244 / 736
Signed by
No.
Title
the President
36. Appropriation Act, 1968. 18th December 1968
37. Finance (No. 2) Act, 1968.
18th December 1968
38.
Imposition of Duties (Confirmation of Orders)
Act, 1968.
24th December 1968
(c) Private Acts
Nil.
CASES OF THE MONTH
Road Traffic, Negligence,
Invitation
to Cross
Path
Car driven by the first defendant was parked on
its off side in a parking strip at the side of the
road. He wished to cross the road to travel in the
direction he was facing, pulled out slightly with
his near side indicator flashing. A bus driver in a
line of traffic stopped, looked in his mirror and
then flashed his lights. The first defendant pro
ceeded until the bonnet projected about a yard
past the front of the bus, when a motorcycle
overtaking the bus collided with him. The motor
cyclist was injuried and brought this action claim
ing damages against the first defendant, the bus
driver, and the bus driver's employer.
In the first instance the plaintiff was found
two-thirds to blame for the accident. The first
defendant was exculpated and the bus driver and
his employer were found to be one-third to blame.
The bus driver and his employer appealed and so
did the plaintiff. On the appeal it was held that
there was no duty on the bus driver in these
circumstances. Flashing his lights meant "come
on as far as I am concerned". If he had seen the
plaintiff he might have been under a duty to stop
the plaintiff but as he did not he should be
acquitted of negligence. The first defendant was
carrying out what was a necessarily dangerous
manoeuvre. It was right for him to proceed in
front of the bus. In Powell v Moody (1966) 110
S.J. 215 a case of similar facts, the driver was held
20 per cent to blame but that was based on a
suggestion that he had not kept a proper look-out.
It had been suggested that the first defendant
might have flashed his lights or sounded his horn
or put the bonnet of his car a short distance out
and then stopped, to give the plaintiff an oppor
tunity to avoid him. However, as the first defen
dant had come out extremely slowly and carefully
it is difficult to see what more he could have done.
In these circumstances the plaintiff was entirely
responsible for the accident.
[Clark v Winchurch and Others, 112 S. J. 909].
Road Traffic, Negligence, Signal
In delivering post, a postman had parked his van
at the apex of a bend in the road partly on the
verge. While standing by the van he saw the
defendant's on-coming car and then looked in the
opposite direction and signalled to the defendant
to pass the van. The defendant accepted his signal
to go past the van and this entailed driving partly
on the wrong side of the road, and asa
result
found himself unable to avoid a collision with the
plaintiff's car. When sued for damages and defen
dant joined the Post Office as a third party claim
ing an indemnity for the damages awarded to the
plaintiff and for damages to his own car. In the
first instance the Judge held that once the defen
dant had started to pass the van the resulting
collision was inevitable; the defendant had acted
reasonably in relying on the postman's signal and
the postman was entirely to blame for the acci
dent. The Post Office appealed on the grounds
that the postman owed no duty of care to the
defendant.
In dismissing the Post Office's appeal Edmund
Davys, L.J., said that a person could not with
impunity and with recklessness give a signal to
other drivers who might not be as able as he to see
what was the true traffic position. The postman
owed a duty and he had been negligent. It could
be that the driver was negligent in attempting
to overtake at all for a driver could not act blindly
on a signal to overtake and such a driver had a
constant duty to drive with reasonable care. Here
it had been proved that the postman was negligent
and it had not been proved that the defendant
acted negligently.
[Grange Motors (Cwmbram) Ltd. v Spenser
and Another, 112 S.J. 908f.
Easement, Right of Support, Wall
The plaintiff's yard is divided from the first defen
dant's yard by a stone wall the property of the
plaintiff. In 1962 two sheds were erected against
the wall by the plaintiff. In 1964 the defendants
in levelling their own yard, employed a firm to
excavate to a depth of four feet adjacent to the
plaintiff's wall. Originally they intended to leave
a bank of earth to support the wall but no bank
was in fact left and the new level of the defen
dant's yard was about one foot below the founda
tion of
the plaintiff's wall.
In 1965
the wall
cracked and damaged the shed and the plaintiff
claimed damages. It was found that the damage
to the wall and the shed was caused by the move
ment of the soil underneath the base of the wall
100