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ACTION THEORY 789

interests and the necessity of l

and politics.33 The second alter

found in the scientistic and tec

this standpoint, reflected in t

August Comte, freedom and d

realms of both means and ends.

reduces the ends to the level of the means and finds the same

logic applicable to both of them. Freedom is defined by the

technocratic theory as the type of action which is based upon

scientific knowledge and scientific principles.34 Authority

becomes an authority over things and not over humans. A free

act is based upon universal principles of science and

consequently lacks any discretionary or arbitrary element.

That is why industrial society is defined as the realm of

freedom, whereas military society is identified as domination

of humans over humans. Naturally, in the context of

technocratic theory domination is defined as any deviation

from the norm of scientism. Strangely enough, a structure of

decision-making monopolized by the professional scientists

and experts which excludes the rest of the society is conceived

by technocratic theorists as perfectly free.

As opposed to conservative romantic-functionalist, liberalist,

and technocratic theories, there is an entirely different

theoretical tradition which bases the concepts of freedom and

agency upon the notion of autonomy. It is this approach to the

question of agency and freedom which can provide the missing

critical link to neofunctionalist action theory. Marxist and

particularly neo-Marxist theories to a large extent follow the

critical tradition of freedom as autonomy. That is another

reason for the utility of a theoretical synthesis of neofunction-

alist multidimensionality with the neo-Marxist concepts of

ideology, fetishism, and alienation.

33 John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, Liberty and Representative Government (New York:

Dutton, 1951).

34 Auguste Comte, Positive Philosophy (London: Bell, 1853), 2: 139-194.

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