160 / 364
Court.
In fact
this
instrument deals with
the
registration of business matters and does not con
tain any reference to costs. We apologise to mem
bers for any inconvenience caused by our error.
BANKING BUSINESS
In the August/September 1965
issue of
the
Gazette
a report of the case United Dominions
Trust Ltd v. Kirkwood extracted from the Law
Times 23rd July, 1965, was published. A member-
has written and suggested that a wrong impression
of the effect of the judgment may have been
given in the note published in the
Gazette. The
member states that it was a defence submission
that the matters in question (i.e.
the taking of
money on
current account,
the payment of
chccpcs drawn on oneself and the collection of
cheques for customers were matters essential to
the legal concept of banking) were essential to the
carrying out of the banking business. The Judge
adopted that for the limited purpose of the case
before him. It seems a fair inference that he only
did so to enable him to make the point that if
they were definite requirements
to a banking
business they had been fully satisfied by the plain
tiffs in the case.
In an earlier part of his judgment he reviewed
various authorities and deduced from them that
it had not been clearly established that the re
quirements in question were essential. The Judge
expressly declined to define a banking business or
to say that it was not possible to carry on a
banking business without at least taking money
on current account, paying cheques drawn on
oneself or collecting cheques for customers.
INTEREST ON JUDGMENT
The following information appeared under the
above heading in
the April 1965
issue of the
Gazette.
The matter
is of
importance and
is
republished lest overlooked on the previous oc
casion :
"Order 41, Rule 6 of the Rules of the Superior
Court, 1962, provides
that every judgment or
order when filed shall be deemed
to be duly
entered and the date of such filing deemed to be
the date of entry. Under the 1905 Rules provision
was made that interest should run from the time
the judgment was entered or the order was made.
A similar provision is to be found in the 1962
Rules. The 1905 Rules did not provide that in
terest on the amount of a judgment should com
mence to run from the date the order was per
fected. There is, however, a difference between
the 1905 and 1962 Rules. The former contained
a provision (Order 41, Rule 2) that entry of the
judgment should be dated as of the date when
the judgment was pronounced and the judgment
was to take effect trom that date. This particular
rule does not appear to have been repeated in the
1962 Rules. Tne matter is of importance when
judgment is given for a large amount where delay
may postpone the date from which interest is to
run. The remedy, however, appears to lie in the
provisions of Order 42, Rule 15 of the 1962 Rules
which concluded with the words 'unless the judg
ment otherwise directs'. It would therefore appear
to be advisable to instruct counsel to ask for a
special order directing interest to run from the
date of the pronouncement of the judgment and
thus restore the position to what it was under the
1905 rules.
Normally there should be no delay between the
date of perfection of the judgment and the date of
entry save in cases where the procedure is to have
in the first instance a Registrar's Certificate which
is then followed by an entry of judgment based
upon it.
In such cases
it
is a matter for the
solicitor as to how soon he wishes to lodge the
necessary papers for the purpose of having judg
ment entered. Very often in cases such as where
there is a pending appeal he may not wish to
enter judgment until the outcome is determined.
In the case of Chancery judgments and orders
and on some Common Law orders there may be
delay as to perfection of the order in difficult and
complicated cases but there will never be any
delay between the date of perfection when ulti
mately arrived at and the date of entry, that is to
say filing as per Order 41, Rule 6.
This matter has been referred to the Society's
representatives on the appropriate rule making
committee for consideration by the committee."
MEATH SOLICITORS ASSOCIATION
At the Annual Meeting of the above Association
held on 28th October, the following officers were
elected: Donal Kearney, Oldcastle, President;
Thomas Noonan, Kells, Hon. Secretary
and
Treasurer; Patrick Noonan, Athboy, Provincial
Delegate.
Committee: Nathaniel Lacy, Stephen Keaveny,
Frank Reilly, Frank Thornton, Alan Donnclly
and Michael Smyth.
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