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MINING FOR CLOSURE
55
be taken on the legislative side to support funding,
and measures required on the legislative side to al-
low works to proceed.
The first of these relates directly to activities de-
scribe in the call for action from the EBRD cited at
the start of Section 5.1 and also reflects the content
called for in the description of the PMA initiative
included in Section 4.2.1.
5.1.2
funding approaches – an
example
As stated in Section 4.2.2, a report titled “Potential
Funding Approaches for Orphaned/Abandoned
Mines in Canada” (Castrilli, 2003) was prepared
that outlined a variety of funding approaches to
be considered for the clean up or management of
liabilities related to OAMs. The report concludes
that no single funding approach would constitute
a complete solution and that a combination of a
number of approaches would likely be required.
Mechanisms to further discuss and develop fund-
ing approaches are still underway. As a part of this
ongoing work, a multi-stakeholder workshop on
“Strategies and Issues of Assessing Liabilities and
Funding” is being planned for the fall of 2005.
A summary of the recommendations is included in
Box 4.
94
While a great deal of this material is con-
sidered to be relevant in an SEE context, the reader
is reminded that the findings presented here are
as delivered to a Canadian governmental audience
should be interpreted as examples only.
5.1.3
dealing with regulatory
and institutional barriers
– an example
This second example is also drawn from the Canadi-
an NOAMI program as reported by Castrilli (2002).
Again, the reader should be aware that the findings
presented here were delivered to a Canadian govern-
mental audience and should be seen as examples
only. This report, titled
“Barriers to Collaboration:
Orphaned/Abandoned Mines in Canada”
examines
existing legislative requirements in Canada, selected
other North American jurisdictions, and a number
of other countries that pertain to:
regulatory or institutional barriers;
liability disincentives, and
collaborative opportunities regarding volun-
tary abatement, remediation, and reclamation
of orphaned/abandoned mine lands. In ad-
dressing the above three matters, particular
emphasis was placed on four approaches:
‘Good Samaritan’ legislation;
95
Permit blocking;
Allocative versus joint and several respon-
sibility; and
Non-compliance registries.
In essence, the report lists a number of very real bar-
riers and disincentives that Canada must seek to deal
with if real collaboration between different social ac-
tors is to be achieved in order to speed the restitution
of lands affected by the legacies of mining.
More specifically, Castrilli reports that in regard to reg-
ulatory or institutional barriers, federal and provincial
environmental and mining laws in Canada contain
a number of permit, regulation, and other require-
ments that likely would have to be complied with by
those voluntarily undertaking abandoned mine land
abatement, remediation, and reclamation.
In regard to liability disincentives he indicates that
federal and provincial law in Canada contains a vari-
ety of judge-made and statutory authorities that could
impose quasi-criminal, civil, or administrative liabil-
ity on those undertaking abandoned mine land abate-
ment, remediation, and reclamation activities. While
he notes exceptions to this, they appear limited.
In regard to collaborative opportunities, a number
of voluntary assessments and abandonedmine land
cleanups have been completed, or are on- going, by
provincial governments in Canada. Interestingly,
these initiatives have been undertaken without
legislative reform. In general, Castrilli finds that
there is no existing or proposed federal or provin-
cial legislation in Canada regarding the subject of
Good Samaritan legislation, though there may be
some statutory developments that could be said to
be analogous to, or precedents for, such legislation.
Some existing law implicitly, though not explic-
itly, may have the same effect as permit blocking.
Finally, there is some law, policy, and practice in
existence regarding non-compliance registries and
allocative versus joint and several liability.
In comparison, Castrilli notes that there appear to
be many more legislative measures in place or pro-
posed at the federal and state level in the United
94. Derived from Castrilli (2003) – in particular – pages 11-12 and
Sections X & XI.
95. As described in footnotes to Section 4.2.2.
1.
2.
3.
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