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GAZETTE
DECEMBE
R
1981
vacating the lis pendens but had not
dismissed the Plaintiffs claim.
The
Supreme
Court,
(per
O'Higgins CJ.) stated that the
general rule with regard to the
operation of a British Statute was
that the operation of such a statute
extended to the whole of the then
United Kingdom and that, if the
intention was to limit the operation to
a part only, an express limitation was
necessary; and, that, in addition, in
the absence of an express limitation,
an intention to limit the application
could be gathered by necessary
implication from the construction of
the Statute; and that the Lis Pendens
Act 1867 was not limited in its
application by express terms nor
could it be said, because of the forms
and terms used in the Act, that by
necessary implication an intention
not to apply to Ireland could be
gathered. The fact that the Act
referred to a section of the
Companies Act 1862 (which Act
expressly did not apply to Ireland)
did not of itself indicate that the Act
of 1867 was intended not to apply to
Ireland.
Also, the absence of a proper
officer or proper machinery for
registering a vacate of a lis pendens
could not be said, by necessary
implication, to indicate an intention
not to apply to this country. Such
absence undoubtedly indicated a de-
fect in the Statute and a defect which
required remedying; but it was noted
that four years later, Section 21 of
the Judgment (Ireland) Act 1871, re-
citing the absence of sufficient pro-
vision for registering a vacate of a lis
pendens, made good the deficiency.
Held
(per O'Higgins C J.) that
(1) The Lis Pendens Act 1867 was
intended to apply to Ireland.
(2) On the evidence before it on the
motion the High Court was not
entitled to conclude that the
Plaintiffs claim was not being
prosecuted bona fide. Re-
gistration of Lis Pendens re-
instated.
Brendan Flynn v. Oliver Buckley and
Anor.
— Supreme Court — (per
O'Higgins C J.) - 24 April, 1980 -
Unreported.
MANDAMUS
Mandamus — Urban District Coun-
cil bye-laws — Mandamus refused to
compel a local authority to enforce
its bye-laws under the Road Traffic
Acts 1961/1968.
The Respondent Urban District
Council made bye-laws in December
1979 under the Road Traffic Acts
1961/1968 for the regulation of their
car parks. The bye-laws included a
prohibition of the sale of goods and
trading in the car parks. Some un-
authorised persons nevertheless used
one of the car parks for trading in
breach of the bye-laws. They were
prosecuted by the D.P.P. (per the
local Gardai) but the prosecutions did
not stop illegal trading. The
Applicants were ratepaying traders
resident in the town of Navan and
sought an order of Mandamus to
compel the Respondents to enforce
their own bye-laws, and, by further
prosecutions and permanent or
temporary fencing of the Car Parks
and other measures of control, to
prevent such illegal trading. On an
application to make absolute a
conditional order of Mandamus, the
Respondents having shown cause,
Held
(per Hamilton, J.) that:
(i) The Applicants had sufficient
interest in the matter to support
their application.
(ii) There was no legal obligation on
the Respondents to take any of
the suggested steps by way of
fencing and the like, to enforce
compliance with the car park
bye-laws.
(iii) Failure to comply with the bye-
laws constituted a criminal
offence and prosecution in
respect of them was a matter for
the
Director
of
Public
Prosecutions,
(since
the
Prosecution of Offences Act,
1974)
and
not
for
the
Respondents.
Refused the Application for an
Order of Mandamus accordingly
State (at the Prosecution of A.C.C.
and others) v. Navan Urban District
Council.
High Court (per Hamilton
J.) 22 February 1980 — unreported.
Summaries of judgments pre-
pared by Eamonn G. Hall,
Brendan Garvan, Daire Hogan,
John F. Buckley and William
Dundon. Edited by Michael V.
O'Mahoney.
cclxxv