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an unqualified person was not prohibited from

making an application under the Land Registration

Acts unless the application could be fairly properly

described as an application for registration, and an

application for an official search or office copies were

not applications for registration (Section 58 of the

Solicitors Act, 1954 places a restriction on the

drawing of documents and were defined in sub

section (4) of that Section. The section of the Irish

Act states that it applies to the following Acts :—

The drawing or preparing of a document relating

to real or personal estate or any legal proceedings,

the making of an application or the lodging of a

document for registration under the Registration of

Title Act, 1891 or any Act amending that Act, at

the Land Registry or to or with a local registering

authority. The Irish Act would appear to be more

comprehensive on this point than the English Act,

of 1957.

The appeal against conviction on the second

charge was dismissed because on the facts, the

appellant had not discharged the onus of proving

that his acts in preparing or drafting instruments

of transfer under the Land Registration Act, 1925

were not done in expectation of fee, gain or reward

within the meaning of Sect. 20 (i)

(a)

of the Act of

J957-

(Carter

v.

Butcher—

The Law Times,

Vol. 236-207,

April gth, 1965).

Evidence ; Postage

The plaintiffs, a finance company, claimed £406

from the defendants, motor dealers, under an in

demnity in a recourse agreement in respect of a H.P.

agreement which had been terminated owing to the

hirer's default. The defendants claimed,

inter alia,

that until the issue of the writ they had not received

notice of the termination of the H.P. agreement.

It was held in the first instance that in the absence of

their postage book the plaintiffs had not strictly

proved the posting of the letters giving notice of

termination which they alleged had been sent and it

was assumed in the defendants' favour that the

notices might not have reached them.

Judgment

was given in favour of the H.P. Company for £156.

The plaintiffs appealed.

Denning, M. R., stated that the issue depended

upon whether or not the notice was given by the

finance company to the dealers of termination of the

hiring. The plaintiffs had lost their postage book.

If the finance company did not give such notice the

dealers and their position was prejudiced, the loss

was not to be held against the dealers, but must go in

diminution of the finance company's claim. Notice

was not given to the dealers until the issue of the

writ and detriment had thereby been caused to them.

The appeal should be dismissed.

Danckwerts & Winn

L.JJ.

agreed.

(Yeoman Credit Limited

v.

Birmingham Com

mercial Motor & Bodyworks Ltd.

(Solicitors Journal

(Vol. 109), p. 293).

Practice—Compromise of Action

In 1963

the plaintiff began an action claiming

relief in respect of architectural work carried out

by the defendant company of property developers ;

the defendants counter-claimed alleging negligence.

In June, 1964 the defendants' solicitors initiated

correspondence "without prejudice", with a view to

compromise, offering £400 and recognising that as

the plaintiff was legally aided they would have to

meet his costs to date. By September the offer had

been increased to £900. The plaintiff's solicitors then

wrote stating that that offer would be accepted on

the understanding that the costs incurred to date

would be paid, and stated that as the plaintiff was

legally aided they would require an order on the

costs and therefore proposed to issue a formal

summons before the Official Referee that terms of

settlement had been arrived at.

They requested

defendants' cheque in settlement and concluded,

that they would prepare a summons and forward it

for "your consent to be indorsed thereon". At the

hearing of the summons before the Official Referee,

the parties were represented only by solicitors' clerks.

The clerk for the defendants indicated that he was

not happy about the position as to costs but the

Official Referee held that, all further proceedings in

the action should be stayed save for the purpose of

carrying into effect the following items :

(i) that the

defendants pay the plaintiff the sum of £900 within

seven days ;

(2) that they pay the plaintiff's costs as

between party and party, such costs to be taxed ;

and (3) that the plaintiff's costs be taxed on a common

fund basis. The defendants appealed on the ground

that, as there was no concluded agreement to com

promise, there was no justification to make the order

which had been made.

Denning, M. R. stated that there was no consent

by the defendant's solicitors' clerk to the making of

a Tomlin order. He stated that in his view when an

action was compromised that gave rise to a new

cause of action, and if there was a dispute the plaintiff

had to sue on the compromise.

In the absence of

consent to the order, the court did not have jurisdic

tion to make it. His lordship allowed the appeal with

some reluctance as did Wynn, L. J.

Danckwerts, L. J., dissenting, said that as a

matter of construction there was on the correspon

dence a final agreement to pay £900 and that agree

ment included a term that the plaintiff's costs should

be provided.