The Gazette 1981

GAZETTE

DECE

R 1981

barred by Section 5 (2) of the Family

Law (Maintenance of Spouses and

Children) Act 1976 from making a

maintenance order for her separate

support. He also ruled that it would

not be appropriate to make an order

pursuant to Section 22 of the said

Act of 1976 debarring the husband

from the family home. However, as

both parties agreed that the wife was

the proper person to have custody of

the child, and that the wife could not

therefore work for some years to

come, the maintenance of the child

should be provided by the husband

and should include a sufficient sum to

enable the mother to look after the

child,

and

the

Court

fixed

maintenance for the child pending

further Order at the sum of £30 per

week.

As far as the family home was

concerned, it appeared that the

husband had expressed a desire to

buy out the wife's interest at a fair

valuation and it was decided that the

parties

should

given

opportunity to negotiate on this

proposition but failing agreement the

family home would have to be sold

and the net proceeds divided equally

between the parties.

In summary, therefore, it was —

Held

(per Barrington J.):

(i) That the husband must have

reasonable access to the child;

(ii) That the wife did not have 'just

cause' for leaving the family

home and was not therefore

entitled to maintenance under the

Family Law (Maintenance of

Spouses and Children) Act

1976, although the maintenance

of the child should be provided

by the husband;

(iii) That the husband should not be

debarred from the family home

under Section 22 of the said Act

of 1976; and

(iv) That, failing agreement between

the parties, the family home was

to be sold and the proceeds

divided

P.V.P.

- High Court (per Barring-

ton J.) - 12 March 1980 - un-

reported.

INJUNCTION — LACHES

Suspension of members of commit-

tee of Hurling and Football Club —

no notification to committee of

charges being preferred against them

personally — natural justice — delay

in taking proceedings.

The plaintiffs were the President and

Chairman of Nemo Rangers Hurling

and Football Club, and as such were

members of the G.A.A., and the

Defendants comprised officers of the

Cork County Board of the G.A.A.

and the Munster Council of the

G.A.A. Nemo Rangers won the

Cork Senior Football Championship

on 17 August 1978. The captain of

the team was instructed not to accept

the cup, because of differences

between Nemo Rangers and the

County Board, which placed the

prize awarding official in an embar-

rassing position in public. Certain

Nemo Rangers' supporters engaged

in an unsportsmanlike demonstration.

The Cork County Board wrote to

the secretary of Nemo Rangers to

ask them to show cause why the Club

should not be suspended for the con-

duct which had taken place, but the

Board did not refer to the possibility

of action being taken against the

Plaintiffs personally. At a meeting on

31 October 1978, in the absence of

the Plaintiffs, the County Board de-

cided to suspend and disqualify the

Plaintiffs. The Plaintiffs appealed to

the Munster Council and on 16

December 1978 the decision of the

County Board was upheld.

The Plaintiffs alleged that they did

not breach any rule and they claim

the County Board acted 'ultra vires,'

contrary to the principles of natural

justice and in breach of the con-

stitutional rights of the Plaintiffs and

in breach of the G.A.A.'s Rules. The

complaints against the Munster

Council were similar, with the ad-

dition that on appeal the Council

should have investigated the conduct

of the County Board and directed the

County Board to reconsider the

matter

'ab initio.'

The Plaintiffs also

claimed that two members of the

County Board on the Munster

Council had no discretion at the

appeal, as under the Rules of the

County Board they were obliged to

uphold the County Board's decision

and that hence this invalidated the

appeal.

Proceedings were issued (more

than one year later) on 7 January

1980 for an injunction to reinstate

the Plaintiffs. The statement of claim

and the motion in the application

were dated 31 January 1980.

Held

(per McWilliam J.): that there

was a case to be argued in the pro-

ceedings but in view of the delay in

bringing the proceedings and the con-

siderable doubt that an injunction

would serve any useful purpose for

the Plaintiffs the application was

refused.

The Court, however, commented

on the inadvisability of imposing

penalty on a person without giving

that person notice of the likelihood of

a penalty being imposed and also

commented that it was unsatis-

factory for any person hearing an

appeal with his discretion fettered.

Cotter and another v. 0*Sullivan &

Others

— High Court (per McWilliam

J.) - 23 April 1980 - unreported.

LEASE OR LICENCE

An agreement in respect of land for

seasonal use as a playing field was

terminated for breach of various

covenants. Agreement found to be a

licence validly revoked, but equitable

relief against forfeiture was granted.

Under the agreement of 14 July

1956, the trustees at that time of the

Defendants (a cricket club) for the

consideration of £1,000 and an

annual payment of £60 agreed "to

lease" to the then trustees of the

Plaintiffs (a rugby club),

"ALL

THAT

the field and the pavilion

thereon known as the Merrion

Cricket Club grounds situate at

Anglesea Road, in the City of Dublin

from the 1st day of October 1956 to

the following 1st day of March

(which period from the 1st day of

October to the 1st day of March is

therein and hereinafter referred to as

"the season") and for the same

period on a further 89 consecutive

occasions subject to the said annual

rent and the conditions and

covenants in the said Lease."

It was alleged by the Plaintiffs that

on two occasions goal posts on the

field had been dismantled by the

Defendants and that in late 1975 the

Defendants had caused the goal posts

to be destroyed so that the Plaintiffs

were unable to use the field for the

purpose of playing rugby football and

then obstructed the Plaintiffs in their

efforts to erect new goal posts.

The Plaintiffs claimed:

(a) An injunction to prevent the

Defendants from using the field

and pavilion;

(b) A declaration that the Plaintiffs

were entitled to use the field and

the pavilion for the purposes of

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