350 / 364
representatives "putting their heads together to
dispose of all
their troubles." A meeting was
arranged for June 27,
i.e., one day after the
time limit for arbitration had expired. At that
meeting it was felt that one side or the other
would make an offer to settle the outstanding
disputes. No offer was made on either side and on
July 6 when
the
shipowners applied
Lo
the
charterers for arbitration, the charterers contended
that the application was time-barred. So the ship
owners asked the court to extend the time for
arbitration under the Arbitration Act 1950 s. 27.
It was held (C.A. :
Lord Denning M.R., and
Salmon L.J.; Harman L.J., dissenting :
January
19, 1967) that the time should be extended be
cause
"undue hardship" would otherwise be
caused to the shipowners. If there was an excus
able mistake and no prejudice to the other side, it
might also be too harsh to deprive an individual
of ever making his claim, all the more so if the
mistake were contributed to or shared by the
other party. Though, when the charterers went
to the meeting on June 27 they did not intend
to mislead the shipowners, nevertheless their con
duct in going on with the negotiations at that
date put the shipowners off their guard. Leave
to appeal to the House of Lords was granted.
(Liberian Shipping Corporation v A. King &
Sons Ltd.—
The Times,
January 20, 1967).
Rating
—
Residential Caravan
In this case, the Court of Appeal upheld the
decision of the Lands Tribunal that a caravan
in residential use was in exclusive occupation of
the caravan owner for rating purposes. The cara
van in question was occupied as a permanent
residence throughout the year. Although it was
mobile and still on wheels and the site owners
had power to move it, having control of access
to the site,
the caravan had remained on
the
same site for over four years, with electricity and
drainage connections. The caravan and its pitch
constituted one unit of occupation which was a
rateable hereditament; a chattel, although not
rateable per se, might become so if enjoyed with
the requisite degree of permanence. Moreover,
the Lands Tribunal had correctly determined that
the owner of the caravan was in exclusive oc
cupation of the caravan and pitch.
(Field Place Caravan Park Ltd. and Ors. v Hard-
ing (Valuation Officer) (1966) 3 A.E.R. p. 247).
Meaning of Factory and Manual Labour
Behind the appellants' radio shop was a back
room where an engineer in their employ repaired
and adjusted television and radio sets. Part of
his job was the diagnosing of faults, but on an
average day he spent most of his time repairing
the sets and replacing faulty parts. This was done
by hand. It was held that the fact that in doing
work with his hands a man used technical know
ledge did not prevent the work being manual
work, so long as it was not primarily work of
a different kind
(e.g.
intellectual activities)
to
which work with the hands was merely accessory.
The engineer was therefore 'employed in manual
labour' for the purposes of the definition of s. 175
of the Factories Act 1961, and the premises where
he was employed were a factory.
(J. and F. Stone Lighting and Radio Ltd. v
Haygarth (1966) 3 All. E.R. p. 539).
Local Authority's Right to Erect Dual
Carriageway
On Thursday, March 9, 1967 Mr. Justice Kenny
ruled in the High Court that there is statutory
authority for the building of dual carriageways.
The plaintiff had claimed that the Dublin County
Council intended to erect a division along the
centre of the Dublin to Naas road which would
deprive him and his customers of free access to
his premises, would constitute an unlawful viola
tion of his rights and an unlawful obstruction.
The County Council had the power and the
duty to maintain and construct main road and
"maintain" included widening. It also included
reasonable improvements. If the new road, when
finished, would form one public road and if the
existing public road would then form another
public road, so that there would be two roads,
the defendants had not erected any obstruction
to either road by leaving a division in the middle
because the passage of the public would not have
been interfered with.
In delivering his reserved judgment the Judge
stated,
inter alia,
that "when completed the two
roads would together form one road, the right
of passage would not arise until the new road
had been opened to the public and the obstruction
created by the raised division would be there when
the road was made available to the public. The
public would thus get the right of passage over
the widened road with the division there already,
and he was not satisfied that such a raised div
ision in the road, created before the road had
been given over to public passage, could be a
nuisance or an obstruction.
136