390 / 736
Department of Agriculture
in 1964—Amnesia
theory
rejected and dismissed by Supreme Court. (O'Dalaigh
C. J., Haugh and Budd J. J.)
Falvey v. Feeley—Unreported—191x1 July, 1967.
Plaintiff fell down stairs with no handrail in public
house and was injured. Murnaghan J. withdrew the case
from jury on ground that anyone going down those stairs
must exercise reasonable care—Supreme Court ('ODalaigh
C. J., O'Keeffe and Walsh J.) reversed Murnaghan J. and
ordered a re-trial on grounds:—
(1) That the question whether danger was usual or-
unusual should be decided with reference to the know
ledge and experience of the class of persons to which the
invitee belonged. In the circumstances the case should not
have been withdrawn from jury, as invitee had never been
on premises before.
(2) When an invitee has knowledge of a danger, the
correct test for determining Invitor's liability is to ask
the question whether the invitee, exercising reasonable
care and knowledge, could adequately carry out the
activity upon which he was engaged, without exposing
himself to risk of injury. Unless the matter is beyond
doubt, the matter should be left to the jury to determine.
O'Donoghue v. Greene—(1967)—I.R. 40.
Defendant found negligent by jury before O'Keeffe
P. in Cork—damages £4,500—plaintiff employee injured
while cleaning covers in acid sulphur tanks—plaintiff
labourer had to remove acid from acid pits—No detailed
instructions—plaintiff furnished with clothing, but had
never done this before—right leg slipped, went down into
acid pit, burnt by acid—Supreme Court (O'Dalaigh C. J.
Walsh and Fitzgerald J. J.) held that President should
have admitted evidence of supervisor as to usual way of
doing job—on injuries question, exensive amputation of
leg necessary—jury's award too much—Supreme Court
on request awards £2,000.
Luttrell v. Gouldings Fertiliser's Cork. Unreported, 2oth
March 1969.
Practice
Extension of time
for trial
by jury granted
It was held by a majority of
the Supreme Court
(O'Dalaigh C. J. and Walsh J., Fitzgerald J. dissenting)
that, although the plenary summons of an action in
respect of a cross roads collision sustained in May 1961
had only been issued in May 1964, and there had been
considerable delay in taking the other steps necessary to
bring the action to fruition, nevertheless the plaintiff
should be entitled to an extension of time from the four
days allowed by the Rules to have defendant's notice of
trial of the action by a judge without a jury served on
5th December 1968 changed to a notice of trial of the
action by a judge with a jury. Henchy J. and on appeal
Fitzgerald J. held that, as the plaintiff's solicitor had been
so dilatory in pursuing the case, the plaintiff had for
feited all his rights. Appeal allowed.
(Cox v. Massey — Supreme Court — Unreported — 7th
March 1969).
A veterinary surgeon directed an assistant of his, in
connection with
the Scheme for Vaccination against
Brucellosis to vaccinate cattle in certain specified farms in
Co. Kilkenny. The scheme Drovided that the calves to be
vaccinated were to be at least 3 months old, and not
more than 6 months old, and that they were to be
vaccinated once only.The Minister was to pay prescribed
fees to the veterinary surgeons who performed the work,
provided a prescribed entry was inserted for each vac
cination on a blue card. The scheme called for regular
accuiate, hling work and it was notorious that many
professional people weie bad at this. In a number of
cases, the assistant vaccinated the calves at the request of
the herd owner without checking whether the animal had
already been vaccinated. These were stated subsequently
by the Minister to numoer 81. The assistant did not check
the age of the calves, and in many cases did not get the
owners to sign the prescribed i'orm, which were subse
quently forged by the assistant.
The principal was subsequently charged before the
Veterinary Council with being guilty of conduct dis
graceful in a professional respect;—
1. In that he claimed iees irom the Department under
the scheme in respect 01 calves which had previously
been vaccinated.
2. In that he claimed fees from the Department in
respect of calves that were over age.
3. In hat he failed to supervise his assistant edequately.
4. In that he failed to keep proper records of calves
vaccinated.
The assistant was similarly charged in respect of (i)
and (2) above and 13) tnat he failed to take reasonable
steps to ensure that he did not contravene the Scheme.
The Council set up a special committee of its members
to consider the matter, and this committee acted with
care and objectivity. Counsel for the veterinary surgeons
did not give this committee any assistance by referring to
reported cases on the meaning of " conduct disgraceful
to him in a professional respect ". The committee duly
found that the charges against
the principal and the
assistant had been well proved and ordered that they be
suspended horn practice for six months; this was duly
endorsed by the Council in November 1968. The appli
cants duly
appealed
to
the High Couit under
the
Veterinary Surgeons Act 1931 to have this decision of
the Council cancelled.
Held by Kenny J. that, having studied the documents
and heard the evidence, he was convinced the Council
had reached a correct decision.
But Kenny J. having been satisfied that the principal
and his assistant had not acted fraudulently or dishonestly,
but merely recklessly and negligently
in vaccinating
these calves ordered that the decision of the Council be
cancelled. The word " disgraceful" brings in an element
of conscious wrongdoing. The conduct, being in a pro
fessional respect, must relate to something which he does
when carrying on his profession. This meaning, as elabo
rated in
Allison v. General Medical Council
(1894)
II
Q.B. and in Felix v. General Dental Council
(1960)
A.C.
was fully considered. There was no element of moral tur
pitude, or fraud but only foolish delay in filling up forms.
No costs were awarded as it was the duty of the lawyers
of the applicants to make sure that the Tribunal knew
the rules they had to apply and to explain fully the
meaning of the term " disgraceful ".
Re Veterinary Surgeons Acts 1931 to 1960.
Kenny J.—3oth January, 1970—unreported.
Tax Law
For tax purposes the valuation of stock-in-trade at the
end of an accounting period at " cost or market value,
whichever
is
the lower" means,
in the retail trade,
valuation at the price fairly to be expected as the retail
price of the stock in due course.
B. S. C. Footwer Ltd. v. Ridgway (Inspector of Taxes).
Court of Appeal, 23 '1/70.
Profits on realization of investments representing funds
104