partnership. A. instructed his solicitors to draft a
deed of partnership, which it was agreed would be
signed. The draft of the partnership deed was never
signed because F. objected to the seniority in holiday
provisions in it. From May nth, 1959, all three had
their surgeries at the clinic and also practised at their
respective private addresses. On October icth, 1959,
F. and B. wrote to A. that since agreement could
not be reached on the above issues the partnership
ought to be dissolved as from November 3oth, 1959.
In proceedings for dissolution of the partnership,
held, that the effect of the partnership between A.,
F. and B. was that it superseeded the partnership
between A. and F. Further, where there was no
express agreement about the duration of partnership,
26 of the Partnership Act, 1890 applied and the
partnership was rendered a partnership at will which
could be dissolved by notice of any partner. Ac–
cordingly, the partnership between A., F. and B.
was dissolved in November 3Oth, 1959; Firth
v.
Armslate ("1964) 108 S.J. 198 Plowman J. Current
Law. (1964) 3. C.L.
Projessional Negligence
P., an electrician, retained D., a solicitor, to pro–
secute his claim for damages against his employers,
arising from a fall which he sustained at a house
where his employers were carrying out subcontracting
electrical work. D., negligently allowed P's claim
to become time barred. On P's claim for damages,
held that P would on the facts have had quite a
formidable case against the employers under the
Building Regulations, 1948 and that he should
accordingly be awarded three-quarters of £2,848
i8s. 5d. to which would be added 12% for the
resulting delay :
(Gregory
v.
Tarlo (1964) 108 S.J.
219; The Times, March 6th, 1964, McNair J.,
(1964) 3 C.C.).
Practice—Pleadings.
In an action by the plaintiff for damages for
personal injuries sustained in a collision between his
motor cycle and the defendant's motor car, the
defence contained a simple denial of negligence and,
although defect in the braking system of the car had
been mentioned in correspondence between the
parties, contributory negligence was not pleaded
and the manufacturers were not joined. At the trial
the defendant sought to lead evidence of the defect.
Held :
(i) That it was sufficient for the defendant
simply to deny that he was guilty of negligence even
though he intended to show that the accident was
due to the act or neglect of a third person ; and
(2) that as the facts raised in
prima facie
case of
negligence on the part of the defendant, the defence
simply denied negligence, the plaintiff should have
been able to anticipate the defendant might rely on
the defect which had been mentioned in the cor–
respondence and accordingly could not complain
that he had been taken by surprise (McKnight
v.
McLoughlin (1963) N.I. 34, Black L. J.).
Termination of H.P. Agreement—Detinue.
No one is bound save by contract, to take a
chattel to the owner of it. His only obligation is not
to prevent the owner from getting it when he comes
for it.
A hire purchase finance company re-took from X
the car he was hiring from the company. This was
unlawful because X had paid one third of the hire
purchase price. X wrote to the Company saying he
would sue for the return of what he had paid, but
before the letter reached the company, the car was
returned and left outside his house, and X made
some use of it for about five months. About eight
months after the return the Company demanded that
the rest of the instalments under the hire purchase
agreement and later sued for these. X defending and
counterclaiming the return of which he had paid, on
the footing that the unlawful retaking had terminated
the agreement. Later, the Company amended to add
a claim in detinue and damages at a weekly rate up to
the hearing. Held that X's defence and counterclaim
succeeded, as though the return of the car was an
offer to restore the agreement it was never accepted,
and the claim in detinue failed because X was never
under an obligation to return the car, and his use of
it was as an implied bailee with the consent of the
company Capital Finance Co.
v.
Bray
(1964)
i W.L.R. 323 ; (1964) i All. E.R. 603, C.A.
Charitable Gift,
A testator gave his studio and the contents, which
included paintings by himself and others, furniture,
china, glass and bric-a-brac, to trustees and directed
that his residuary estate be used to endow the studio
as a museum for the display of his collection.
On a summons to determine whether a valid
charitable trust had been created, art experts gave
evidence that the studio was squalid and that the
collection had no educational value whatever and
Wilberforce J. held, first, that when determining
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