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posed upon him the court assigned to him counsel
and solicitor.
[The People (at the suit of the Attorney Gen
eral) v. Thomas Anthony Morrissey; I.L.T.R. and
S.J. (Vol. G), 1966, p. 128.]
Mental Distress—Death of Son
The provisions of the Civil Liability Act, 1961
(No. 41 of 1961) s. 49 were considered in a case
which came before Lavery, J., in Glaway in Oc
tober of 1965. The plaintiff was the mother of
John Gubbard who was a worker employed by the
second named defendant, who was killed while
discharging cargo from a ship, the property of the
first named defendants at Galway. The deceased
was aged fifty-five and a bachelor and he lived
with the plaintiff, a sister Margaret, a brother
Patrick, and a niece Mary V. McMahon, to whom
he was in loco parentis. Other members of the
family were three brothers and one sister, Sarah
McMahon, who did not live in the family home.
Held (1) the Act did not intend to provide
large compensation for every member of the fam
ily. (2) Compensation should be awarded only to
those who have some real intense feeling or have
been grieviously affected by the death.
[Mary Cubbard v. Rederij Viribus Unitis and
Glaway Stevedores Ltd.; I.L.T.R. (Vol. C), 1966,
p. 40.]
Meaning of Public Place—Onus of Proof
R. was charged in the District Court with
offences under sections 49 and 52 of the Road
Traffic Act, 1961, in connection with the driving
of a motor car. The essence of each offence was
that it should have happened or been committed
in a "public place" as defined in section 3 (1) of
the Road Traffic Act, 1961, as meaning "in a
street, road or other place to which the public
have access with vehicles whether of right or by
permission or whether subject to or free of charge".
The only evidence deduced by the State as to the
place where the said offences were alleged to have
happened or been committed was that it was
described by one of the witnesses for the prose
cution as a private car park :
that it was situate
near licensed premises known as Mill House : and
that near the defendant's motor car there was
situate a motor taxi and at least one other motor
car. At the close of the State case, a direction
having been applied for on behalf of the defen
dant on the grounds that no evidence had been
deduced to show that the offences had been com
mitted in a public place, the District Justice sub
mitted a case with questions of law to the High
Court.
Held by Davitt, P., (1) that the onus was on
the prosecution to establish by proper evidence
that the offences were committed in a public
place as defined by section 3 of the Road Traffic
Act, 1961, and (2) that the prosecution had not
proved that the place in question was one to
which the public had access and thus failed to
prove an essential element of each offence.
[The Attorney General (at the suit of Supt.
Patrick G. McLoughlin) v. Thomas Rhatigan;
I.L.T.R. (Vol. C), 1966, p. 37.]
Duty of Local Authority to Maintain Highway
In January or February 1965 when a highway
authority inspected the pavement of a busy road,
all the flagstones were in a good, sound, level
condition. In June 1965 the plaintiff fell over a
ridge of a flagstone which projected half an inch
above the adjoining flagstone. The time when
the defect occurred and its cause were unknown.
The plaintiff brought an action against the
authority for damages for personal injruies, alleg
ing,
inter alia,
non feasance. There was evidence
that the flagstone was potentially dangerous, that
three-monthly inspections of the highway were
desirable but that no such systematic inspection
was carried out because, although the authority
could employ more labourers who might be trained
to carry out such inspections, they could not
obtain the necessary skilled tradesmen to do the
repairs and that a labourer could have repaired
the flagstone. The County Court Judge found
that the flagstone was a potential danger and that,
although a system of inspection could have been
devised, it would in fact have resulted in no
practical improvement of the condition of the
roads in the area and that it was pure speculation
whether the defect existed in March 1965 and,
therefore, whether a systematic inspection would
have disclosed it. He considered that in order to
establish their defence under section 1 (2) of the
Highways (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1961,
the authority had to prove that they had em
ployed the standard of care reasonably required
of all highway authorities and, since they had
merely proved that they could not comply with
that standard, their defence failed. He awarded
the plaintiff £75 damages. The authority appealed
on the ground,
inter alia,
that the judge had mis
directed himself in that he considered that he
should not take into account their inability to
obtain an adequate labour force, but they did not
appeal against the finding that the flagstone was
dangerous.
The Court of Appeal, dismissing the appeal
(Sellers, L. J., dissenting), held that since there
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