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(3) As a new principle had to be decided, a fee of 3

guineas

for obtaining

the general opinion of

Counsel would be allowed.

(4) The Taxing Master originally allowed an instruc

tions fee of £50 in respect of the appeal to the

prosecution and this was subsequently increased to

£105. It was held that the sum of £105 was

reasonable having regard to the fact that, in the

forefront of

this appeal, was

the fundamental

question whether an appeal lay to the Supreme

Court.

(5) The prosecutor's solicitor was found to proceed to

brief counsel on the appeal on the basis that the

appeal was going to proceed on the same lines as

in the High Court, and the onus that the same

documents would be required lay upon the pro

secutor's counsel.

(6) Originally,

the Taxing Master allowed on the

appeal a brief fee of 100 guineas and refreshers

of 25 guineas for two senior counsel with appro

priate fees for one junior counsel. This was sub

sequently increased to a brief fee of 125 guineas,

and refreshers of 40 guineas for senior counsel.

The fees, as marked by senior counsel, were 200

guineas on the brief, with refreshers of 75 guineas.

The total actual amount allowed by the Taxing

Master was thus 913 guineas. Held that the amount

allowed by the Taxing Master should not be dis

turbed, as it was impossible to be dogmatic in

respect of any particular fee which was discre

tionary.

(7)

It was held that the fee of 6 guineas allowed by

the Taxing Master to each Counsel for hearing

the judgment of the Supreme Court was reason

able. A fixed fee for hearing of a judgment, no

matter how long is of such long standing that its

retention should be favoured.

The State (Michael Browne) v. District Justice Feran

(No. 2)—Murnaghan J.—29th April, 1969—unreported.

Crime

The Court upheld the decision of a

trial judge in

admitting evidence by a detective put by the police in a

cell next to

those occupied by

the appellant and a

co-prisoner. Such direction should be exercised on a

consideration of the motive for the eavesdropping and

the substance of the conversation overheard.

Regina v. Stewart, Court of Appeal, 13/1/70.

A chairman of quarter sessions who announced a

sentence of six months eried when he altered it to seven

months in order to circumvent the provisions of section

39 of the Criminal Justice Act, 1967, which require that

a sentence of not more than six months should be

suspended.

Regina v. Corr, Court of Appeal, 15/1/70.

The Lord Chief Justice said in the Court of Appeal

that a quarter sessions court which substitutes a suspended

sentence of imprisonment on appeal should take into

consideration the time the appellant has spent in custody,

and in appropriate cases should adjust the length of the

suspended sentence.

Court of Appeal Eng. 19/1/70.

Where a sentence has been suspended and a further

offence has been committed during the period of the

suspension, the fact that the further offence is of a dif

ferent character from the original offence is no ground

for net bringing the suspended sentence into effect.

Regina v. Saunders, Court of Appeal, 16/2/70.

Two offences can constitute a " series'' within the

Indictments Act, 1915, Schedule i, rule 3, and "nexus"

is a feature of similarity which, in all the circumstances

of the case, enables the offence to be described as a

series, their Lordships decided when unanimously dis

missing

an

appeal

by Edward Loftus, who

had

been convicted on two counts which had been tried

together. He was convicted at the Central Criminal Court

of attempted larceny at a public house in Acton, on

August 20, 1968, and of robbery with violence at another

public house in the same area on September 5 that year,

for which he was sentenced to six months and a con

secutive 18 months.

Ludlow v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner, House of

Lords, 12/2/70.

Damages

Although by English law no damages can be awarded

for the grief or sorrow caused by another's death, or for

a mother's worry about her children, or her difficulty in

adjusting herself to a new way of life after her husband's

death, damages are recoverable for the medical effects, the

nervous shock, of seeing his death.

Hinz v. Berry, Court of Appeal, 15/1/70.

The House of Lords, affirming an award of over

£54,000 damages under the Fatal Accidents Acts, laid

down the lines on which such damages should be assessed.

Their Lordships decided that an award of damages for a

widow's loss of dependency should be increased to take

account of her income tax factor, and expressed differing

views on the relevance of inflation. Lord Pearson said

that the price of an annuity was not the correct measure

of the sum a widow should receive as damages. They

also considered that the orthodox approach of judges to

the assessment of damages was correct if it resulted in

very high awards.

Taylor v. O'Connor, House of Lords, 21/1/70.

Defamation

A scientific paper published in the British

Medical

Journal

which was critical of a

technique for dental

anaesthesia

introduced, used and recommended by a

named dental surgeon was held by a majority of the

Court to be capable of bearing a meaning defamatory

of the surgeon in the way of his profession and that it

should not therefore be struck out

in limine

as disclosing

no reasonable cause of action.

Lord Denning, in a dissenting judgment, expressed

fears that such a decision might deter scientists from

publishing the results of their research, but his fears

were thought by Sir Gordon Willmer to be unfounded.

Drummond Jackscn v. British Medical Association and

Others, Court of Appeal, 13/2/70.

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