267 / 364
stantial amount of the deficiencies were caused by
Bertram Hall. It might be
that, as
the Law
Society .said, while he had to allow a measure of
independence to a very skilled conveyancing clerk,
aged 60, yet Mr. Lincoln failed to exercise even a
rneasure of supervision, but it was unnecessary to
go into, that matter and his Lordship would treat
this as a case where no effective supervision could
possibly, have disclosed what was occurring. His
Lordship was content to deal with the matter in
regard to the delay in the keeping of the accounts
and the fact that a very considerable deficiency
was disclosed quite apart from any that resulted
from Hall's actions.
It had been said more than once in this court
that where professional misconduct was concerned
—that is, misconduct in the profession—this court
would not readily interfere with the penalty which
the Disciplinary Committee thought appropriate.
Having considered all the matters, and, in par
ticular, the strong mitigation put forward, his
Lordship was constrained to say that not only
would he not readily interfere but that he entirely
agreed with what the Disciplinary Committee had
ordered.
Mr. Justice Ashworth and Mr. Justice James
agreed.
[Re/A Solicitor
(Ellis Lincoln);
The Times,
Friday, 29 July 1966.]
Termination of Solicitors Retainer
Negotiations being in progress between the de
fendants and others with a view to developing a
London building site through the medium of a
building agreement and subsequent lease, a part
ner in a firm of solicitors concerned, who had long
acted for B., one of the parties to the negotiations,
wrote to. the defendants on 11/3/1959, a letter
confirming the basis of the agreement between the
defendants and .B The letter included the follow
ing paragraph! 'May we please take this oppor
tunity of placing on record the understanding that
all the legal work of and incidental to the com
pletion of the development and the grant of the
leases shall be carried out by us."
At the time of the letter there was no existing
agreement, so the court found, between the solici
tors and the prospective client (the defendants)
for employment in legal business. The solicitors in
fact transacted some legal work in connection with
the development and with fringe properties. In
1962
the solicitors enquired of
the defendants
whether they should call for a lease in pursuance
of the building agreement and as to the method
of disposing of flats built on the site, and the
defendants replied that they had by then their
own legal department, and that they were unable
to instruct the solicitors.
By further letter, dated 5/11/1962 the defen
dants wrote to the solicitors saying that they had
acquired B's interests in 1959 and had established
their own legal department and that it was de
sirable that their legal work should be carried out
by their own solicitor. The solicitors brought an
action against the defendants claiming damages
for breach of contract tq employ them.
Held :
the claim for damages failed because :
(1) The letters of March 1959 did ,not amount
to a legal binding contract, but at most produced
confirmation on behalf of the defendants of a
present intention to instruct .the solicitors to do
legal work as and when it arose;
:
(2) Even
if, however,
there were a binding
contract of retainer, it was a retainer for non-
contentious business and was not an entire con
tract; the defendants were entitled to terminate
the retainer at any time on giving no^ipe^ to the
solicitors, and had terminated it .by |heirf, letters
in 1962.
,.
,!•(,,••. .,-
[ J. H. Milner & Son v. Percy^ $jlton. Ltd.
(1966), 2 All E.R. 894.]
"
;
:
Legal Aid in Criminal Cases
The accused was convicted of the offence of
rape. An application was made on his behalf to
the Circuit Judge pursuant to the Criminal Justice
(Legal Aid) Act, 1962, s. 4, for the purpose of
obtaining a legal aid (appeal) certificate in rela
tion to an intended appeal against the sentence of
seven years' imprisonment imposed on the accused
by the Circuit Judge. His application was refused.
The accused served notice of intention to apply
to the Court of Criminal Appeal for liberty to
appeal against the sentence imposed. An applica
tion for a legal aid (appeal) certificate was then
made to the Court of Criminal Appeal seeking
legal aid for the hearing of the application for
leave to appeal against sentence. On hearing of
the application it was agreed that the accused had
no means.
It was contended on behalf of the Attorney
General that the provisions of section 4 (3) of the
Courts of Jsutice (Legal Aid) Act, 1962, only
applied to cases where the appeal was against
conviction, but did not apply when the appeal
was against sentence and no more.
The Chief Justice delivering the judgment of
the court stated that the court was satisfied that,
under the powers of the Criminal Justice (Legal
Aid) Act, 1962, the court had power to assign
counsel to a solicitor where an accused person
who wished to appeal against the sentence im-
49