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ney-General 1965

I.R.

294

—The "flouridation

case.") Undoubtedly there is a personal right to

know whether one is committing a criminal offence

in engaging in conduct or speech.

In the United States the Federal Courts are

familiar with the concept of "vagueness" as a

ground for finding legislation unconstitutional be

cause it violates the guarantee that "no person

shall be ... deprived of his life, liberty or pro

perty without due process of law" under the 5th

and 14th amendments of the Constitution.

In

Schenck v. United States (1919) 249 U.S. Mr.

Justice Holmes laid down the test in relation to

offences of advocating criminal conduct — (in

this case the publishing of a manifesto denouncing

conscription) — by saying: "The question in every

case is whether the words are used in such cir

cumstances and are of such a nature as to create

a

clear and present danger

that they will bring

about the substantive evils that Congress has a

right to prevent."

Danger lacking

This "clear and present danger" element is

totally lacking in the definition of the criminal

offence under section 4. It is not necessary for con

viction that the advocating and encouraging should

have been effective, or even persuasive. The prose

cution do not have to show that anyone listened,

or that anyone read the article or words, if the

encouragement was in written form. No American

court would be likely to condone such vague ter

minology. Irish judges look to American cases as

persuasive on Constitutional issues, and it is reas

onable to suppose they would apply similar prin

ciples.

In a recent American case, Yates v U.S. (1957)

354 U.S. 298 the Supreme Court quashed a con

viction of 14 people on a charge of conspiracy "to

advocate and teach the duty and necessity of over

throwing the Government of the United States by

force and violence," contrary to the Smith Act

1940, by their activities in the Communist Party.

One of the grounds for quashing the conviction

was because the lower court failed to distinguish

between "advocacy by forcible overthrow as an

abstract doctrine and advocacy of action to that

end," because passive advocacy could never be

sufficient.

But the Irish Bill uses the word "encourages"

as well as "advocates" and there is no requirement

of proof of the effect which this encouragement

might have on persons to forcibly enter or re

main on property belonging to another. It may

be noted that the American case involved the

much more serious offence of advocating the over

throw of the Government by unlawful violence,

and yet the courts were concerned to protect the

individual from the possibility of having freedom

of speech curtailed to such an extent that there

could be a conviction for advocacy of an abstract

doctrine which

could

influence others to action.

These cases show the concern of the American

judges to protect freedom of speech and personal

liberty. Our courts share a similar tradition, and

faced with this situation the judges would undoubt

edly look to American practice for guidance on

the underlying principles. The wording of section

4 of the Irish Bill is much more vague than its

American counterparts. There is no reason to

believe the Irish court would be less vigilant in

finding such phraseology unconstitutional.

The

matter should be remedied

before

the Bill becomes

law.

I have confined my argument in this article to

an attack on the constitutionality of Section 4 of

the Bill.

If it comes before the Senate I shall

oppose the other sections of the Bill on legal

and social grounds, but these are not relevant to

my present thesis. I call on the Government to

seek legal advice on the constitutionality of Sec-

titon 4. I call on lawyers in this country to be

vigilant in safeguarding our personal rights against

such possible encroachment.

(The Irish Times, 6

February 1971)

PROFIT AND PROTEST

by John Temple Lang, M.A., LL.B.,

Solicitor.

John Temple Lang considers that the Bill would

serve property speculators at

the expense of

protest against injustice.

The

legal case for the new Prohibition of

Forcible Entry and Occupation Bill is nothing like

as strong as its supporters try to make out. The

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