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Eastern Caspian 83 Environment and Security
21. The positions staked out reflected the interests of
the states: Azerbaijan, with many offshore oilrigs, fa-
voured the territorial division model based on a roughly
north-south median line, along with Kazakhstan and
Turkmenistan. Significantly Russia changed its position
in 2000 to favour territorial division, after it emerged that
the promising North Kashagan oil field would be in its
sector. As territorial division seemed inevitable, Iran re-
quested that the sea be divided into 5 equal shares, a
claim disproportionate to its 15 % share of the coastline
and targeting hydrocarbon fields in the sectors claimed
by Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan.
It is worth pointing out that the disputes over under-
water areas between East Caspian states are not be-
tween Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, where the border
provides a demarcation line on which both seem to
agree, but with the other neighbouring states. At present
Kazakhstan seems to have settled its undersea claim
(the trilateral agreement of May 2003) with Russia and
Azerbaijan. The most serious disputes all pertain to oil
fields located in the southern Caspian Sea and involve
Azerbaijan. The Turkmen-Azeri dispute concerns Hazar
(Azeri), Osman (Chirag), Altyn Asyr (Sharg), and Serdar
(Kyapaz), the Iranian-Azeri dispute revolves around the
Alov-Araz-Sharq (Alborz in Farsi) oil field (Haghayeghy,
2003). In this respect Turkmenistan has disagreed with
the median line proposed by Azerbaijan that would give
the Kyapa/Serdar field to Baku.
22. Azerbaijan made arrangements to start exporting oil
to Iran, since the BTC stopped functioning for several
weeks and another westward oil route via Georgia to
the Black Sea was constrained by military action.
23. In parallel, foreign military aid to the Caspian coun-
tries has also increased. Not only the US has provided
aid but also Russia and China.
24. On 19 September 2007 the Kazakh Defence Minis-
ter, Daniyal Akhmetov, discussed plans to bolster Ka-
zakhstan’s naval force in the Caspian Sea. The planned
build-up, laid out in a new strategic planning document
outlining the development of the Kazakh navy through
2015, includes the planned procurement of several large
naval vessels, the modernization and expansion of the
Zenit shipbuilding facility in Uralsk and the training of
naval specialists. Minister Akhmetov explained that the
build-up reflects the recognition that “the Caspian region
is of great significance for the economy of Kazakhstan,”
and the “need to create a modern navy to ensure” security
in the Caspian Sea (RFE/RL NEWSLINE Vol. 11, No. 175,
Part I, 20 September 2007). According to media reports,
the Kazakh Ministry of Defence has set March 2008 as
the target time to launch the new Kazakh navy (RFE/RL
Newsline Vol.12, No. 25, Part I, 6 February 2008).
25. The disputed area between Iran and Azerbaijan led
in July 2001 to an armed confrontation in the Caspian,
with an Iranian military vessel firing at BP geological
exploration ships operating on the Alov-Araz-Sharg
concession for the Azerbaijani government. Since this
incident the countries have been able to downplay ten-
sion and reached bilateral or trilateral agreements al-
lowing continuing exploration and exploitation of the
resources.
26. Turkmenistan received US$130 per thousand cu-
bic metres for the first six months of 2008, and will get
US$150 per tcm for the last half of the year. Just half a
decade ago Central Asian states were offered US$25
per tcm. The price for Turkmenistan’s natural gas may
well increase to US$300 per tcm in the coming years.
(See: “Price manoeuvring begins for Uzbek and Turk-
men Natural Gas Exports to Russia”, Eurasianet, 21
April 2008). The question of the terms of payment for
Central Asian gas is a sensitive political issue. In De-
cember 2007 Turkmenistan stopped gas supply to Iran
allegedly for technical reasons but probably in a move to
increase gas tariffs. Competition among energy-thirsty
economies has caused an unprecedented increase in
prices for oil and gas. In this situation, energy giants
such as Gazprom had to renegotiate prices with pro-
ducers in Central Asia. In 2009 Gazprom will be paying
average market prices for Central Asian gas. A decision
that may have far reaching consequences on the eco-
nomic viability of other energy export projects such as
Nabucco or the pipelines to China. See: “Domestic gas
monopoly declares the inevitable rise in energy prices”,
Nezavisimaya gazeta, 2008-06-11,
economics/2008-06-11/1_gazprom.html?mthree=1.
27. The NFRK, which had accumulated US$5 bil-
lion in late 2004 (or approximately 17 % of GDP). For
details see, Kalyuzhnova and Kaser (2005) and IMF
(2004:19). For 2007 data see IMF Country Report No
07/235 of July 2007 and factsheet of the National Bank
of Kazakhstan
lish621708_4142.pdf).
28. In 2006 the Kazyna Sustainable Development Fund
was established to provide long-term funding for infra-
structure and projects in new industries in non-extrac-
tive sectors. The fund is the managing company and
sole shareholder in the Kazakh Development Institutions
(comprising the Development Bank, Investment Fund,
National Innovation Fund, Small Business Development
Fund, Marketing and Analytical Research Centre, Kaza-
khstani Centre for Investment Promotion, State Insur-
ance Corporation for Export Credits and Investments).
In 2007 the total authorized stock of the Development
Institutions amounted to US$1.8 billion (as of 1 June
2007). (Source: .
29. Tengiz is the largest oil production area in Atyrau,
while Zhana-Ozen is an important oil and gas produc-
tion area in Mangystau.