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GAZETTE
JULY/AUGUST 1992
There must be proper understanding
of the nature and scope of the
prosecution's duty of disclosure. The
Court referred to the
Crown Court
(Advance Notice of Expert
Evidence)
Rules 1987
which were not
exhaustive: they did not supplant or
detract from the prosecution's
general duty of disclosure of
scientific evidence. That duty
extended to anything which might
arguably assist the defence. It was
wider in scope than the rules.
The Court stated that given the
undoubted inequality as between
prosecution and defence in access to
forensic scientists, it was of
paramount importance that the
common law duty of disclosure
should be appreciated by those who
prosecuted and defended in criminal
trials.
Summarising the principles which at
present governed the disclosure of
evidence by the prosecution before
the trial, the Court of Appeal stated -
Court of Appeal:
"our law does not tolerate
a conviction tobe secured by ambush".
that, inter alia, the duty to disclose
should normally be performed by
supplying copies of witness
statements to the defence. All
relevant experiments and tests must
be disclosed. Nothing in the
Attorney General's Guidelines
(1982)
74 Cr App R 302 derogated from
those legal rules.
The Court concluded that those
responsible for the prosecution failed
to carry out their basic duty to seek
to ensure a trial which was fair both
to the prosecution, representing the
Crown, and to the accused. The
court greatly regretted that, as a
result, a grave miscarriage of justice
had occurred.
Domestic "Skivvy": Liability of
Employers in Tort for
Intimidation
The tort of intimidation has been
employed in a unique set of facts in
the case of
Godwin
-v-
Uzoigwe,
(The Times,
Law Report, June 18,
1992). In
Godwin,
the Court of
Appeal (England and Wales) (Dillon,
Stuart-Smith and Steyn, LJJ), held
that a couple who brought the
respondent aged 16 from Nigeria to
England and used her as a domestic
drudge or skivvy for two and half
years, requiring her to work
excessively long hours without money
and without allowing her proper
food, clothing and social intercourse
were liable in tort for intimidation.
The Court of Appeal held that the
couple were in loco parentis to the
respondent and their duty of care
included a duty not to require her to
work excessive hours so that her
health did not suffer. Dillon LJ said
that Dr Uzoigwe was registrar
anaesthetist at Pontefract General
Hospital and his wife was the holder
of a post-graduate diploma in
education and was preparing a thesis
on the education of women and girls
in Nigeria. They had five children.
In December, 1985 or January, 1986
the respondent's father had agreed
that she should accompany them to
England in return for payment of
medical expenses to her mother and
she had entered in 1986 as a visitor
for three months. The Court stated
that Dr Uzoigwe had later applied for
an extension of her stay, describing
her to the Home Office as his niece.
He had described his object in
bringing her to England as charitable.
The respondent had remained with
the family until 1988. In August and
September of that year the
appellants and their family had gone
away on holiday, leaving the
respondent at their home in
Sheffield. TVvo neighbours had
befriended her while they were away
and because of what they found had
called in an officer of the National
Society for the Prevention of Cruelty
of Children.
Dillon LJ stated that the basis of the
respondent's claim was that for two
and a half years in the defendants'
house she was a household drudge
and virtually a slave. She was beaten
if she did anything that displeased
the Uzoigwes and lived in constant
fear of upsetting them. She had no
morfe than the minimum of clothing
for comfort, was given no money
and the defendants knew she had no
financial resources. When the
defendants found she had
misbehaved she was beaten or made
to kneel in the bathroom and not
move until she was told to do so. In
general, stated Dillon LJ, the
respondent had stayed within the
house. There was no suggestion that
at any stage the appellants had made
any attempt to allow her to meet
other people. The appellants had
made it clear they would not tolerate
her acquiring friendships and gave
her no opportunity to do so. They
had deliberately used their dominant
authority over the plaintiff so as
effectively to control her.
Intimidation was intentional
unlawful coercion, according to
Dillon LJ. The appellants had
intimidated the respondent into
working excessive hours, going
without personal freedom and
without the training in domestic
science they had contracted with her
father to provide. Being in loco
parentis the appellants had
unlawfully abused their parental
control and exerted their authority to
prevent the respondent from having
any contact with people outside their
house and in particular any social
intercourse with her peers.
Stuart-Smith LJ agreeing, said that
the trial judge had found that on
many occasions the respondent was
beaten with a stick and slapped.
Those assaults were sufficient in
themselves to justify the conclusion
that the tort was made out. The
whole situation in which the
respondent found herself was an
intimidatory one. The relationship
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