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GAZETTE

DECEMBE

R

1981

ROAD TRAFFIC ACTS

In a prosecution for driving while

having excess alcohol In die body,

where a certificate of analysis is

produced by die Bureau of Road

Safety, the onus b on the Defendant

to show that the analysis was not

carried out "as soon as practicable"

and that the certificate of analysis

and copy certificate were not

forwarded by die Bureau "as soon as

practicable". Sections 22 and 23 of

the Road Traffic (Amendment) Act

1978 considered.

This was a case stated to the High

Court by a District Justice pursuant

to Section 2 of the Summary

Jurisdiction Act 1857 as extended by

Section

51

of

the

Courts

Supplemental Provisions Act 1961

on

the

application

of

the

Complainant (i.e. the Director of

Public Prosecutions) by way of

appeal. It concerned a charge against

the Defendant of having in his body

an excessive quantity of alcohol

contrary to Section 49 (2) (4) (a) of

the Road Traffic Act 1961 as

inserted by Section 10 of the Road

Traffic (Amendment) Act 1978.

The Defendant was arrested on 24

October 1979 under the Road Traffic

Acts 1961/1978 and he gave a

sample of his blood as prescribed and

on that date the sample was sent to

the Bureau of Road Safety. The

Bureau issued its certificate of

analysis dated 13 November 1979,

on which the seal of the Bureau was

affixed on 15 November 1979. The

prosecuting garda could not give

evidence as to when he received the

certificate from the Bureau except to

say that it was before 18 December

1979 and the Defendant gave no

evidence as to when he received the

copy certificate. The case was

dismissed in the District Court on the

basis that the analysis had not been

done "as soon as practicable" nor

had the certificate been forwarded to

the prosecuting garda "as soon as

practicable".

The question raised on the case

stated was as to whether the District

Justice was right in law in dismissing

the complainant. The statutory

provisions applicable to the question

of law submitted to the High Court

were as contained in Sections 22 and

23 respectively of the Road Traffic

(Amendment) Act 1989.

Section 22 (1) provided as follows:—

"As soon as practicable after it

has received a specimen forwarded

to it under Section 21, the Bureau

shall analyse the specimen and

determine the concentration of

alcohol or (as may be appropriate)

the presence of a drug or drugs in

the specimen".

Section 22 (3) provides —

"as soon as practicable after

compliance with sub-Section (1),

the Bureau shall forward to the

Garda Station from which the

specimen analysed was forwarded

a completed certificate in the form

prescribed for the purpose of this

section and shall forward a copy

of the completed certificate to die

person who is named on the

relevant form under Section 21 as

the person from whom the

specimen was taken or who

provided it".

Section 23 (2) provides —

"A certificate expressed to have

been issued under Section 22

shall, until the contrary is shown,

be sufficient evidence of the facts

certified to in it, without proof of

any signature on it or that the

signatory was the proper person to

sign it, and shall, until the

contrary is shown, be sufficient

evidence of compliance by the

Bureau with all the requirements

which the Bureau is obliged to

comply with by or under this Part

or under Part III of the Act of

1968".

The High Court (per Finaly P.)

indicated that the effect of these two

sections might be summarised as

indicating that the Bureau had two

obligations with regard to time; the

first was to analyse the specimen as

soon as practicable after it received it

and the second was to send to the

Garda Station and to the Defendant

the certificate as soon as practicable

after analysing the specimen.

The second feature was that there

was a rebuttable presumption arising

from the production of the certificate

itself that these two obligations

inter

alia

had been complied with by the

Bureau and that therefore the onus of

establishing that they had not was

upon the Defendant.

The Director of Public Prs-

secutions had a case stated to test

the propriety of the District Justice's

decision and in the High Court the

appropriate Section 22 of the Road

Traffic (Amendment) Act 1978 was

analysed, and Finlay P. considered

that this section imposed an

obligation on the Bureau to perform

the analysis of the sample as soon as

practicable after it has received it and

to sent the certificate and copy

certificate to the appropriate people

as soon as practicable after the

analysis. The next section of the Act

i.e. Section 23, creates a rebuttable

presumption on the production of the

certificate, that these two obligations

have been carried out by the Bureau.

The Court referred to

Hobbs v.

Hurley

(Unreported judgment of 10

June, 1980 of Costello J.) where the

words "as soon as practicable" were

examined, and where it was held (1)

that those words were not the same

as "as soon as possible' which would

impose a more severe obligation; and

(2) that those words had to be strictly

construed because they were in a

penal statute; and, (3) difficulties

attendant on effecting the obligation

expressed by those words had to be

considered in evidence and in

particular the nature and purpose of

the obligation had to be borne in

mind. With regard to the obligation

on the Bureau to send the certificate

to the prosecuting garda, the purpose

of this was to enable that garda to

decide under which sub-Section (if

any) the arrested person should be

prosecuted and the purpose behind

the obligation to send a copy

certificate to the Defendant was to

give the Defendant notice of the

evidence against him. Because of the

rebuttable presumption created by

Section 23 of the 1978 Act the

Defendant had to produce evidence

as to the difficulties and surrounding

circumstances affecting the Bureau in

performing its obligations and also as

to the effects caused by any delay,

before a court could properly reach

the conclusion that a specimen was

either not analysed or a certificate

was not sent "as soon as

practicable".

Held

(per Finlay P.) that in the

absence of evidence such as was

required as stated above the District

Justice was not entitled to reach a

conclusion as he apparently did that

either the specimen had not been

analysed "as soon as practicable" or

that the certificate had not been sent

"as soon as practicable" and in doing

so to the presumption contained in

Section 23 of the 1978 Act.

Director of Public Prosecutions

v.

Leonard Corrigan

— High Court

(per Finlay P.) — 21 July 1980 —

unreported.

cclxxiii