246 / 736
in respect of work and so if the selection of mater
ial is left to the contractor he must exercise due
skill an.d care in choosing the material. In this
case the appellants maintained there was no war
ranty as to fitness or quality as the material and
the supplier were chosen by the respondents. The
respondents admit that if it is held that the choice
of this type of tile was theirs and theirs alone
there can be no implied warrnty as to its fitness
for the contract purpose. But they say that there
still was a warranty that the tiles would be of good
quality and that the warranty must be implied
notwithstanding the fac thatt they left no choice
to the appellants in selecting the person who was
to supply the tiles. They argued that in the cir
cumstances of this particular case, the loss was
not caused by the particular tiles selected being
unsuitable for the contract purpose but was caused
by the tiles which were supplied being of defec
tive quality.
It was held that the fact the builder had speci
fied tiles made by only one manufacturer did not
preclude the ordinary implied warranty of quality.
In this particular case it was known
to the
employer and the contractor when the contract
was made that the sole manufacturer of the speci
fied materials was only willing to sell on terms
excluding liability under Section 14
(1) of the
Sale of Goods Act 1893 and in these circumstances
it would be unreasonable to put on the contractor
a liability for latent defects.
[Young and Marten Ltd. v McManus Childs
Ltd. (1968), 3 W.L.R. 635].
Income Tax, Expenses of Attending Professional
Conference
In an appropriate case expenses incurred in at
tending an international conference may be allow
able as a deduction for tax purposes.
In this case the defendants were a firm of prac
tising accountants with clients in many parts of
the world. One of their partners attended a six-
day international accountancy conference in New
York. He travelled by the cheapest flight available
and came back at the earliest opportunity. One
and a half days were spent in business sessions
and the remainder of the six days in formal dis
cussion, visits on businesses and sight-seeing excur
sions. The partner visited a firm with which his
own firm had had professional dealings and he
saw a new business method which was claimed
could be adopted with advantage by his firm. In
calculating their profits his firm sought to deduct
the travel and living expenses of the partner for
the air flights and the six days of the conference
only. Cross, J., held that the expenses claimed
were properly allowable as a deduction under
Ccction 137 (a) of the Income Tax Act, 1952.
[Edwards
v Wornsley Henshall
and Co.
(1968) 1 All E.R. 1089].
Limitation of Action, Property, Adverse Possession
In 1947 G, then aged fifty, married JG, then
seventy-four, and went to
live with him
in a
bungalow. G had been told that some time she
would "come into the bungalow when he was
gone" but in 1951 AG executed a conveyance of
the property in favour of H, his nephew, in con
sideration of £1,500. He did not tell H about the
conveyance until some later. In 1959 he gave H
the title deeds telling him the property was his
and that he should have the deeds and later he
said that he was only in the house by H's leave
and offered to give up possession. H told him that
he could stay as long as he liked. AG died in
November 1965 and in his will forgave H any
money owing on the property. H demanded the
property but G continued to live there and an
action for possession was brought. H claimed that
he had given AG oral permission or licence to
occupy the bungalow and G claimed to be in un
disturbed and exclusive possession
thereof since
November 1947 jointly with her husband until his
death and solely thereafter and claimed a posses-
sery title. In the first instance it was held that
AG did not any time intend to deny H's right to
the property and had never been in adverse pos
session and an order for possession was given to
H. On appeal it was held that at common law
adverse possession was in the nature of an ouster
and was very difficult to prove. Under the 1939
Act a person was in adverse possession if he was a
person
in whose favour time could run. Time
could not run in favour of a licensee and therefore
he could not have adverse possession. It could run
in favour of a tenant at will if he remained in
possession for twelve years after its expiry without
acknowledgment. It was held in Moses v Love-
grove (1952) 2 QB that where the right to occupy
was derived from the owner in the form of per
mission or grant it was not adverse; if it was not,
. it was adverse. In this case there had been a
licence to occupy; there was no intention to create
any interest in AG. Appeal dismissed.
[Hughes v Griffin and Another, 112 S.J. 907].
102