The Gazette 1964/67

349 / 364

own hands in his endeavours on behalf of his
client, cited as co-respondent, in order to get the
husband to abandon the action. The solicitor
asked for an adjournment on the ground that
evidence and witnesses he wished to have avail
able could not be put before the committee on
that date. The committee refused an adjournment,
whereupon the solicitor, protesting that he had
not had a chance fully to prepare his case, walked
out, and the committee concluded the hearing in
his absence, found that his course of action in
attempting to cause the abandonment of the
divorce proceedings against his client was de
plorable, and ordered that his name be struck
off the Roll. The Divisional Court, expressing the
view that even if there had been an adjournment,
the committee's findings with regard to the divorce
suit would have been the same, dismissed his
appeal. The solicitor applied for leave to appeal.
Lord Denning, M.R., said that if the solicitor
had stayed he would have had a perfectly fair
hearing and had only himself to thank for leaving
as he did. The Master of the Rolls further stated
that leave to appeal should be refused on the
ground both of the adjournment and the request
for a review of the order with further evidence.
Harman, L. J., concurring, said that there was
ample material to justify the committee's decision.
The solicitor did not think any holds were barred.
He was prepared to go to any length : tape re
corders under the table, every kind of chicanery
and bluff, suggestions of blackmail by the other
solicitor, any suggestions that might stifle the
proceedings. His behaviour showed that he was
not fit to pursue the honourable calling of a
solicitor. Salmon, L.J., also concurring, said that
it was clear from the transcript of the tape re
cording that the solicitor was uttering naked
threats with a view to advancing his own client's
interest, regardless of the ordinary standards of
propriety. His lordship would have been surprised
if the Law Society had not taken the view that
anyone capable of that conduct was not fit ot
remain on the Roll. Application refused.
(Click v The Law Society. The Solicitors'
journal, March 17th, 1967 [Vol. Ill] p. 215).
Certiorari — When Applicable to Statutory Board
A board which is set up by statute to determine
zoning orders may, contrary to the general rule of
law that a person should not be judge in his
own cause, determine zoning orders even though it
has pecuniary interest. But though a writ of
certiorari does not apply to the above, it does
apply if a committee appointed by the same
board to investigate and report on the zones does
135
not state in the report the evidence heard, and
at the public hearing did not consider written
evidence. Accordingly the zoning order was
quashed.
(Jeffs and Ors. v New Zealand Dairy Production
and Marketing Board and Ors. (1966) 3 All E.R.
p. 863).
Insurance — Public Liability Policy
A telephone cable was damaged by a workman
employed by Potter & Co. Ltd., which had taken
out a public liability policy with the Norwich
Union. Potter & Co. Ltd., went into liquidation,
so the Post Office contended as a preliminary
point of law that they could pursue an action
against the insurance company under the Third
Parties (Rights against Insurers) Act 1930, s. 1.
The policy provided that the insurance company
would indemnify the insured "against all sums
which the insured shall become liable to pay."
The insurance company contended that they were
under no liability to the Post Office unless the
precise amount of liability of the insured to the
Post Office had been determined. No agreenmet as
to the amount of any liability had been i cached
between the insured and the Post Office, nor had
there been an agreement between the Post Office
and the liquidator of the insured.
It was held (C. ord Denning, M.R., Har
man and Salmon . : January 18, 1967) (re
versing the decisio onaldson J. : N.L.J. Nov
ember 17, 1966, p. 1544) that the Post Office were
not entitled to pursue their action against the
insurance company. The right procedure was for
the Post Office to sue the wrongdoer, and having
got judgment against the wrongdoer, they could
then make a claim against the insurance company.
But to sue the insurance company direct, before
liability had been ascertained, was not correct.
(Post Office v Norwich Union Fire Insurance
Society Ltd.— The Times, January 19, 1967).
Arbitration — Extension of the time Limit
Ship-owners and charters had entered into a
charter-party containing an arbitration clause,
which provided that : "Any claim must be made
in writing and claimant's arbitrator appointed
within three months of final discharge and where
this provision is not complied with, the claim shall
be deemed to be waived and absolutely barred."
A fire broke out on board the chartered vessel,
and this led to delay and final discharge of the
cargo did not take place until March 26, 1966.
Accordingly, all claims would have to be made by
June 26. The shipowners and charters, who were
both victims of the fire, met and agreed to their