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"(1) When a contract for a sale is made between
a purchaser and an estate agent retained by
the owner, the onus for proving that the
estate agent had authority to make a con
tract is on the purchaser.
(2) An estate agent as such has no implied
authority to conclude a contract for sale.
(3) An owner who puts his property on the
books of an estate agent and authorises him
to find a purchaser and to negotiate a sale
does not thereby authorise him to complete
a contract.
(4) An owner who puts his property on the
books of an estate agent and informs him of
the lowest price he will accept does not
thereby authorise him to conclude a con
tract.
(5) An estate agent who is instructed to sell at
a defined price has authority to conclude a
contract for sale, at that defined price if the
contract is an open contract.
(6) The estate agent may be expressly authorised
to accept on behalf of the owner an offer
made to the agent and, in that event, has
authority to conclude a contract.
(7) If an offer is made to an estate agent and
if he communicates it to the owner and is
authorised
to accept it or
if
the owner
states that he will accept it the agent has
authority to make an open contract with
the purchaser."
(Law and Another v. Robert Roberts & Go.
[Ireland] Limited [1965] I.R., p. 292).
Estate Duty—Passing of Property
On various dates between February 28th and
April 28th 1952 K. affected 14 single premium
policies on his life, each under section 11 of the
Married Women's Property Act 1882 for the bene
fit of Mrs. K. if she should survive him for more
than one month. If she should not so survive him,
the policies were to be for the benefit of the two
sons of K. in equal shares. The trusts thus created
were trusts of the policies, not merely of the
moneys to arise from them. The provisions of the
trusts showed that the trustees were under no
obligation to retain the policies in specie; and it
was in K's. contemplation that the policies might
be sold or surrendered or money raised on them
for the purpose of investment and that the trust
fund might come to consist of or include income
producing securities. K. died in October 1961.
All the policies were subsisting at his death and
an aggregate sum of £66,638-19-2 became pay
able thereunder. Mrs. K. was living at the expira
tion of one month from his death. The Crown
claimed estate duty on the policies or their pro
ceeds under Section
2(1)
(d) of
the Finance
Act, 1894. It was common ground that the policies
were "interests provided" by the deceased within
section 2
(1)
(d). The Grown would be entitled
to some duty if a beneficial interest in the policies
of any measurable value arose either on K's.
death or at the expiry of one month from his
death in view of Section 22 (1) (1) of the Finance
Act, 1894. Held : No estate duty became payable
on the death of Mrs. K. in respect of the policy
moneys because :
(1) Under the trust declared by Section 11 of
the Married Women's Property Act 1882, Mrs. K.
took a vested interest in the policies liable to be
divested on her death before the expiry of one
month from K's. death, and this vested interest
would entitle her to receive any income arising
from the policies before they vested indefeasibly,
with the consequence that her beneficial interest
was not changed in any way by K's. death.
(2) Even if the mere change from defeasibility
to indefeasibility rendered applicable Section 2
(1)
(d) of the Finance Act, 1894, the difference
in value between Mrs. K's. interest immediately
before the expiration of one month from K's.
death and its value immediately thereafter (when
it became indefeasible) was admittedly nil.
(In re. Kilpatrick's Policies Trusts. Kilpatrick
and Another v. Inland Revenue Commissioners,
Law Times, July 2, 1965 [Vol. 236] p. 375).
Receiving Stolen Property
The appellant was charged with others with
conspiring to steal bricks, and also with receiving
(contrary to Section 33
(1) of the Larceny Act
1916), stolen property, viz. two separate sums of
£7, the proceeds of the sale of two loads of the
bricks stolen pursuant to
the conspiracy. The
prosecution case rested substantially on voluntary
statements made by the appellant admitting the
receipt of the money; but there was no evidence
that he had either seen or been near the two
stolen loads or was aware that these particular
bricks had been stolen before the theft was com
pleted. On appeal on the ground that the appel
lant, a party to the conspiracy to steal, could not
also be convicted of receiving the two sums of £7
being property into which the stolen bricks were
converted within the definition of "property" in
Section 46 (1) of the Larceny Act 1916.
Held :
There was no evidence from which an
inference that the appellant was constructively
present at one or other or both of the thefts
58