ACTION THEORY 789
interests and the necessity of l
and politics.33 The second alter
found in the scientistic and tec
this standpoint, reflected in t
August Comte, freedom and d
realms of both means and ends.
reduces the ends to the level of the means and finds the same
logic applicable to both of them. Freedom is defined by the
technocratic theory as the type of action which is based upon
scientific knowledge and scientific principles.34 Authority
becomes an authority over things and not over humans. A free
act is based upon universal principles of science and
consequently lacks any discretionary or arbitrary element.
That is why industrial society is defined as the realm of
freedom, whereas military society is identified as domination
of humans over humans. Naturally, in the context of
technocratic theory domination is defined as any deviation
from the norm of scientism. Strangely enough, a structure of
decision-making monopolized by the professional scientists
and experts which excludes the rest of the society is conceived
by technocratic theorists as perfectly free.
As opposed to conservative romantic-functionalist, liberalist,
and technocratic theories, there is an entirely different
theoretical tradition which bases the concepts of freedom and
agency upon the notion of autonomy. It is this approach to the
question of agency and freedom which can provide the missing
critical link to neofunctionalist action theory. Marxist and
particularly neo-Marxist theories to a large extent follow the
critical tradition of freedom as autonomy. That is another
reason for the utility of a theoretical synthesis of neofunction-
alist multidimensionality with the neo-Marxist concepts of
ideology, fetishism, and alienation.
33 John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, Liberty and Representative Government (New York:
Dutton, 1951).
34 Auguste Comte, Positive Philosophy (London: Bell, 1853), 2: 139-194.
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