Agency and Freedom in Neo-Functionalist Action

792 SOCIAL RESEARCH

instrumental rationality reduces

eliminates the realm of freedom a

this inconsistency in the neofun

question of freedom, the fundame

action is not the identity of o

functionalism) and freedom, but

and freedom. This implies that we

definition of freedom from intern

such a conclusion is based upon a so

a transcendental, approach to th

order to clarify the antinomy of f

we should follow Durkheimian in

theory. According to Kant, the e

edge and morality fail to explain

character of both objective know

both human knowledge and m

individual's experience of the

consequences of practical action, th

and the imperative nature of

explained. Consequently, for Kan

edge of the world and moral

transcendental structure of mind which is not derived from the

individual's experience or inclinations.41 However, as Durk-

heim emphasized, Kantian theory failed to see (a) the historical

variety of systems of knowledge and morality and (b) the

similarity and commonality of the ideas and values of the

members of the same society or cultural group.42 In

Durkheim's theory, therefore, the necessity and universality of

human norms and values are due to the fact that they are

shared by the members of the society. In other words, the

necessity of normative beliefs is derived from the cultural

system and tradition of the society. In this theory, internaliza-

tion of norms and values is precisely due to the fact that the

41 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason (New York: Modern Library, 1958).

42 Emile Durkheim, Suicide (New York: Free Press, 1951), pp. 152-297.

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