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INFORMS Philadelphia – 2015

222

MC50

50-Room 106A, CC

Retail Supply Chain: From Demand Forecast to

Order Fulfillment

Sponsor: Manufacturing & Service Operations Management

Sponsored Session

Chair: Santiago Gallino, Tuck School of Business,

100 Tuck Hall, Hanover, NH, United States of America,

santiago.gallino@tuck.dartmouth.edu

1 - How an e-Retailer can Profit from the Right Free Shipping Policy:

A Model and Evidence

Joseph (Jiaqi) Xu, The Wharton School, University of

Pennsylvania, 3730 Walnut Street, Suite 500, Philadelphia, PA,

United States of America,

jiaqixu@wharton.upenn.edu,

Gerard Cachon, Santiago Gallino

We present a model of online retail profitability when customers purposely

increase their order size to qualify for free shipping. While this behavior results in

more sales, it also adds cost from less shipping revenue and more product returns.

We find that free shipping threshold often decreases profitability and is effective

only for retailers with high fulfillment cost relative to shipping revenue and with

low probability of return. The model is applied to data from an online retailer.

2 - Can Supply Chain Flexibility Facilitate Information Sharing?

Mohammad M. Fazel-Zarandi, PhD Candidate, Rotman School of

Management, 105 St.George Street, Toronto, M5S 3E6, Canada,

M.FazelZarandi10@Rotman.Utoronto.Ca,

Oded Berman,

Dmitry Krass

We attempt to provide an explanation for a long-standing observation in supply

chain management: while simple contracts cannot induce credible forecast

sharing between different supply chain parties, firms often use them in practice,

and exchange information through unverifiable communication. Using a stylized

supply chain model, we show that if the reporting firm is uncertain about the

receiving firm’s reaction to its report, it may truthfully share its private

information in equilibrium.

3 - Improving Color Trend Forecasting using Social Media Data

Youran Fu, PhD Student, The Wharton School,

3730 Walnut St, Philadelphia, PA, United States of America,

youranfu@wharton.upenn.edu,

Marshall Fisher

We partnered with a leading apparel retailer to investigate how to use social

media data to improve fashion color trend forecasting. We find that using fine-

grained Twitter data and a Google search volume index to predict style-color sales

three months out reduces forecast error by 11% compared to conventional

methods.

4 - Wisdom of Crowds: Forecasting using Prediction Markets

Ruomeng Cui, Assistant Professor, Indiana University, 309 E.

Tenth Street, Bloomington, IN, 47401, United States of America,

cuir@indiana.edu,

Achal Bassamboo, Antonio Moreno-Garcia

Prediction markets are virtual markets created to aggregate predictions from the

crowd. We examine data from a public prediction market and internal prediction

markets run at three corporations. We study the efficiency of these markets in

extracting information from participants. We show that the distribution forecasts,

such as sales and commodity prices predictions, generated by the crowds are

perfectly calibrated. In addition, we run a field experiment to study drivers of

forecast accuracy.

MC51

51-Room 106B, CC

Dynamic Contracts in Operations Management

Sponsor: Manufacturing & Service Operations Management

Sponsored Session

Chair: Hao Zhang, Associate Professor, University of British Columbia,

Sauder School of Business, Vancouver, BC, V6T1Z2, Canada,

hao.zhang@sauder.ubc.ca

1 - Optimal Long-term Supply Contracts with Asymmetric

Demand Information

Wenqiang Xiao, Associate Professor, New York University, Stern

School of Business, 44 West Fourth Street, 8-72, New York, NY,

10012, United States of America,

wxiao@stern.nyu.edu

,

Ilan Lobel

We consider a manufacturer selling to a retailer with private demand information

arising dynamically over an infinite time horizon. We show that the

manufacturer’s optimal dynamic long-term contract takes a simple form: in the

first period, based on her private demand forecast, the retailer selects a wholesale

price and pays an associated upfront fee, and, from then on, the two parties stick

to a simple wholesale price contract with the retailer’s chosen price.

2 - Dynamic Mechanisms for Online Advertising

Hamid Nazerzadeh, University of Southern California, Bridge

Memorial Hall, 3670 Trousdale Parkway, Los Angeles, CA, 90089,

United States of America,

hamidnz@marshall.usc.edu

,

Vahab Mirrokni

I will discuss designing dynamic contracts for selling display advertising. I will

show that under natural but rather restricted assumptions, the traditional

reservation contracts can be revenue-optimal. I will also present the optimal

mechanism in a general setting and discuss their practical implementations.

3 - Dynamic Short-term Contracts under Private Inventory

Information and Backlogging

Lifei Sheng, PhD Candidate, University of British Columbia, 2053

Main Mall, Vancouver, BC, V6T1Z2, Canada,

Fay.Sheng@sauder.ubc.ca,

Mahesh Nagarajan, Hao Zhang

We study a setting where a supplier sells to a retailer facing random demand over

multiple periods. At the beginning of each period, the supplier offers a one-period

contract and the retailer decides his order quantity before the demand realizes.

The retailer carries leftover inventory or backlogs unmet demand, which is

unobservable by the supplier. We show interesting properties of the supplier’s

optimal contract and study special cases when the problem is tractable.

4 - Structures of Optimal Dynamic Mechanisms

Alexandre Belloni, Professor Of Decision Sciences, Duke

University, 100 Fuqua Drive, Duke University, Durham, NC,

27708, United States of America,

abn5@duke.edu,

Peng Sun,

Bingyao Chen

Consider a principal procures up to one unit of a product/service in every period

from an agent who is privately informed about its marginal production cost in

each period. We identify regularity conditions on the distribution of private

information under which the optimal contracts offer at most two different

procurement levels depending on the newly reported cost. Our results rely on

“dynamic virtual valuation,” a generalization of the Myersonian virtual valuation

in the static setting.

MC52

52-Room 107A, CC

Analytics for IT Services

Sponsor: Service Science

Sponsored Session

Chair: Aly Megahed, Research Staff Member, IBM Research, 650 Harry

Road - Office D3-428, San Jose, CA, 95120, United States of America,

aly.megahed@us.ibm.com

1 - Operations Research and Analytics Solutions for it

Service Providers

Aly Megahed, Research Staff Member, IBM Research,

650 Harry Road - Office D3-428, San Jose, CA, 95120,

United States of America,

aly.megahed@us.ibm.com

,

Hamid Reza Motahari Nezhad, Peifeng Yin, Taiga Nakamura

Large IT service providers compete to win highly-valued outsourcing IT deals via

submitting proposals to potential clients. In this talk, you will learn about some of

the analytics and OR work done for managing such complex service

engagements. A case management approach that analyzes costs and prices of

deals in preparation will be presented. Additionally, a predictive analytics tool for

identifying the influential factors on the outcome of deals will be shared.

2 - Measuring Cloud Services Profitability

Ray Strong, Impact Of Future Technology, IBM Research,

650 Harry Road, San Jose, CA, 95120, United States of America,

hrstrong@us.ibm.com,

Jeanette Blomberg, Sunhwan Lee, Anca

Chandra, Pawan Chowdhary, Susanne Glissmann, Robert Moore

The costs of providing cloud services are not easily attributable to revenue. We

present a complex modeling approach to understanding the profitability of

individual service offerings and individual service contracts. We explore ways of

creating long running models of cloud service performance in spite of the month-

to-month and pay-for-use nature of many cloud contracts. We suggest an

approach to estimating the total current value of a cloud service contract to a

vendor.

MC50