Table of Contents Table of Contents
Previous Page  153 / 1145 Next Page
Information
Show Menu
Previous Page 153 / 1145 Next Page
Page Background

Paper 2: Why embrace the concept of the Safety Requirements Specification?

Institute of Measurement and Control – Functional Safety 2016

1

Paper: 2

Why embrace the concept of the Safety Requirements

Specification?

Russell Cockman

Functional Safety Consultant, Europe – Emerson Process Management

Abstract

Process safety and functional safety have the same fundamental goal, to reduce the

risk to people and the environment posed by intrinsically hazardous processes. The

safety instrumented system (SIS) is only there because the process risk is not ALARP

without it. The success of a safety instrumented function (SIF) is entirely dependent on

it doing the right thing at the right time in the right way. Given this common goal it is

strange that there is often such a disconnect between them throughout their lifecycle.

This disconnect starts at the beginning of the safety lifecycle. How many SIS

specifications do you see with no mention of the process being protected at all? It is no

wonder that specifications are the source of so much failure, as we cannot tell from the

specification what exactly is the design intent of each requirement, we just go on

assuming that the requirement is right. If you look at the suggested SRS content in

IEC61511-1 you can see that requirements of the process dominate. However, the

importance and significant benefits of the SRS are not appreciated.

Based on recent experiences of the author in helping customers prepare their SRS, we

will explore the benefits in doing so and the change in approach required to get the

most from this activity. We will look at how to make the SRS a valuable tool rather than

just another document. It will give examples of where a dedicated SRS activity can

yield positive benefits to the overall safety achieved.

Introduction

Properly designed Safety Instrumented Systems (SIS) are made up of highly

reliable components with a Probability of (random) Failure which is very low

indeed; low enough such that the risk reduction provided by these Safety

Instrumented Systems brings down the risk in the processes we operate to a

tolerable or broadly acceptable level. However, choosing reliable equipment is

only part of the story. We know from experience that failures of protection

systems can come from a variety of places with many traceable to human error

at some point in the history of the process affected. Such failures are referred

to as systematic Failures and are managed by following performance based

standards such as IEC61511.

Why process industries are safe

Decades of experience and expert input has led to the development of many

prescriptive standards, industry best practices and comprehensive company

procedures. Over the life of a hazardous process the automation system goes

through many phases. During each phase various factors significantly impact

the probability that the process and its protection systems will be safe.