162 / 364
Parker, G. J., said that the appeal was centred
round mitigating factors which could have per
suaded the committee, had they heard them in
full, to impose a lesser penalty. The appellant
had been in practice on his own account, alone
with one clerk and one secretary. He had, on the
evidence before the court, always borne a very
high reputation in his profession. The court was
loth to interfere, in a case of professional mis
conduct, with the penalty of
the Disciplinary
Committee. His Lordship thought that, on analy
sis, that something had gone wrong here. Was the
extreme penalty necessary in the case of a man of
nearly seventy-four, unable one way or another to
conduct his office
in a businesslike way, but
throughout a credit to his profession? Was it
necessary, for the honour of the profession, to
safeguard the public and to act as a deterrent,
that he should end his life struck off the roll?
Bearing that in mind, it seemed that the sentence
was not warranted; the honour of the profession
would be preserved, the public safeguarded and it
would be a sufficient deterrent to others if this
man, of no dishonesty, was suspended, bearing in
mind that he had already once been suspended
for a period of three years. If, at the end of three
years, he was still minded to practise, it was open
to the Law Society to grant a conditional licence
on terms, maybe that he should not practise on
his own account, but that was a matter for the
Law Society.
Ashworth and Widgery, J. J., agreed. Appeal
allowed. Suspension for three years substituted
accordingly,
(re a
solicitor—Solicitors'
Journal
(Vol. 109), p. 853.
Untaxcd Bill of Costs Including Sum for Taxation
WH had acted as solicitor to JH prior to the
latter's death in 1959. Some costs were due to the
solicitor by JH at his death and the solicitor pre
sented a bill of costs for these items to the de
ceased's personal representative. The bill included
charges for taxing the bill. The personal represen
tative paid the bill in March, 1961, and in De
cember, 1961, petitioned the High Court for an
order that the bill be referred for taxation. Held
by Kenny, J., that the payment by a client of his
solicitor's bill of costs which includes charges for
taxation of the bill
is a "special circumstance"
which requires the Court to refer the bill for
taxation (in re : Horan, I.R. 1964, p. 263).
"Court Rate" of Interest
There is no statutory provision or rule of Court
which compels the Court to adopt the rate of
interest of 4 per cent on the purchase money in
Court sales or proceedings in a specific perfor
mance. This is a decision of Mr. Justice Kenny
in Law and Anor. v. Robert Roberts and Co.
(No. 2) I.R. 1964, p. 306.
Estate Agent's Authority
"The defendants by letter, offered
leasehold
premises for sale through estate agents, H. Ltd.
O'H. (an assistant employed by H. Ltd.) showed
the premises to the plaintiff G., and his solicitor
L. A copy of the lease was furnished to L., and L.
was
informed
that the vendors would accept
£5,000 for the premises. L., from previous ex
perience, knew that the lessor held a good title.
L., informed O'H. that he had instructions to
offer £4,500 but would go to £4,750 and auction
eers fees of 2£ per cent. O'H. telephoned C.G.
the defendant's managing director who instructed
O'H. to accept £4,750 and fees. O'H. then tele
phoned L. and told him that the defendants
would accept the figure. He subsequently tele
phoned C.G. and told him that L. had agreed to
give that figure and that he O'H. would write to
both parties and confirm the offer. C.G. then told
O'H. he would have to consult his other directors.
Later the same day C.G. telephoned O'H. and
told him that his directors had agreed to the sale.
On 7th November, 1960 a director of H. Ltd.,
wrote to L. to confirm the offer and added :
'We
have asked Messrs R to have the contract for
warded to you immediately". On the same day
he wrote a corresponding
letter
to C.G. and
added :
"Would you please be good enough to
instruct your solicitors to forward a contract direct
to Mr. L." C.G. on the same day wrote to the
defendant's solicitors saying : "We have today sold
the above premises ..." On 9th November,
C.G. wrote O'H. to express regret that his direc
tors have to call the sale off.
In an action for specific performance it was
held by Kenny, J. and affirmed by the Supreme
Court (O'Dalaigh, C.J., Lavery, and Haugh, J. J.)
that (1) O'H had been authorised by the defen
dants to accept an offer of £4,750 and auction
eer's fees; (2) the reference to a contract letter of
7th November, 1965 was not intended to create a
term or condition of the agreement between the
parties; (3) the correspondence between the par
ties constituted a sufficient note or memorandum
of agreement under the Statute of Frauds.
Per Kenny, J. : The cases seem to establish the
following propositions—
57