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BEMIP Gas Regional Investment Plan 2017
For the Russian gas supply disruption to the Baltic States, the remaining flexibility is
0% for all cases with 1-day design case demand and for the year 2017. Results
show that the projects listed in all three infrastructure scenarios help to increase the
remaining flexibility for the following years. The only exception is again the low+GIPL
scenario for the year 2025, in which case the remaining flexibility goes back to 0%.
This is because the model assumes that the Klaipėda LNG terminal will stop operat-
ing in 2024 since the current lease contract will elapse in this year. It highlights the
fact that the GIPL alone cannot provide sufficient gas supplies for the Baltic States
in cases of serious disruption.
For Russian disruptions of gas supply to Finland and the Baltic States, the situation
remains similar as in the previous disruption case – the remaining flexibility is low in
2017 for high-gas demand periods, but the projects in all three infrastructure
scenarios help to increase the remaining flexibility for the following years.
Disrupted Rate
For all three infrastructure scenarios with a 1-day design case, a disrupted rate
occurs for Estonia in 2017. The only exception where no disruption occurs is for the
supply disruption from Belarus to Lithuania. This implies that further infrastructure
projects are needed to help Estonia to deal with peak demand situations in case of
gas supply disruptions from Russia. The projects modelled in the infrastructure
scenarios for the following years help to decrease the disrupted rate to zero in most
cases.
The scenario where a disrupted rate still occurs is for the low+GIPL scenario in the
year 2025. The reason is the same as mentioned before – the model assumes that
the Klaipėda LNG terminal will stop operating in 2024. The same conclusion can be
derived here as with the remaining flexibility, namely that GIPL alone is not sufficient
as an alternative supply source for Estonia during high-gas demand periods and gas
supply disruptions. In order to have no disrupted rate, in addition to GIPL, intercon-
nectors like Balticconnector and potentially LNG terminals are needed.
6.3 Finland
Remaining Flexibility
Since Finland is supplied by a single supply source (Russia) until the Balticconnec-
tor pipeline between Finland and Estonia is commissioned (estimated in 2020), it is
evident that Finland’s remaining flexibility is zero in all cases where supply
from Russia is disrupted. This does not mean that Finland’s security of energy
supply is endangered, since it has a rather extensive back-up fuel system relying on
biogas, LNG and alternative fuels.
When fuel supply disruptions do not impact Finland (i. e., “No RU supply to the
Baltic States” and “No supply from BY to LT” cases), the remaining flexibility is
always above zero for Finland which means that the supply is sufficient to cover all
gas needs in the country and hence there is sufficient flexibility. When comparing
the Blue Transition and Green demand scenarios with each other, it can be seen that
the remaining flexibility is higher in the Green demand scenario and thus the supply
capacity is higher in demand than in the Blue Transition scenario.
In the infrastructure scenario where the Balticconnector is in place by 2025, the
remaining flexibility for the 14-day demand case remains above zero also in cases
where gas supplies from Russia to Finland are disrupted. This is not the case for the
demand situation design case, where the remaining flexibility is still zero in Russian
gas supply disruption. If GIPL pipeline (and other PCIs in the region) exists and the