(3) As a new principle had to be decided, a fee of 3
guineas
for obtaining
the general opinion of
Counsel would be allowed.
(4) The Taxing Master originally allowed an instruc
tions fee of £50 in respect of the appeal to the
prosecution and this was subsequently increased to
£105. It was held that the sum of £105 was
reasonable having regard to the fact that, in the
forefront of
this appeal, was
the fundamental
question whether an appeal lay to the Supreme
Court.
(5) The prosecutor's solicitor was found to proceed to
brief counsel on the appeal on the basis that the
appeal was going to proceed on the same lines as
in the High Court, and the onus that the same
documents would be required lay upon the pro
secutor's counsel.
(6) Originally,
the Taxing Master allowed on the
appeal a brief fee of 100 guineas and refreshers
of 25 guineas for two senior counsel with appro
priate fees for one junior counsel. This was sub
sequently increased to a brief fee of 125 guineas,
and refreshers of 40 guineas for senior counsel.
The fees, as marked by senior counsel, were 200
guineas on the brief, with refreshers of 75 guineas.
The total actual amount allowed by the Taxing
Master was thus 913 guineas. Held that the amount
allowed by the Taxing Master should not be dis
turbed, as it was impossible to be dogmatic in
respect of any particular fee which was discre
tionary.
(7)
It was held that the fee of 6 guineas allowed by
the Taxing Master to each Counsel for hearing
the judgment of the Supreme Court was reason
able. A fixed fee for hearing of a judgment, no
matter how long is of such long standing that its
retention should be favoured.
The State (Michael Browne) v. District Justice Feran
(No. 2)—Murnaghan J.—29th April, 1969—unreported.
Crime
The Court upheld the decision of a
trial judge in
admitting evidence by a detective put by the police in a
cell next to
those occupied by
the appellant and a
co-prisoner. Such direction should be exercised on a
consideration of the motive for the eavesdropping and
the substance of the conversation overheard.
Regina v. Stewart, Court of Appeal, 13/1/70.
A chairman of quarter sessions who announced a
sentence of six months eried when he altered it to seven
months in order to circumvent the provisions of section
39 of the Criminal Justice Act, 1967, which require that
a sentence of not more than six months should be
suspended.
Regina v. Corr, Court of Appeal, 15/1/70.
The Lord Chief Justice said in the Court of Appeal
that a quarter sessions court which substitutes a suspended
sentence of imprisonment on appeal should take into
consideration the time the appellant has spent in custody,
and in appropriate cases should adjust the length of the
suspended sentence.
Court of Appeal Eng. 19/1/70.
Where a sentence has been suspended and a further
offence has been committed during the period of the
suspension, the fact that the further offence is of a dif
ferent character from the original offence is no ground
for net bringing the suspended sentence into effect.
Regina v. Saunders, Court of Appeal, 16/2/70.
Two offences can constitute a " series'' within the
Indictments Act, 1915, Schedule i, rule 3, and "nexus"
is a feature of similarity which, in all the circumstances
of the case, enables the offence to be described as a
series, their Lordships decided when unanimously dis
missing
an
appeal
by Edward Loftus, who
had
been convicted on two counts which had been tried
together. He was convicted at the Central Criminal Court
of attempted larceny at a public house in Acton, on
August 20, 1968, and of robbery with violence at another
public house in the same area on September 5 that year,
for which he was sentenced to six months and a con
secutive 18 months.
Ludlow v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner, House of
Lords, 12/2/70.
Damages
Although by English law no damages can be awarded
for the grief or sorrow caused by another's death, or for
a mother's worry about her children, or her difficulty in
adjusting herself to a new way of life after her husband's
death, damages are recoverable for the medical effects, the
nervous shock, of seeing his death.
Hinz v. Berry, Court of Appeal, 15/1/70.
The House of Lords, affirming an award of over
£54,000 damages under the Fatal Accidents Acts, laid
down the lines on which such damages should be assessed.
Their Lordships decided that an award of damages for a
widow's loss of dependency should be increased to take
account of her income tax factor, and expressed differing
views on the relevance of inflation. Lord Pearson said
that the price of an annuity was not the correct measure
of the sum a widow should receive as damages. They
also considered that the orthodox approach of judges to
the assessment of damages was correct if it resulted in
very high awards.
Taylor v. O'Connor, House of Lords, 21/1/70.
Defamation
A scientific paper published in the British
Medical
Journal
which was critical of a
technique for dental
anaesthesia
introduced, used and recommended by a
named dental surgeon was held by a majority of the
Court to be capable of bearing a meaning defamatory
of the surgeon in the way of his profession and that it
should not therefore be struck out
in limine
as disclosing
no reasonable cause of action.
Lord Denning, in a dissenting judgment, expressed
fears that such a decision might deter scientists from
publishing the results of their research, but his fears
were thought by Sir Gordon Willmer to be unfounded.
Drummond Jackscn v. British Medical Association and
Others, Court of Appeal, 13/2/70.
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