INFORMS Philadelphia – 2015
320
4 - Speculative Oil
Anna Kruglova, Research Affiliate, MIT Center for Finance
and Policy, 30 Memorial Drive, Cambridge, MA, 02142,
United States of America,
Kruglova@mit.edu, Andrei Kirilenko
The long-standing framework predicated on a premise that producers are the
main drivers of energy prices, the so-called “hedging pressure” theory, has been
shown to be less consistent with the empirical regularities present in the oil
prices. We hypothesize that with the influx of financial investors, the last needed
barrel is traded not between a hedger and a speculator, but between two
speculators: a commodity trader and/or a bank. We use granular information on
shipments of seaborne crude oil into the US during 2008-2012 to examine the
industry structure and determine who holds the crude oil that supports the
determination of prices in financial markets.
TC07
07-Room 307, Marriott
Systemic Risk: Methods and Models
Cluster: Risk Management
Invited Session
Chair: David Brown, Duke University Fuqua School of Business,
1 Towerview Rd, Durham, NC, United States of America,
dbbrown@duke.edu1 - Time-varying Systemic Risk: Evidence from a Dynamic Copula
Model of CDS Spreads
Dong Hwan Oh, Economist, Federal Reserve Board, 20th Street
and Constitution Avenue N.W., Washington, DC, 20551, United
States of America,
donghwan.oh@frb.gov,Andrew Patton
This paper proposes a new class of copula-based dynamic models for high-
dimensional conditional distributions, facilitating the estimation of a wide variety
of measures of systemic risk. We use the proposed new models to study a
collection of daily credit default swap spreads on 100 U.S. firms. We find that
while the probability of distress for individual firms has reduced since the
financial crisis of 2008-09, the joint probability of distress is substantially higher
now than in the pre-crisis.
2 - An Optimization View of Financial Systemic Risk Modeling
Nan Chen, Prof, Chinese University of Hong Kong, 709A William
Mong Engineering Building, Hong Kong, Hong Kong - PRC,
nchen@se.cuhk.edu.hk,Xin Liu, David D. Yao
We develop an optimization-based formulation on financial systemic risk. A
partition algorithm is constructed to solve the problem. The sensitivity analysis
helps us identify two multipliers to characterize the amplification effects caused
by liability networks and market liquidity. The effects of policy intervention are
also discussed in the paper.
3 - Optimal Capital Requirements in Interbank Networks with Fire
Sales Externality
Jongsoo Hong, Duke University, 1 Towerview Rd, Durham,
NC, 27707, United States of America,
jongsoo.hong@duke.edu,
David Brown
We consider an interbank network with fire sales externality and study the
problem of optimally trading off between capital reserves and systemic risk. We
find that the optimal capital requirements is a solution to a stochastic linear
programming without fire sales externality and a stochastic mixed integer
programming with fire sales externality. We offer an iterative algorithm that
converges to the optimal. We demonstrate the methods on an example using data
from a central bank.
TC08
08-Room 308, Marriott
Different Facets of Innovation: Product, Technology
and Business Models
Cluster: Business Model Innovation
Invited Session
Chair: Serguei Netessine, Professor, INSEAD, 1 Ayer Rajah Avenue,
Singapore, 138676, Singapore,
Serguei.Netessine@insead.edu1 - Identifying and Analyzing Styles in Design Patents
Tian Chan, INSEAD,
TianHeong.CHAN@insead.edu,
Jurgen Mihm, Manuel Sosa
We introduce an approach to identify styles (categories of product designs similar
in form) among 400,000 US design patents. We combine state-of-the-art
clustering techniques with experimental validation to create, for the first time, a
dataset of styles. Building on this platform, we find that i) the level of turbulence
(unpredictability of changes) in styles follows a U-shaped pattern to the level of
turbulence in functionality, and ii) styles turbulence is increasing over time.
2 - Free Riding in Team Projects: The Role of the Leadership Style
Morvarid Rahmani, Assistant Professor, Georgia Tech,
morvarid.rahmani@scheller.gatech.edu,Uday Karmarkar,
Guillaume Roels
In order to remain innovative in today’s global market, firms are increasingly
organizing work around teams. In this paper, we investigate the role of the
leadership style (autocratic or democratic) on free-riding in teams and
characterize which leadership style is the most efficient depending on the project
characteristics.
3 - Different Approaches to Crowdfunding: Kickstarter vs. Indiegogo
Simone Marinesi, Wharton, 562 Jon M. Huntsman Hall, 3730
Walnut St, Philadelphia, PA, 19104, United States of America,
marinesi@wharton.upenn.edu, Karan Girotra
We compare the different modes of interaction between backers and creators
offered in the two most famous crowdfunding platforms, and provide
prescriptions on their implementation, taking the view of project creators.
4 - Are Good Idea Generators also Good at Evaluating Ideas
Otso Massala, INSEAD, 1 Ayer Rajah Avenue, Singapore,
Singapore,
Otso.MASSALA@insead.eduUsing data collected from a series of innovation tournaments we relate different
business opportunity generation skills with evaluation skills. We find that prolific
generators are worse evaluators while generators that produce high quality ideas
tend to also be good at evaluating. We provide implications for design of
innovation tournaments and innovative organizations.
TC09
09-Room 309, Marriott
Crowd Innovation
Sponsor: Technology, Innovation Management & Entrepreneurship
Sponsored Session
Chair: Mohamed Mostagir, Assistant Professor, University of Michigan
Ross School of Business, 701 Tappan Ave, R5316, Ann Arbor, MI,
48109, United States of America,
mosta@umich.edu1 - Time-Based Crowdsourcing Contests
Ersin Korpeoglu, Carnegie Mellon University,
5000 Forbes Avenue, Pittsbugh, PA, United States of America,
ekorpeog@andrew.cmu.edu, Laurence Ales, Soo-Haeng Cho
We study a crowdsourcing contest wherein a seeker solicits a population of agents
to solve a problem. Each agent’s stochastic solution time depends on her effort
and expertise. We show that it is optimal for the seeker to screen and compensate
only the highest-expertise agents when their solution times are less uncertain, but
a larger group of agents when they are highly uncertain. An agent’s optimal
compensation is based on her solution time and whether the seeker can observe
agents’ efforts.
2 - Payoffs in Contests
Kevin Boudreau,Harvard University and London Business
School, Harvard Business School, Cambridge MA,
United States of America,
kboudreau@hbs.edu, Karim Lakhani,
Nichale Menietti
Many tournament outcomes possess signaling value. In this article, the results of
a field experiment on signaling incentives are presented. Using a structural model,
we obtain estimates of the value of nominal prizes, as well as extra value
associated with the contest. Signaling and cash values exhibit large interaction
effects. In all conditions, the perceived value of the prizes differs from the
nominal value. Competitors tend to undervalue small prizes and overvalue large
prizes.
3 - Achieving Efficiency in Dynamic Contribution Games
George Georgiadis, Assistant Professor, Northwestern University,
2001 Sheridan Rd, Evanston, IL, 60208, United States of America,
g-georgiadis@kellogg.northwestern.edu, Jaksa Cvitanic
We analyze a dynamic contribution game, in which a group of agents exert costly
effort over time to make progress on a project that generates a lump-sum payoff
once the cumulative effort reaches a pre-specified threshold. We characterize a
budget balanced mechanism which overcomes the free-rider problem, and at
every moment, induces each agent to exert the first-best effort level in a Markov
Perfect Equilibrium. Applications include early-stage entrepreneurial ventures
and joint R&D ventures.
TC07